THE Public Interest

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Stephen White

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The New Industrial State
Robert M. Solow • *John Kenneth Galbraith*

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COMMENT

After The Riots

OTIS DUDLEY DUNCAN

THE echoes of the shooting in Newark and Detroit had hardly died down before the second-guessers and soothsayers began to have their say. Mine took the form of a letter to a government official. His request for an expression of views conveyed a tone of urgency, but I doubt that this tone will be sustained. Without assuming it will make any difference whatever, I should like to submit to a wider audience the thoughts that were crystallized in a brief moment.

* * *

July 27, 1967

Dear .....:

You asked me for any suggestions I might have concerning the bearing of social research on the crisis in race relations that the nation is confronting as manifest in the current unrest in our major cities.

My contribution to this question, such as it is, has to do with patterns of urban residential distribution, or segregation. We now refer to this as the problem of the "Ghetto." My work is but one item in a long series of distinguished studies beginning no later than W. E. B. DuBois's *The Philadelphia Negro* (1899). As the decades have passed we have learned to measure more and more precisely, and to document ever more conclusively, a fact that is plain to ordinary observation: to wit, that Negroes in northern cities (and to an increasing extent also in the South) are confined in their selection of residences to highly constricted areas, usually densely populated and almost always containing a housing inventory of substandard quality, amenity, and occupancy characteristics. Historical documentation is available in Chicago Commission on Race Relations, *The Negro in Chicago* (1922); T. J. Woofter, Jr., *Negro Problems in Cities* (1928); E. Franklin Frazier, *The Negro Family in Chicago* (1932); St. Clair Drake and H. R. Cayton, *Black Metropolis* (1945); Robert C. Weaver, *The Negro Ghetto* (1948); my own monograph with

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Beverly Duncan, *The Negro Population of Chicago* (1957); Commission on Race and Housing, *Where Shall We Live?* (1958); and K. E. Taeuber and A. F. Taeuber, *Negroes in Cities* (1965) – to conclude a list that could easily be extended for several pages.

It could be claimed, with reason, that social scientists have been tireless in bringing the facts of segregation and the undesirable concomitants of segregation to light. If it were a time for recrimination, they might even complain that at all levels of government, and at all stages of policy formulation and implementation, a deaf ear has been turned to their attempts to inject the information about segregation into the relevant systems of decision-making. The Congress, as you know, has been dragging its heels on "Open Occupancy" legislation. The Executive branch has moved more slowly here – both in terms of general policy statements and in regard to such specific programs as public housing and urban renewal – than in almost any other area opened up by the Civil Rights movement. Indeed, that movement itself has rarely focused directly upon residential segregation as a basic limitation on human freedom, but has chosen instead to attack one of its symptoms, the so-called "de facto" segregation of the public schools.

It would appear that we have reached a turning point in that "the Ghetto" is now receiving the blame for the civil disorder that is bringing so much grief and suffering in its wake. But I have the impression that we still have not screwed up our courage to the point of enunciating the policy that *the Ghetto must go.* I would sharply distinguish that policy, as a long-range national and urban goal, from one that focuses on the immediate objective of making the Ghetto a more tolerable place to live.

What is intolerable about the Ghetto is not merely that housing *is old, over-crowded, and vermin-infested – although these things* are true, and could be remedied if there were a will to do so. What is intolerable is that there is a Ghetto at all, except as it might arise from the process of people making unfettered choices as to where they will live. As long as it is known that everyone who is black must live only in certain quarters and must stay away from others, then everyone who lives there – whether or not he would choose to move, given the choice – must day by day and minute by minute experience the restriction and humiliation that this abridgement of freedom implies.

We now know, absolutely for certain, that the Ghetto is *not* the outcome of a market process in which some sectors of the population merely have less money to spend for housing than others, but spend it where they choose. If people were distributed over the urban landscape in proportion to their income levels, the degree of segregation would be no more (conservatively) than one-quarter as great as it now is and probably (realistically) no more than one-tenth as great.

As I have reviewed them thus far, the facts about segregation established by social research are the following: (1) segregation of

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Negroes reaches a very high degree in *all* American cities of any substantial size and with any substantial number of Negro inhabitants; (2) the degree of segregation has *not* been diminishing perceptibly over time, but if anything has been on the increase – contrary to the case with immigrant groups earlier in this century, where the degree of isolation of ethnic colonies lessened more or less continuously with the progress of socio-economic assimilation; (3) segregation of Negroes is not in any substantial way attributable to Negro-white economic differences, nor is it reasonable to assume that it represents a voluntary choice on the part of all Negroes.

Of recent months, there has been much discussion of the consequences of segregation, especially revolving around the report on *Equality of Educational Opportunity*. That report was noteworthy in attempting to show, systematically, that segregation is a basic cause of the ineffectual way in which many members of minority groups attack the problem of preparing themselves intellectually for life in a complex and demanding society. It appeared from the tabulations of the report that the few Negroes having the opportunity to attend nonsegregated schools performed better, on conventional academic tests, than did the preponderant majority securing their schooling in the situation of de facto segregation. This particular report is vulnerable on many counts, and I have myself resisted its citation as an authority for the proposition that integrated schooling, per se, improves the academic performance of the Negro child. There are too many other special circumstances associated with the few instances of such integration we can now observe for us to be sure that integration is itself the effective cause. Yet the report has raised the issue that must be faced both in social science and public policy. Since it has created the presumption that school segregation is a basic cause of retardation of learning, we must devise more probing studies to test this hypothesis. In terms of policy, there must be a means of creating experimentally the conditions that permit a crucial test. To put it bluntly, the only way to find out whether integrating schools will upgrade performance is to try it and see!

Similarly, we must have research that will pinpoint the effects of segregation – if they are demonstrable – on access to job opportunities, to civic amenities, and the like, and ultimately on the very personal circumstances of people's lives as reflected in the structure and behavior patterns of the family. My personal opinion is that the well-known "pathologies" of the Negro family trace back – as much as to any one source – to the brute fact of segregation. I cannot prove this proposition, and it is not even easy to say what would constitute adequate proof. Yet the problem is one that surely must be placed high on the priority list of research.

The reason for assuming the proposition to be true is simply that involuntary residential segregation implies a lack of control of the circumstances of family living on the part of the family head. If the head of the family cannot control where and how the family will live,

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it is a bit much to expect him to control the tendencies of his own children to indulge in socially undesirable behavior. What – such a person may well ask himself – is the point of making great effort to insure the desirable kinds of achievement on the part of his offspring, when the fruits of such achievement for the child will merely be an injunction to return to the situation that now exists?

If we may indulge in the luxury of philosophical generalization, I would point out that movement and freedom of movement is a very condition of life for any class of organism. Barriers to movement amount to a crippling restriction on the opportunities of life. Surely in American society we have endorsed this proposition wholeheartedly by universalizing the automobile, by insisting that no State shall erect legal barriers to migration, by individually taking up bed and board for removal to new quarters at the rate of 20 percent of the population per annum.

In the end, therefore, the Ghetto must go, not because it is unpleasant to live there, nor because its children score poorly on school examinations, or for any other immediate, instrumental reason. It must go because the restriction of the ability to move as one chooses is an abridgement of a human right and an affront to human dignity. We cannot expect people to behave responsibly and to comport themselves in a dignified way if we tell them, in effect, every hour of the waking day, that they cannot have responsibility for where they are to reside.

I HAVE, of course, limited myself to one aspect of the total problem you are considering, and must assume that views on this aspect will be complemented by statements on the many others that must be considered. At the risk of one-sidedness, however, let me indicate what I consider to be the top priority item for each of several kinds of participants in defining the national purpose with respect to our largest minority:

(1) In the Executive branch of all levels of government, there should be enunciated a clear statement of the long-range goal of making it possible, as a matter of right, for anyone to live anywhere that his means permit, without fear of overt retaliation for the exercise of this right or of experiencing covert subversions of it.

(2) In the Legislative branch, it should be written into law that none shall wittingly, directly or indirectly, abridge this right; and that public resources, financial and organizational, shall be provided to those who need help in taking the first steps to exercise the freedom to move.

(3) In the Administrative echelons of all agencies, it should be a guideline of all policies that none of the routines of law enforcement, public assistance, distribution of public investments, or whatever shall be predicated on the indefinite continuation of a pattern of segregated living. While, in the short run, much effort must go into the amelioration of the conditions of life in the Ghetto, no program

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should be approved that in effect fastens the present population of the Ghetto to their present locations.

(4) In the scientific and intellectual community, we must redouble our effort to trace out the ramifications and consequences of the limitation on the freedom to move with respect to such items (among others) as family structure, organizational effectiveness, opportunities for personal development and fulfilment, and achievement of economic security. The impact of such research can, of course, only be felt over the long run. From a purely intellectual standpoint, I should like to think that we will in the future be in a position to observe and record systematically the effects of the disappearance of involuntary segregation on the standards of life in a minority in process of assimilation. In the short run, social research has already supplied as much intellectual justification as can possibly be needed for a new direction and emphasis in American policy.

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Carnegie, Ford, and Public Television

STEPHEN WHITE

Before the end of 1968, the 90th Congress will in all probability have brought into being a noncommercial television service intended for the general public. The necessary legislation is expected to pass in two stages, with the structure of a Corporation for Public Broadcasting being established during the first session and long-term financing during the second. The United States will thus be in a position to enjoy, after nearly half a century of broadcasting, what most countries have had since the very beginning: a broadly conceived, well-endowed television service which is not financed by the sale of advertising.

The consequences are not yet calculable. However carefully the structure of the new service is designed, and however lavishly it may be supported, in the end it is nothing but a device to produce pictures and sounds in the living room. It is the kinds of pictures and kinds of sounds that will be consequential. The new system will be the direct descendant of the educational television system that now exists; and if it has no more impact than that system, it will leave matters substantially unchanged. On the other hand, if it becomes a highly professional, well-directed medium of news and cultural programming geared toward some kind of an elite, it will no doubt perform a major service – but it will leave commercial television still dominant and pretty much unchanged (or changed for the worse, as commercial

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television gives up once and for all upon this segment of its public). If, finally, Public Television enters into any kind of competition with commercial television, and begins to attract any measurable share of the general audience, we may well find ourselves entering a new era in mass communications. Any one of these three outcomes is possible; the legislation can serve any of them.

What can be said without equivocation is that with the new legislation, the potential for change will have been provided. American television need no longer be monolithic. It will at least be possible that other voices will be heard, of their own right and not merely upon the sufferance of the soap, drug, and cigarette manufacturers.

The Carnegie Commission

Only an unusually bold prophet could have suggested, as recently as 1965, that Congress would soon be persuaded to take action so pregnant with the opportunity for drastic change. True, there had been grumblings about commercial television from the moment it supplanted radio as the primary mass medium. There had been public statements, too, such as Newton Minow's memorable castigation of the "vast wasteland." But these, in effect, amounted to appeals to the conscience of commercial television, and the assumption was that change could be effected only by acts of persuasion directed toward the networks. Commercial television, with a good thing in its possession, sailed its own course.

The road that led to Congressional action was pioneered without foresight or conscious intention. It was opened in late 1964 by Ralph Lowell, trustee of the Lowell Institute and prime mover at WGBH, the educational television station in Boston. Mr. Lowell, at a meeting in Washington called by the National Association of Educational Broadcasters, proposed that a Presidential Commission be established to study the financing of educational television. What he had in mind was straightforward enough: ETV was so thoroughly poverty-stricken that its very survival was in question. Mr. Lowell hoped to begin a process that would lead to direct infusions of federal aid.

The notion of a Presidential Commission did not long survive. The President himself owns a most profitable television station in Austin, Texas, and was quite properly reluctant to assume responsibility for a study that bore upon television. Instead John Gardner, at the time president of the Carnegie Corporation of New York, accepted the role the White House could not play, and established the Carnegie Commission on Educational Television, wholly financed by Carnegie (the bill in the end was more than half a million dollars) and operated directly by the foundation. Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., chairman of the corporation at the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-

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nology, consented to serve as chairman of the Commission, and went on to devote to it more than 18 months of intensive and skillful direction. The White House, having formally established its disassociation, went on to maintain a close and continuing interest in the work of the Commission.

Even before the Commission came into being, a significant modification had been made in Mr. Lowell's proposal. Educational stations are predominantly operated by educational institutions of one kind or another. In large cities, however, nonprofit corporations have come into being to run educational stations; and these community stations, although they number only about one-fourth the total, have been in general the strongest and the most nearly lively ("most lively" would be too much to say). They have the best channel allocations, the largest audiences, and in the context of educational television the widest ambitions. Carnegie decided to concentrate its efforts on the community stations, and decided further to study the manner in which those stations operated as well as their balance sheets. It thus directed its Commission away from mere cost-accounting into matters which involved aims, values, and manner of performance of noncommercial television.

The Commission itself took that decision a significant step forward at one of its early meetings. It decided to limit itself to that part of non-commercial television which was directed toward the prime-time home audience. It left to another time, another place and above all another Commission the task of dealing with instructional television and the use of television in the classroom. This move transformed the role of the Commission. The Carnegie Commission moved into the big leagues. It was now preparing to deal with matters of great public interest and importance – much greater than anyone had anticipated at the outset.

Enter Ford

During the period when both the Carnegie Corporation and Mr. Killian were defining the study, Carnegie was in close touch with the Ford Foundation. Ford, after all, was the patron saint of noncommercial television, which had come into being largely because of Ford, had been kept in existence simply because Ford repeatedly pumped money into the system, and owed all its ambitious programming – little as it was – to National Educational Television, a creation of the Ford Foundation. It seemed to Carnegie that the good will of Ford was essential. That good will was formally expressed by Henry Heald, President of the Ford Foundation, although his privately expressed views on Carnegie's initiative were by no means amiable. Still, the study could not appropriately be carried out by Ford, for there it would take on the shape of a self-examination and

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would inevitably be suspect. In any case, in a certain sense Ford's approval had been sought and granted, and Carnegie had every reason to believe that it was free to proceed and that Ford would stand aside while its study was in process.

Mr. Heald's expression of benevolent disinterest, however, quickly became irrelevant. He was succeeded at Ford by McGeorge Bundy, who had no reason to feel bound by earlier conversations, who had a profound respect for the power of mass communication, and who felt strongly that television was an area in which Ford should continue to be a major factor. Mr. Bundy was not the kind of man who would willingly remain passive while the Carnegie Commission deliberated.

Coincidentally, a palace revolution at the Columbia Broadcasting System set free Fred Friendly, president of CBS News. Mr. Friendly is a skillful television journalist, with a most enviable record in the production of news and documentaries; he is, moreover, a man of great charm and persuasiveness. For reasons peculiar to the television industry and Mr. Friendly's place in it, nothing in commercial television appeared particularly attractive to him. Ford beckoned; Mr. Bundy and Mr. Friendly clasped hands, and Ford was back in business. Nor was there to be any secret about it, for neither of the two men is shy and retiring.

Some months earlier, before the Commission was formed, Mr. Friendly – then at CBS – had commented that the problems of noncommercial television could be summed up in a few words: "A dollar an hour a mile." These are, approximately, the charges made by A. T. & T. for use of coaxial cable – charges which had more than once inhibited or oppressed Mr. Friendly when a big news story was in the making. He felt those charges to be unreasonable, and to be moreover the principal barrier to more flexible – and hence better – television, whether commercial or noncommercial. At the time, Mr. Friendly's preoccupation with line charges appeared to be merely a personal peculiarity; they quickly took on significance when he moved the focus of his attention and his own vast energy to the Ford Foundation.

With Mr. Bundy in command and Mr. Friendly at his side, it was apparent that Ford would decide, as had the Carnegie Commission only a few weeks earlier, to concentrate its efforts upon prime-time home television. Thus, both foundations had now determined to move in a direction that was quite new to Carnegie, and that had been at Ford usually subordinate to the uses of television in formal education (though Ford had in fact already been shifting its emphasis before Mr. Bundy appeared). For the time being, both foundations were abandoning television as an educational instrument in favor of television as a social instrument.

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What is "Public Television?"

At a latter date, the Carnegie Commission adopted the name "Public Television" for the subject-matter of its considerations, and Ford immediately followed suit. The phrase has since become generally accepted. It might be well to specify more closely what it means: Public Television is noncommercial, nonprofit television, directed in principle to all set owners (although it is generally conceded that any individual program may be directed to some segment of that all-inclusive audience). To that extent, there is general agreement between Carnegie and Ford, and the phrase "Public Television" is also commonly so understood both by those who favor and those who oppose it. There is no such agreement, however, on how a Public Television system might be organized. Above all, there is no agreement concerning the kind of television programs such a system should provide. As we shall see, Carnegie and Ford have adopted diametrically opposed positions in respect to organization and programming.

From the outset, it should have been clear to anyone who thought steadily about the matter that the adoption of the name "Public Television," and the decision to concentrate attention upon Public Television, were inferentially sharply critical of commercial television. Both Ford and Carnegie were implying that there were services of which television was capable, and to which the general public was entitled, but which were not being provided by commercial television. Among those who participated in the Carnegie and Ford endeavors, there could be no substantial differences of opinion on this point. Differences did appear, however, in the conclusions that were deduced. It could be held, and is held by some, that this is a natural and even a praiseworthy state of affairs: that commercial television has its own tasks to perform, in most respects performs those tasks well, and is in no way obliged to render any but the services it chooses to render. This could be read as a powerful argument for establishing some kind of Public Television. But there are also those who believe that commercial television, whether it likes it or not, should be required to provide a full range of television services, and that to create a Public Television service would simply relieve commercial television of its own deepest obligations, and impose a charge upon the public in doing so. There is also a kind of intermediate position, whose proponents hold that commercial television should indeed do a great deal more than it does, but is not going to do so, and that consequently a Public Television system should be erected under conditions that oblige commercial television to support it out of commercial television's own ill-gotten gains. Nor does this exhaust the possibilities, for there is also pay-television to be considered, or variants on the existing commercial system, or still

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others that fecund minds can provide for future contemplation.

None of those considerations is to be found in the Report of the Carnegie Commission, and they are treated only tangentially in the various Ford documents. Instead, practical men came to the practical conclusion that there was little point in seeking a direct confrontation with commercial television. This strongly entrenched industry, with no shortage of friends in high places, was not going to change radically of its own volition, and there has never been any reason to believe that either Congress or the Federal Communications Commission is disposed to direct it to reform itself radically. Under such circumstances, to inflame the commercial television interests and to array them in opposition would be the worst conceivable tactic for any group which intended to add to the utility of a television set. For the Carnegie Commission there was the further complication that three commissioners representing commercial television would be called upon to sign the final report. Thus, in the end, both foundations produced documents which are inferentially highly critical of commercial television, and yet at the same time resolutely bland.

An idea is orbited

While the Carnegie Commission, during the first six months of its existence, went about its business quietly and behind closed doors, Ford found itself confronted with an immediate opportunity. Mr. Friendly's preoccupation with line charges had engendered an ingenious notion. Ford was developing a scheme which would free television of A. T. & T. line charges, by replacing coaxial cables with a communications satellite. That satellite would provide interconnection and other services to commercial television, for a fee, and the same services to Public Television for no charge at all. What is more, the profits of the satellite broadcasting corporation would be turned over to Public Television and used for its support. The notion was in many respects an attractive one. For those who believed that a major deficiency of noncommercial television was its poverty, it provided funds. For those who believed that the principal need of noncommercial television was the kind of electronic interconnection that would make of it a network after the pattern of NBC and CBS, it provided the means for such an interconnection. For those hostile to commercial television, it provided a means – indirect but none the less real – of forcing commercial television to pay the costs of Public Television. Finally, it fed the familiar American faith that the solution to most problems lies in gadgets.

In order to pursue this plan, it was necessary to straighten out the entanglements into which communications satellites had fallen. Congress had awarded to COMSAT exclusive operating rights to satellites operated for international communications, but the locus

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of such rights for domestic operations had not been determined. Such rights might be awarded to COMSAT, or to a new common carrier incorporated for the purpose, or to new or existing corporate entities which would not act as common carriers but would use specific satellites for specific purposes. The Ford scheme was reliant upon a decision favoring the last of these three lines of action, and hence the Ford Foundation was an interested party to an inquiry into the matter being held by the FCC. Briefs were requested by the FCC on August 1, 1966, and Ford hastened to file.

The effects of the Ford filing were prodigious. The Ford proposal was radical, sensational, and different, and it caught both the public fancy and the public attention. This public response was not long in making itself heard, and it revealed a widespread discontent with commercial television and a broad body of belief that something should be done to provide a kind of television which was lacking and for which a real general need was felt. Where earlier the Carnegie Commission may have wondered, in its quiet moments, whether there was any substantial demand for what it was seeking to build, and whether any forceful public support for its proposals could ever be generated, the Ford intervention made it clear once and for all that those concerns need no longer occupy its attention. The desirability and the propriety of Public Television were no longer an issue.

But at the same time Ford's new idea represented a kind of declaration of war between it and Carnegie. Undeclared war, for on both sides all parties strenuously denied that hostilities had been opened. Mr. Bundy and Dr. Killian tendered and accepted invitations to one another's deliberations at propitious moments, and missed no public occasion to express warm respect for one another. Nonetheless, at Ford there was a general sense of elation that the initiative had been recaptured by it; among friends of the Carnegie Commission, a strong feeling that the Commission had been "betrayed" by Ford, and that its own attempts to provide a thoughtful, reasoned study of Public Television had been nullified by Mr. Bundy and Mr. Friendly, shooting from the hip.

Both reactions were reasonable. Ford had indeed recaptured the initiative. But in doing so, it had defined Public Television in a fashion that prejudged many of the issues with which the Carnegie Commission was grappling. To buttress a brief that dealt fundamentally with technical issues, Ford was obliged to describe the brave new world of television which the receipts from a privately-managed satellite would sustain, and Ford's brave new world differed in many respects from the Public Television that the Carnegie Commission was laboriously whipping into shape. The precise nature of those differences will be considered below; for the moment it is enough to say that they are real, and friends of the Carnegie

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Commission were painfully aware of them; painfully aware, too, that by the time a dissenting Carnegie report was laid before the public, the Ford Foundation might have fixed forever in the public mind the shape of Public Television.

In addition, the Ford filing had inextricably intermingled the notion of Public Television and the notion of a communication satellite. Their only link was the link forged by Ford when it proposed that the costs of one be sustained by the receipts from the other. That link was a tenuous one, for the first hard look at the Ford proposal made it clear that receipts from a satellite could never, under the best of circumstances, pay more than a small part of the full cost of a Public Television system. Nonetheless, an association had been established, and it remains, despite the fact that the arguments for a Public Television system, whether they are persuasive or not, are unaltered by the existence or nonexistence of a communications satellite, and would be the same if no satellite had ever gone into orbit.

A new network or local control?

During the months that elapsed until the Carnegie Commission filed its report, Ford continued to press, privately and publicly, for its own design. The Report of the Carnegie Commission was issued late in January, 1967. It was well received, by press and public, and almost invariably linked with the Ford proposal. Mr. Bundy hailed it as complementing and supplementing the work of his own organization– putting the fine finish, as it were, upon what Ford had already accomplished. Dr. Killian had equally kind words to say of Ford.

Yet in its two most important aspects, the Carnegie Report is so fundamentally opposed to the Ford proposal that there can be, in fact, no meeting between the two. Both Ford and Carnegie speak of a Public Television system, and consistently do so in terms that make it appear they are speaking of the same thing. Instead, the two plans have little in common but the name.

To begin with, the Carnegie design is persistently erected on the base of the local station. It anticipates complete local control of program scheduling, substantial local production, and a broad reliance on local talent. It explicitly opposes the concept of a fourth network. It enthusiastically supports electronic interconnection among the stations, but looks upon it as a distribution device, which will give every station access to programs produced anywhere within the system, without prescribing for any station the manner in which those programs are to be used – the station is in fact freer not to use a program than to use it, since it will have access to far more programs than it can possibly air.

What underlies that design is the belief that a fourth network would fail to serve needs that are not now being met by commercial

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television. Any system structured as commercial television is structured will ultimately obey the same imperatives as commercial television: maximization of audience, centralization of decision, and the appeal to a least common denominator. It may be a higher least-common-denominator than that served by commercial television, but there is no guarantee that it would be high enough to serve any real public needs. Put somewhat more broadly, a fourth network would encourage the same kind of uniformity that commercial television demands – uniformity that would perhaps exist at a slightly higher level, but a uniformity none the less. The Commission preferred to believe that against the constant and unremitting pressures that exist to make our society uniform, there should remain at least one area of diversity: that at least one station in Atlanta should have the opportunity to be something more than a faithful image of corresponding stations in Seattle, New York, Los Angeles, and Omaha.

The Ford design, in contrast, is firmly suspended from the satellite. It calls explicitly for a fourth network. Like CBS and NBC, the system would arrange for production of programs in a few locations, would then arrange nightly schedules, and would transmit those programs for use by affiliated stations. Again like commercial affiliates, the local stations would plug into the network at some early hour of the evening, and pull the plug again a few hours later.

That design, too, has its rationale. It is, to begin with, the only way that television now works. It is economical: each program receives maximum use. It responds to the acknowledged fact that great talents are to be found congregated only in a few cities, and that it is thus easier to create television of high gloss and finish in those cities.

But there are hidden assumptions in the Ford design. The most important is the assumption that there is no room in television for programs intermediate between the purely local and the purely national. Television talent, in whatever field, becomes divided into two categories: those with national appeal, and those with local appeal. This, of course, is the viewpoint of commercial television: the comedian who amuses a few million viewers must be denied access to the airwaves, which can utilize only the comedian who amuses tens of millions. It is true that the Ford proposal does take cognizance of local autonomy and local production; it fits them into the interstices of networking. The Carnegie proposal allows for high-gloss production and upon occasion for networking, but they are elements of the total system and are not the system itself. Basically, the two propsoals are completely antithetical.

Public TV and journalism

The second principal distinction is the Ford commitment to journalism and the Carnegie report's antijournalistic bias. The Ford

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proposal represents Mr. Friendly's earnest and sincere belief that the single central purpose of television is the dissemination of news and commentary of national interest and significance, and that everything else is secondary. It was essentially on the basis of this belief that Mr. Friendly entered into guerrilla warfare at CBS and was forced to resign. He holds this belief as an article of faith, and he can hardly be criticized if he does battle for it.

Thus, the network that Ford proposes is primarily a journalistic network; its proposal grows lyrical when it deals with the extent to which a well-supported, interconnected fourth network can provide news coverage of a depth, a breadth, and a substance that cannot now be found on television. For the rest, Ford speaks solemnly of great plays, great concerts, great art. But this, too, is a form of journalism as the Ford proposal deals with it. Essentially, Ford proposes to *reflect*, on the one hand, what happens in the world of politics, of social and military confrontation, and of castastrophe; on the other hand, it will also *reflect* what is happening in the theater, the opera house, the concert hall, the museum. In neither case does there enter any concept of creativeness. There is little notion that television, too, may be an art form, and that it need not be at its best when it presents on a twenty-one inch screen "Carmen" or the New York Philharmonic or "Hamlet."

The Carnegie report, on the other hand, implies that pure journalism, on the national scale, is more than adequately served over most of its range by commercial television and other news media, and that Public Television would be wasting its substance if it engaged in a hopeless attempt to enter into competition. There is, indeed, one member of the Commission who has commented that the American public is too well served with news – much of it fabricated to fill the time that commercial television devotes to it – and that part of the current American malaise can be attributed to a constant exposure to commotion and catastrophe without the concurrent means of coming to grips with any of it.

The Carnegie report identified the great journalistic need as a local need, for it is here that the commercial networks are least effective, the local newspaper less and less enterprising, and the national magazines by their nature inadequate. At this level, too, there is less temptation to sensationalize the news, for the local viewer is more likely to be in a position to check on the veracity of the newscaster. (Much national news is in fact local news sensationalized to the extent necessary to make it nationally titillating.) Thus the Carnegie Commission attempted to create means by which the local station would enjoy a greater capacity to produce local newscasts and local news commentary.

For the rest, the Carnegie proposal is epitomized in a few words

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with the epigraph by E. B. White which stands at the head of its report. Public Television should be, Mr. White wrote, "our Minsky's, our Camelot." In short, the commission intended to rid Public Television once and for all of the sober pedanticism and the dull virtue that characterized educational television. Public Television should rather set out frankly to entertain and to satisfy, in its own terms and on any level where there is an audience to serve. It should have television presentations of quality and distinction for the person who at other times will go to the theater to see Hamlet or to the concert hall to hear Carmen; it should also have television presentations of quality and distinction for the person who at other times will go to the cinema to see the Marx Brothers or to the theater to see "My Fair Lady."

The contrast between the two proposals is here cast in the starkest terms. The Ford proposal does speak of creativity, the Carnegie proposal of great Shakespearian productions. But the centers of gravity of the two proposals are as far apart as they can possibly be.

What flesh on the bones?

These principal differences between the two proposals have not yet been resolved, nor is there any formal attempt to resolve them. The Corporation for Public Broadcasting which is being considered by Congress, and which no doubt will in time be erected and put into operation, can move in either direction, or indeed in almost any direction at all. Congress is dealing only with the bare bones of Public Television; the flesh will be put on them by the men and women who become the Corporation and who set about creating and directing the system.

The Ford Foundation has moved ahead with its own design. Mr. Bundy has established the Public Television Laboratory, and staffed it with professionals of high skill and talent. They are now preparing to launch a two-hour television program each Sunday evening (or perhaps alternate Sundays) to consist primarily of pure journalism and secondarily of what might be called derivative journalism, and to be fed to a network of noncommercial stations. This is the course of action indicated by the Ford proposal, and they are being consistent in pressing ahead with it.

The Carnegie Commission dissolved with the issuance of its report. A Citizens Committee for Public Television was created, some five months later, but it has been inactive so far. In any case, there is no reason to believe that the Citizens Committee will adopt the viewpoint of the Carnegie Commission; indeed, it would be surprising if it should do so, for that committee itself has been bathed in the atmosphere of the Ford proposal, its executive secretary comes out of the Ford-Friendly shop, and it will find that its ground, too, has

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in part been pre-empted by the energetic Ford Foundation.

It would be salutary if broad public consideration could be given to the differences between the two proposals. That has not been done, in part because there has been no general recognition that they do indeed differ. It may be that my own bias – which I have taken no pains to disguise – is mistaken, and that the fourth network, dominated by journalism, is indeed the most desirable shape a Public Television system could assume. But there is surely some possibility that the position taken by the Carnegie Commission, once it is fully understood, is closer to American needs and American desires.

In the absence of further consideration, it is clear that the Ford position will prevail, if only because the Ford Foundation is pressing for it actively and with substantial resources. The likely outcome is that the Corporation for Public Television will be formed, that Ford's Public Television Laboratory will dominate its program production, and that it will fall into a simple fourth network operation. Let it at least be clear that, if this happens, or if anything much like it happens, the intentions of the Carnegie Commission will have been largely ignored. What is more important, American television will have survived its crisis and will continue into the future essentially unaltered, if perhaps somewhat improved.

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Toward open schools

JAMES S. COLEMAN

Since the publication, in July, 1966, of the Office of Education's report to Congress and the President on "Equality of Educational Oportunity," there has been much speculation and discussion concerning the policy implications of the report. The report itself, which focused principally on inequalities experienced by Negroes and other racial and ethnic minorities, contained only research results, not policy recommendations. Indeed, if recommendations had been requested, they could hardly have been given – for the facts themselves point to no obvious solution.

In some part, the difficulties and complexity of any solution derive from the premise that our society is committed to overcoming, not merely inequalities in the distribution of educational *resources* (classrooms, teachers, libraries, etc.), but inequalities in the oppor-

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The office of Education report on "Equality of Educational Opportunity," popularly known as "the Coleman Report," has received extraordinary publicity; its findings on the school experiences of Negro children have been intensively studied and widely debated. Mr. Coleman wrote a first summary of his findings in THE PUBLIC INTEREST, *No. 4, Summer 1966. Here he returns to discuss some of the implications of the report and of its reception.* – Eds.

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tunity for educational *achievement*. This is a task far more ambitious than has even been attempted by any society: – not just to offer, in a passive way, equal access to educational resources, but to provide an educational environment that will free a child's potentialities for learning from the inequalities imposed upon him by the accident of birth into one or another home and social environment.

The difficulty that attends this task can be seen by confronting some of the results published in the report with one another. First, the inequality in results of elementary and secondary schooling for different ethnic groups, as measured by standardized tests, is very large for Negroes, Puerto Ricans, American Indians, and Mexican Americans. At the beginning of the twelfth grade, these groups were, on the average, three, four, or five grade levels behind whites in reading comprehension, and four, five, or six grade levels behind in mathematics achievement. Second, the evidence revealed that within broad geographic regions, and for each racial or ethnic group, the physical and economic resources going into a school had very little relation to the achievement coming out of it. This was perhaps the most surprising result to some persons: that variations in teacher salaries, library facilities, laboratories, school size, guidance facilities had little relation to student achievement – when the family backgrounds of the students were roughly equated. Such equating of background is necessary because, within each racial or ethnic group, the factor that showed the clearest relation to a child's achievement was his home background – the educational and economic resources provided within his home.

This pair of results taken together – the serious differences in educational output and their lack of relation to differences in the input of conventional educational facilities – create the complexity of the problem. For if it were otherwise, we could give simple prescriptions: increase teachers' salaries, lower classroom size, enlarge libraries, and so on. But the evidence does not allow such simple answers.

Heterogeneity and achievement

Another finding of the survey does give some indication of how different schools have different effects. The finding is that students do better when they are in schools where their fellow students come from backgrounds strong in educational motivation and resources. The results might be paraphrased by the statement that the educational resources provided by a child's fellow students are more important for his achievement than are the resources provided by the school board. This effect appears to be particularly great for students who themselves come from educationally-deprived backgrounds. For example, it is about twice as great for Negroes as for whites.

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There are relatively small differences in the physical and economic resources of schools attended by Negro children and schools attended by white children (another surprising finding); but there are very large differences in the educational resources provided by their classmates. Classmates and schoolmates are usually rather homogeneous in economic and educational backgrounds, especially in large urban areas, and this homogeneity works to the disadvantage of those children whose family's educational resources are meagre. The disadvantage is particularly pronounced for Negroes, where historical patterns of school segregation and residential segregation, combined with the lower educational backgrounds of Negro families, place most Negro children in schools where the sum of educational resources brought to school by members of the student body is very small.

These results do offer a direct course of action in many communities where racial segregation of schools can be overcome by various means. For the results indicate that heterogeneity of race and heterogeneity of family educational background can increase the achievement of children from weak educational backgrounds with no adverse effect on children from strong educational backgrounds. Such integration cannot be expected to bring about full equality of opportunity for achievement; but the evidence does indicate effects that are far from negligible. In the large cities, however, where lower-class Negroes are both concentrated and numerous, this approach quickly exhausts its possibilities. There are simply not enough middle class children to go around.

Some observers have inferred from the Report that through racial integration of schools, and *only* through racial integration, will Negroes' educational achievement begin to match that of whites. The Civil Rights Commission has proposed that Congress pass a law requiring that all schools contain fewer than 50 per cent Negroes — a recommendation based partly on evidence in our report about Negro achievement in schools of differing racial and class composition. I believe such inferences are mistaken, and that the recommendations following from them are self-defeating. Racial integration of the schools is an important goal in its own right, affecting the very ability of our society to become truly multiracial. It is important to know, as the Report shows, that this goal does not conflict with, and to some degree aids, the goal of increasing the educational achievement of lower-class children. But these two goals are not identical. The task of increasing achievement of lower-class children cannot be fully implemented by school integration, even if integration were wholly achieved — and the magnitude of racial and class concentrations in large cities indicates that it is not likely to be achieved soon.

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Reconstructing the environment

I suggest that the matter may be better dealt with by inquiring more fully into the question of *how* a child's achievement is affected by the educational resources brought to school by other children. The evidence on this matter is not strong, but it is suggestive.

It is, for instance, a simple fact that the teacher cannot teach beyond the level of the most advanced students in the class, and cannot easily demand performance beyond that level. Thus, a comparison of Negro students (having similar family backgrounds) in lower class and largely segregated schools with those in middle class and often integrated schools shows that the former get higher grades than the latter, but their performance on standardized tests is lower. The student in a lower class school is being rewarded more highly for lower performance – not as much can be demanded of him.

It is also clear that going to school with other children whose vocabulary is larger than one's own demands and creates a larger vocabulary. Sitting next to a child who is performing at a high level provides a challenge to better performance. The psychological environment may be less comfortable for a lower class child (and there is some evidence that it is), but he learns more.

In short, there is some indication that these middle class schools have their effects through providing a social environment that is more demanding and more stimulating. And once we consider this, we realize that integration is not the only means, nor even necessarily the most efficient means, for increasing lower-class achievement. There may be other and better ways of creating such an environment.

For whatever the benefits of integration, it is also true that even in socially or racially integrated schools a child's family background shows a very high relation to his performance. The findings of the Report are quite unambiguous on this score. Even if the school is integrated, the heterogeneity of backgrounds with which children enter school is largely preserved in the heterogeneity of their performance when they finish. As the Report indicates, integration provides benefits to the underprivileged. But it takes only a small step toward equality of educational opportunity.

Thus a more intense reconstruction of the child's social environment than that provided by school integration is necessary to remove the handicap of a poor family background. It is such reconstruction that is important – whether it be provided through other children, through tutorial programs, through artificial environments created by computer consoles, or by some other means. The goal of increasing lower-class Negro achievement may be affected through a wide variety of means, which reconstruct a child's social and intellectual environment in any of several ways.

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But if we recognize that racial and class integration does not in itself provide a full enough reconstruction of the environment, what happens then to the goal of racial integration in the schools? If more efficient methods for increasing achievement are found, as is likely to be the case, does this imply abandonment of attempts to overcome de facto segregation?

To answer this question requires a full recognition that there are two separable goals involved in current discussions for reorganizing schools. *The aim of racial integration of our schools should be recognized as distinct from the aim of providing equal opportunity for educational performance.* To confound these two aims impedes the achievement of either. It is important to know, as the Office of Education survey shows, that integration aids equality of educational opportunity; that white children perform no less well in a school with a large minority of Negroes than in an all-white middle class school; that Negro students perform somewhat better in such a school than in a predominantly Negro lower class school. Conversely, of course, greater equality of performance facilitates integration, making "grouping" or "tracking" within schools unnecessary. But integration is important to both white and Negro children principally for other reasons. We are committed to becoming a truly multiracial society. Yet most white children grow up having no conception of Negroes as individuals, and thus develop wholly unnatural and ambivalent reactions to Negroes as a group; most Negro children are in a similar circumstance. All educational policies must recognize the legitimacy and importance of the aim of racial integration. But we should not confound it with the aim of increasing equality of educational performance. Thus the proposals I shall make, though they stem from a single overall principle for reorganizing our schools, are directed to these two goals as *separable* goals.

From closed to open schools

The general principle underlying the proposals may be described as the transformation of schools from closed institutions to open ones – the creation of "open schools."

The general idea is to conceive of the school very differently from the way we have done in the past – not as a building into which a child vanishes in the morning and from which he emerges in the afternoon, but as a "home base" that carries out some teaching functions but which serves principally to coordinate his activities and to perform guidance and testing functions. The specific ways of "opening up" the schools are indicated below.

The essential aims of the elementary school, if the opportunity for further learning is not to be blocked, are the learning of only two

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things: reading and arithmetic. It is in teaching these basic skills that present schools most often fail for lower class children, and thus handicap them for further learning. Many new methods for teaching these subjects have been developed in recent years; and there is much interest of persons outside the schools in helping to solve the problem; yet the school is trapped by its own organizational weight — innovations cannot be lightly adopted by a massive educational system, and local arrangements that use community resources outside the school cannot easily be fitted into the school's organization.

In an open school, the teaching of elementary-level reading and arithmetic would be opened up to entrepreneurs outside the school, under contract with the school system to teach only reading or only arithmetic, and paid on the basis of increased performance by the child on standardized tests. The methods used by such contractors may only be surmised; the successful ones would presumably involve massive restructuring of the verbal or mathematical environment. The methods might range from new phonetic systems for teaching reading or new methods for teaching numerical problem-solving to locally sponsored tutorial programs or the use of new technological aids such as talking typewriters and computer consoles. The payment-by-results would quickly eliminate the unsuccessful contractors, and the contractors would provide testing grounds for innovations that could subsequently be used by the school.

One important element that this would introduce into schools is the possibility of parental choice. Each parent would have the choice of sending his child to any of the reading or arithmetic programs outside the school, on released time, or leaving him wholly within the school to learn his reading and arithmetic there. The school would find it necessary to compete with the system's external contractors to provide better education, and the parent could, for the first time in education, have the full privileges of consumer's choice.

One simple control would be necessary to insure that this did not lead to resegregation of the school along racial or class lines: no contractor could accept from any one school a higher proportion of whites than existed in that school, nor a higher proportion of students whose parents were above a certain educational level than existed in the school.

This means of opening up the school, through released time, private contractors, payment by results, and free choice for the consumer, could be easily extended to specific core subjects in high school. It should be a potentially profitable activity to the contractor, but with the profitability wholly contingent upon results, so that the incentives of these teachers and educational entrepreneurs are tied wholly to improving a child's achievement beyond the level that would otherwise be expected of him.

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The use of released time and private contracts would be diversified in later years of school, so that a potential contractor could apply for a contract in any of a wide range of subjects, some taught within the school, but others not. The many post-high school business and technical schools that now exist would be potential contractors, but always with the public school establishing the criteria for achievement, and testing the results.

It would still remain the case that the child would stay within the school for much of his time; and in those schools that stood up well to the competition, most children would choose to take all their work in the school. At the same time, some schools might lose most of their teaching functions – if they did not deserve to keep them.

A second major means of opening up the school is directed wholly at the problem of racial and class integration, just as the first is directed wholly at the problem of achievement. The school would be opened up through intensifying the interactions between students who have different home-base schools. To create integrated schools in large urban centers becomes almost impossible; but to bring about social integration through schools is not. Again, the point is to discard the idea of the school as a closed institution, and think of it as a base of operations. Thus, rather than having classes scheduled in the school throughout the year, some classes would be scheduled with children from other schools, sometimes in their own school, sometimes in the other – but deliberately designed to establish continuing relationships between children across racial and social class lines. Certain extra-curricular activities can be organized on a cross-school basis, arranged to fit with the cross-school class schedules. Thus children from different home base schools would not be competing *against* each other, but would be members of the *same* team or club. An intensified program of interscholastic activities, including debates and academic competitions as well as sports events, could achieve the aims of social integration – possibly not as fully as in the best integrated schools, but also possibly even more so – and certainly more so than in many integrated schools.

This second means of opening up the school could in part be accomplished through outside organizations acting as contractors, in somewhat the same way as the reading and mathematics contractors described earlier. Community organizations could design specific cultural enrichment programs or community action programs involving students from several schools of different racial or class composition, with students engaging in such programs by their own or parent's choice. Thus, resources that exist outside the school could come to play an increasing part in education, through contracts with the schools. Some such programs might be community improvement activities, in which white and Negro high school students learn

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simultaneously to work together and to aid the community. But the essential element in such programs is that they should not be carried out by the school, in which case they would quickly die after the first enthusiasm had gone, but be undertaken by outside groups under contract to the school, and with the free choice of parent or child.

A widening of horizons

The idea of opening up the school, of conceiving of the home school as a center of operations, while it can aid the two goals of performance and integration described above, is much more than an ad hoc device for accomplishing these goals. It allows the parent what he has never had within the public school system: a freedom of choice as a consumer, as well as the opportunity to help establish special purpose programs, clinics and centers to beat the school at its own game. It allows educational innovations the opportunity to prove themselves, insofar as they can attract and hold students. The contract centers provide the school with a source of innovation as well as a source of competition to measure its own efforts, neither of which it has had in the past. The interschool scheduling and interscholastic academic events widen horizons of both teachers and children, and provide a means of diffusing both the techniques and content of education, a means which is not possible so long as a school is a closed institution.

A still further problem that has always confronted public education, and has become intense in New York recently, is the issue of parental control versus control by the educational bureaucracy. This issue is ordinarily seen as one of legitimacy: how far is it legitimate for parents to exert organized influence over school policies? But the issue need not be seen this way. The public educational system is a monopoly, and such issues of control always arise in monopolies, where consumers lack a free choice. As consumers, they have a legitimate interest in what that monopoly offers them, and can only exercise this interest through organized power. But such issues do not arise where the consumer can implement his interest through the exercise of free choice between competing offerings. Until now, this exercise of choice has only been available for those who could afford to buy education outside the public schools.

It is especially appropriate and necessary that such an opening up of schools occur in a period when the interest of all society has become focused on the schools. The time is past when society as a whole, parents as individuals, and interested groups outside the school were willing to leave the task of education wholly to the public education system, to watch children vanish into the school in the morning and emerge from it in the afternoon, without being able to affect what goes on behind the school doors.

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Thoughts on the Presidency

HENRY FAIRLIE

I have never understood why radicals in England object to the banal clichés which the Queen normally utters to her subjects. The English, after all, fought a civil war, executed one king and sent another king packing, precisely to be sure that monarchs in the future would not say anything which had any meaning. They then made doubly sure of this by giving the crown to a Hanoverian who could speak barely a word of English. When the Queen's consort to-day, a man of continental upbringing and notions, accentuated by an education at Gordonstoun, does say something in public which appears to carry some meaning, both Parliament and the press call for the executioner: only a 20th-century half-heartedness prevents the Duke of Edinburgh's head from rolling. It could, indeed, be said that the reason why the English fought their passionate, but still rather scholarly, civil war, and laboriously carried through what deserves to be known as the Inglorious Revolution, was primarily to make certain that those on the throne, and those near the throne, would not communicate intelligently with their subjects, but only with pedigree cattle, horses, and gun dogs.

So unused is an Englishman to the idea that a Head of State can do and say things of political importance that he is at something of a disadvantage (or is it an advantage?) when he contemplates a Presi-

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dency, whether the Presidency of the Fifth Republic or the Presidency of the United States. He does not really understand an elected and powerful Head of State. President Lebrun, in his frock coat, comes much more easily in his range of vision than President de Gaulle; and an English friend of mine likes to observe that *Mrs.* Calvin Coolidge seems to him very much what an ideal Head of State should be. Whenever there has been a national crisis (real or supposed) during my stay in America, I have found myself worried by the interventions and appearances of the President. Who, I always want to know, *is* speaking? The Head of State? The Commander-in-Chief? The head of a temporary administration? The temporary head of a political party? It is never quite clear; at least, I am never clear. All right: "Hail to the Chief." But what chief, I ask, and chief of what?

The improbable United States

I first observed the (present) President of the United States on my first Saturday in this country. It was in March, 1965, just after the disturbances at Selma, Alabama, and he was giving a televised press conference in the Rose Garden of the White House. The impression which it made will never leave me, especially the extraordinary discordance between the decorousness of the surroundings and the almost Barnum and Bailey vigour with which the whole ceremony – for a ceremony it was, and was intended to be – was conducted. I remember turning to an English colleague, who had been in America for some time, and asking him why the American journalists stood when the President entered, a salute which no English journalist would give to any politician. "Because, you fool, he is the Head of State," my colleague whispered back. "But he is not to-day," I answered. "He is a party leader announcing a new party policy." Two days later, to my utter amazement, this same party leader was allowed to address a joint meeting of both Houses of Congress, again conferring on a party policy something of the dignity which only a Head of State can offer.

It will seem to some that I am labouring an obvious and not very important point. I can only answer that the combination of Head of State and party leader is to me the most improbable feature of what I regard as a most improbable political office. Indeed I would, after two years, still find it hard to explain why the United States exists at all. I can find no manifest reason why it should have been the destiny of this subcontinent to become, and remain, one nation, under God or not. Nor can I find any satisfactory explanation of how this same nation survived the colossal strain of the mass immigration which took place in the last quarter of the 19th century, and the first twenty years of this. (When I read Richard Hofstadter's *The Paranoid Style in American Politics,* my first and main reaction was, not

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that there have been so many "kooks" on the American political scene, but that there have been so few, and especially that there were so few during and immediately after the period of mass immigration.) The real miracle of the United States – and the source of its perpetual fascination over the minds of other peoples, "more powerful than the eloquence of Mirabeau or the sword of Napoleon," as Archibald Alison said in 1833 – is its mere existence; and, the more I ponder this improbable existence, the more I am convinced that *one* key to it lies in the most improbable of its political offices: the Presidency.

In fact, when I have gone back, with the slight experience of the United States which I have so far accumulated, to a rereading of *The Federalist*, I find in it this same awareness of the improbability of the whole business in which the constitution-makers were engaged. *The Federalist*, indeed, draws much of its power from the fact that it is a series of prudent essays on the improbable; and when I describe the Presidency as an improbable office in an improbable country, it is, of course, the fact and the nature of federalism (itself an improbable form of government, quite alien to English concepts, even though the English did assist in creating federal governments in Canada and Australia) which is attracting and holding my attention.

It was David Hume who foretold that the fruitful combination of the two ideas of representation and federation would enable – would *alone* enable – popular government to adapt itself to a vast continent. An outside observer, on his first encounter with it, must be allowed a little bemusement at the fact that the combination has worked, that the attempt was ever made, and that the achievement is so far there to see.

A mythical institution

First, however, there is demolition work to be done. A myth has been created since the Second World War – and is again being fostered – that the Presidency has become and is becoming "institutionalized." It is a myth worth destroying, for it is already distorting political observation. The truth is the opposite. There is no high political office which is less institutionalized.

I take an institution to be a body – an establishment, if one likes; I happen to dislike – which has a corporate existence of its own, independent of its supreme (but temporary) office-holder (or office-holders). A permanent civil service, as strongly entrenched, as formally and informally assured of its position, its influence, and its powers as is the English civil service, is quite clearly an institution. So, now, is the English monarchy; for, although the personality of the monarch may play some part in determining what she says and does (and, especially, how), it is obvious now that the heart of the monarchy lies, not in the person of the monarch, but in the office of her

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Private Secretary, which has built up, by precedent piled minutely on precedent, a body of rules and conventions which are self-perpetuating. To make the point amply clear, one can say that the English cabinet is an institution, that it has been "institutionalised" in the office of the Secretary to the Cabinet – but that the office of prime minister is not a political institution. Nor is the office of President of the United States.

The myth that the Presidency is being "institutionalized" is based, as far as I understand it, on the following claims:

1. That the President's personal staff, the formidable array of special assistants and counsellors in the White House, represents a qualitative, and not merely a quantitative, change in the character and activity of the Presidency;

2. That various traditional activities of the President – for example, his relations with Congress – have been "institutionalized" in a particular office in the White House: for example, Lawrence O'Brien's while he was there, and even now that, formally, he is not there;

3. That the Presidency, through various instruments, such as the rapidly developing Bureau of the Budget, has "institutionalized" its relationship with the various government departments and agencies;

4. That a body of White House lore is being built up, perpetuating itself in successive Presidencies, and exemplified by the close contact which was established, between November, 1960 and January, 1961, between the staff of the out-going President in the White House and the (constitutionally nonexistent) staff of the in-coming one.

That is it; and, for the life of me, I cannot see that it adds up to saying much more than that the President does many things which the President did not do before, and needs a larger staff to help him. One specific claim I intend to keep separate, because it helps to make a separate and important point: namely, that the activities of the Bureau of the Budget, the Council of Economic Advisors, and the Office of Scientific Advisor to the President together constitute a form of "institutionalizing."

The White House staff

I have to admit that there is, at first, the charm of novelty about the special assistants and counsellors who have become such a much-publicized element of government in the past seven years. The roll-call of these Presidential assistants since 1961 is, indeed, stirring: Theodore C. Sorenson, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Lawrence F. O'Brien, McGeorge Bundy, Carl Kaysen, Richard Goodwin, Jack J.

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Valenti, Bill D. Moyers, Walt W. Rostow, John P. Roche. . . . the list is extensible, the names well known. But one must beware of being seduced by the publicity which has attended them, and which some of them have done much to create. ("While few of us had a 'passion for anonymity,' most of us had a preference in that direction," says Sorensen in *Kennedy,* words which one would like to believe contain a dash of deliberate irony.) On the whole, glamour and publicity are unreliable evidence of influence and power.

Yet it is as such that they are taken, for example, by Theodore H. White:

> The White House [under Kennedy] was a community. The politics of America were discussed not only at the White House and in its offices but were chewed over for hours in the evenings and over weekends by men who were transfixed by their participation in the thrill of power. . . . It was as if, under Kennedy, a fourth branch had been added to the traditional trio of executive, legislative and judicial branches. The new fourth branch was the policy-making branch of government.

It is a startlingly naive remark. Yet the leap which White makes — the leap from a description of the atmosphere which Kennedy's White House staff brought with them to the claim that a new political institution had been created, a new branch of government — is much the same as that made by other observers who argue that the increased number of special assistants and counsellors to the President, and the proliferation and variety of their roles, represent an "institutionalizing" of the Presidency.

It is with no disrespect that I suggest that the nearest parallel, in previous systems of government, to the nature of these men and their role, is to be found in the eunuchs who wielded such power and influence in many of the ancient empires. Eunuch rule, in the Chinese or the Turkish, in the Roman or the Mogul, empires was the most straight-forward device which emperors found for keeping power in their own court, away from a bureaucracy or an aristocracy (or even an army) which might challenge them. The eunuchs accumulated power and influence and wealth, and one T'ang eunuch gathered so large a hoard of gold and silver, jewels and silks, that thirty carts were needed for thirty days to move them — without his even writing a biography of his emperor.

The usefulness of this parallel is that it emphasizes the personal nature of the relationship between the President and his special assistants and counsellors. The ancient emperors wanted men whom they could trust — and who could be trusted more than those of poor origins, whom they had mutilated for their convenience and peace of mind, and then raised to the highest positions? The system and

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the methods are not precisely the same to-day, but the degree of personal dependence remains. "Kennedy wanted his staff to be small, in order to keep it more personal than institutional," Sorensen says, and then, in a vital and emphatic passage, he hammers the point home:

> . . . From the outset he abandoned the notion of a collective, institutionalized Presidency. He ignored Eisenhower's farewell recommendation to create a First Secretary of Government to oversee all foreign affairs agencies. He abandoned the practice of the Cabinet's and the National Council's making group decisions like corporate boards of directors. He abolished the White House practice of White House staff meetings and weekly Cabinet meetings. He abolished the pyramid structure of the White House staff, the Assistant President-Sherman Adams-type job, the Staff Secretary, the Cabinet Secretariat, the NSC Planning Board and the Operations Cordinating Board, all of which imposed, in his view, needless paperwork and machinery between the President and his responsible officers. . . . He relied instead on informal meetings and direct contacts – on a personal White House staff, the Budget Bureau and *ad hoc* task forces, to probe and define issues for his decision. . . .

Both Sorensen and Schlesinger emphasise that the special assistants in the White House, in those days, were for the most part *generalists*, whereas the most obvious attribute of "institutionalizing" is *specialization*, the codification of areas and boundaries of responsibility, the strict observance of precedent and record (as in the minutes of English cabinet meetings), and an almost hierarchical accountability.

None of these features of an institution, of "institutionalizing," was present in President Kennedy's White House staff; and, although something of the air, of the atmosphere, of the wide-ranging generalist has disappeared, none of them is present in President Johnson's White House staff, either.

It is absurd to talk of the "institutionalizing" of the Presidency through the White House staff, when that staff is liable to be changed from top to bottom with each change of President, and certain to be changed from top to bottom with a change of President which also involves a change of party; when men make the office, as Lawrence O'Brien emphatically did, as McGeorge Bundy did in a way very different from that of his successor, and as John Roche has done in a way very different from that of his predecessor; when the President can reach out and recruit almost at whim, as President Johnson did when he plucked back McGeorge Bundy during the Middle East crisis; and when the men themselves may resign almost at whim, as in the gradual withdrawal, between 1964 and 1966, of most of the "Kennedy men."

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It will, I hope, eventually be seen why I regard the noninstitutional character of the Presidency as of such importance. For the moment, it is enough to say that the Presidency, *as organised in the White House,* seems to me a form of unencumbered, arbitrary, personal rule. "Institutionalization," precisely because it is based on precedent and hierarchy and codification, is the very opposite of arbitrariness; and it is with the arbitrary nature of the Presidency that I am at this point concerned.

An instrument of political will

The other supposed evidence of the "institutionalizing" of the Presidency can be disposed of quickly. It was President Eisenhower who first established a special office in the White House to handle its relations with Congress. It was Lawrence O'Brien, under President Kennedy and then under President Johnson, who transformed that office into a formidable operation. But I must insist that the existence of this office, and others similar to it, is no evidence of "institutionalizing," *unless* it can be shown that it has changed the nature of the President's relationship with Congress, or the sanctions which either President or Congress can employ, or the nature of the Presidential *act* itself. The evidence is already in. It has done none of those things.

First, under President Eisenhower, the office became more a channel for Congress (i.e., Senator Lyndon Johnson) to run the White House rather than *vice versa;* while, under President Kennedy and President Johnson, it became the channel for O'Brien to work prodigious miracles in the art of directing by subtle indirection. In other words, it is the character of the President, and the character which he gives his Presidency, which has determined the role of the office – which is the very opposite of "institutionalization."

Secondly, the noninstitutional character of the office could not be clearer than it is to-day, when it can hardly be said to exist outside the person of the Postmaster-General, who is, of course, Lawrence F. O'Brien. In fact, there is some evidence that, faced with a difficult 90th Congress, President Johnson has increasingly fallen back on more traditional channels of communication with Congress, and has even bothered to remember that his Vice-President is also President of the Senate.

Thirdly, if the offices in the White House are made partly by the men who hold them, and partly by the character of the President and his Presidency, they are also made partly by situations and events. The handling of the 90th Congress in 1967 was an entirely different political task from the handling of the 89th in 1965, or the 88th in 1963. All these considerations, which apply to the legislative office in the White House, apply equally to all its other offices. With a new President, with the end of the war in Vietnam, with the definition of

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different national "goals," the organisation of the White House would immediately look very different from its organisation under President Eisenhower, President Kennedy, or President Johnson, when the "institutionalizing" of the Presidency is supposed to have occurred. We are not, in fact, gazing on an institution at all, but on an arbitrarily flexible instrument of political will.

D.O.D. and B.O.B.

The rapid development of the power of certain departments and agencies – the Bureau of the Budget and the Department of Defense are the most obvious – is clearly an important example of "institutionalization." But the "institutionalizing" of what? It is this question which must be considered carefully, for it is not enough to show that these agencies have become more effective instruments of the political will of the President. If the claim that the Presidency is being "institutionalized" is to be sustained, it has to be shown that their own "institutionalization" has significantly altered the conditions in which the Presidential will operates: that it has significantly altered the character of the Presidential act.

Robert McNamara's assertion of the power of the Department of Defense over the established Service departments is, of course, an indirect assertion of the Presidential power within his administration. But I am not in the least clear how significant this assertion is: how much of it is merely a reflection of the character of McNamara himself, of his "special relationship with the President," and of the wholly unmanageable nature of the war in Vietnam. I am not prepared to say, from my own observation, that the present character of the relationship of the President with his Service departments and his Service chiefs would survive the removal of any of these factors; that there has yet been an institutional change amounting (which is the argument I am contesting) to a constitutional change. (It is worth noticing, here, the role of the Department of Justice under Robert Kennedy: because of his personal relations with the President, even the most acute observers talked about it as an arm of the Presidency. But it was R. F. Kennedy who was the arm; not the Department.)

Similarly, the very significant development of the Bureau of the Budget – under two creative directors, and now, which is equally important, under a tough and skilled consolidating one – has obviously made the potential effectiveness of the Presidency much greater. Although President Truman relied on it, and therefore strengthened it a great deal, its nearly "institutional" development began, as so much else did, with President Eisenhower, in his attempt to create a Presidency which dispensed with the necessity for a President. (In much the same way, as is too seldom pointed out, the genius of his "military" leadership in the Second World War was to try and

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remove the necessity for generals. One always gets the impression from his memoirs that he could not understand why it was necessary to have a Bradley or a Patton or a Montgomery actually at the front.) From one Presidential memorandum – a significantly institutional method of proceeding – the Bureau of the Budget has moved, with the same pertinence and determination as the clerical bureaucracy under the medieval English kings, into feudal domains which previously seemed impregnable, and do not yet seem ripe to fall.

The extension of the activities and power of the Bureau of the Budget is the most obviously unexplored political development in the history of the United States in the past quarter of a century. Perhaps it is because it seems a dull subject: it *is* as "dull" as ditchwater, teeming with microbe, insect, and reptile life. Tadpoles, in the Bureau of the Budget, are frogs the next day – and all by virtue of the scribbled memoranda which are the hallmark of all institutional power, in any system, in any age. Climbing the steps of the Executive Office Building to visit the Bureau of the Budget is very like what it must have been to call on the scarcely known men who constituted the pertinacious bureaucracy of Henry II. At any moment, when they talk of Commerce or Agriculture or Health, Education and Welfare as if these were part of a rebellious (ecclesiastical or lay) baronage, one expects to hear the cry, "Who will rid me of this turbulent priest?"; and one would not be in the least surprised if five knights rode immediately down Pennsylvania Avenue to butcher the department heads in the sanctuary of their departments.

The instruments of pain which the Bureau of the Budget has devised in its battle with the feudal departments of government are many and terrible. The whole mysterious eschatology (for so they represent it, as a doctrine concerning last, or final, matters) of cost-effectiveness has become an almost sublime machine of torture, which the Inquisition would not have disdained. Moreover, the Bureau is reaching, not only to the obvious feudal domains, the hitherto largely independent departments or agencies, but beyond them to the Congressional committees with whom the departments have elaborately feudal relationships of mutual right and obligation. There is no doubt, in fact, that the power of the Bureau of the Budget has changed so much in recent years that a proper Whig (if any were left) in a proper Whig assembly (if any still existed) would introduce a motion simply announcing that its power has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished. But I am still not certain that the change has been a radical institutional or constitutional one. The present Director, certainly, has fought enough battles during the past year, and lost enough, to make one remember that a baronage, even in a republic, has deep reserves of that irresistible form of energy: total inaction.

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The doorkeepers

Lastly, there is no evidence that any White House lore, any body of precedent or rules or conventions, is being built up, to be passed on from one Presidency to the next. The passage from Sorensen's *Kennedy,* which has been quoted above, makes it amply clear that President Kennedy ripped apart the elaborate White House staff system which President Eisenhower had constructed, and established another which suited his own needs, methods, and appetites. The peculiar circumstances of President Johnson's succession, and especially the retention, for a number of months and, in some cases, for years, of many of President Kennedy's own staff, concealed an equally personal reorganization. It was not merely that Valenti and Moyers, for example, were hardly the same kind of men as Sorensen and O'Donnell; it was that what was asked and expected of them were different. No description of the roles of Valenti and Moyers – the scope and manner and impact of their activities – would bear any institutional relationship to the roles of Sorensen and O'Donnell.

Similarly, to-day, now that Valenti and Moyers have gone, who would be bold enough to try and define, in sensible institutional terms, the role of Marvin Watson? That he is a powerful and influential doorkeeper (as was O'Donnell, as was Moyers) does not say enough. In every system of government, there have been people intelligent enough to realize that keeping the monarch's door is a source of power. It was not for nothing that, in the Middle Ages, the period in all history which has been most fertile in the creation of political institutions, the most powerful official was frequently called by the title of chamberlain (*chamber:* room; *-ling:* one concerned with); and it is no surprise, therefore, to find that, in as personal a system of government as the Presidency, the office of chamberlain still exists.

But the doorkeeper, as eunuch after eunuch in the ancient empires, and busy cleric after busy cleric in the Middle Ages, quickly discovered, can make the most flexible use of his opportunities. His post, in other words, is not an institutional one at all; it depends far too much on personal influence and opportunity; and the White House is pre-eminently a staff of competing doorkeepers.

Goosey, goosey, gander,
Whither shall I wander?
Upstairs and downstairs,
And in my lady's chamber.

The nursery rhyme, it is believed, had a precise political application when it was composed. It still has, to-day, a general political application: not least in the Executive Mansion of the President of the United States of America.

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Disguising constitutional change

Still, it is said, one cannot brush aside, in this way, the cumulative "institutionalization" which is represented, not only by the Bureau of the Budget, but by the Council of Economic Advisors and the Office of the Scientific Advisor to the President. There is no intention, here, of brushing aside anything that happens within the Executive Office Building, behind its 900 Doric columns, at the head of its four heroic cantilevered staircases. Henry Adams called the building itself "an architectural infant asylum." That the offices within it are not political infant asylums hardly needs stating.

I have dealt with the Bureau of the Budget, and acknowledged possible evidence of "institutionalization" there. (One of the obvious signs is the attractiveness of the Bureau to *career* civil servants in Washington. It can, more or less, pick and choose; and its staff has the positive bearing of an elite corps, much as Strategic Air Command once used to have in the armed services.) But, for all its obvious importance, it is hard to describe the Council of Economic Advisors as an "institution." If, as I have said, I am to recognize an institution, I wish to be shown a body whose *functions* and *attitudes* and *methods of procedure* exist, and remain very much the same, independently of the actual persons who staff them, or the actual politicans to whom they are responsible. I have followed, as closely as possible, some of the internal debates which have taken place about economic policy during the time I have been in the United States, and which have resulted in Presidential economic decisions of varying timeliness and effectiveness. But the bodies which, in these debates, have acted as "institutions," with permanent habits of address have been – lo and behold! – the Treasury and the Federal Reserve; and, of course, to meet members of the Federal Reserve System, not merely in its headquarters in Washington, but scattered across the states, is to realise exactly what a formidable institution it is.

As for the Scientific Advisor to the President, and his office, their importance has declined as rapidly at it rose, during the period when science seemed to be the breastplate of the New Frontier. It may, of course, regain its importance, in new conditions, under another President; and its office, certainly, will survive, if only because the scientific community in the country expects it, and wants it. It has clients, in short, just as much as Commerce or Agriculture has always had them; and as even the Council of Economic Advisors may be said to have them now, among those who do not find the Treasury or the Federal Reserve congenial channels for expressing their interests or their opinions. These client relationships help to emphasise that the new arms of the Presidency are important, not because they represent its "institutionalization," but because they are a response to the ex-

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pansion of its functions, and especially of the functions *it is expected to perform,* either by client bodies (e.g., the scientific community) or by the public at large. An expansion of functions *may* be a result of "institutionalization," and they *may* result in "institutionalization": this is the two-way story of all great bureaucracies. But a significant expansion of functions is the expression, primarily, not of institutional, but of constitutional change. Function, in a political process, is best defined in terms of expectation: of what people (either in the general public or as specific bodies) expect this or that part of the political process to do. In short, the powers of the constitution are redistributed because the expectation of performance by different bodies under the constitution has been redistributed. "Institutionalization" is a euphemism for disguising profound constitutional change.

A last example may be given. It could be said – it is said – that the President's supervision of foreign policy is being increasingly "institutionalized": in the National Security Council, for example, and almost physically in the Operations Room. But one should notice one feature of this development. The State Department itself increasingly leans on those in the White House who are concerned with foreign policy. The State Department itself has a heightened expectation of, not only what the White House will do, but what the White House should do. This raised expectation might seem, at first, to be only an internal, institutional, redistribution of functions. But is it much more. It is the result of a general – public – expectation of the role and powers of the President in a situation (only 25 years old) in which the definition of the national interest abroad and the creation and execution of a national policy abroad have become (as they were not before) such an unavoidable function of the political process, and one of such magnitude, that it is the Presidency which is expected to bear and perform it.

The change (like all the changes discussed), if it is institutional at all, is only secondarily so. It is primarily a constitutional change; for, a constitution may define functions, but it is itself made by expectations.

Presidential energy

Some of the importance of Richard E. Neustadt's *Presidential Power* was that it was a restatement of the entirely personal, entirely accidental, entirely improvising nature of the supreme political office in the United States, this nature being unavoidable because it is confronted, not only by Congress, but by a score of other repositories of power and influence usually (as has been said) "in combat postures." He never boldly takes it on, but he is restless with the idea of an "institutionalized" Presidency. Machiavelli wrote a prescription for the "new men" of the "new prince." Neustadt, in terms suitable

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to our more commonplace age, but with similar anticipation, wrote a prescription for the "new men" of the "new president."

Properly and significantly, Neustadt directed his attention (in the three central chapter headings) to: Persuasion; Reputation; Prestige. None of them is an institutional quality. None of them can be "institutionalized." In fact, Neustadt was writing about exactly what Hamilton and Madison and Jay wrote about in *The Federalist*. The two most remarkable features of *The Federalist*, in its discussion of the Presidency, are, first, that they discussed it so little and, secondly, that the only really extended discussion of its nature (Nos. 70-77) is a discussion of Presidential *energy*.

"The necessity of an energetic executive . . ."; "energy as the most necessary qualification . . ." — it was on this that Hamilton (they were Hamilton's papers) fixed his mind. And so (not surprisingly, for he was writing at the end of President Eisenhower's artful, but not fully satisfying, exercise in relaxed government) did Neustadt; and so, of course, did President Kennedy.

It is impossible to ignore his Uncompleted Presidency. I have not the slightest doubt that much of its importance derives from the fact that it was uncompleted: that now, and for ever more, it can be maintained that, given two full terms, this exceptionally gifted politician could have moved, convincingly and successfully, to the full realization of his policies and his hopes. I have to demur, if only on the grounds I have already suggested: that inaction is the only inexhaustible form of political energy. But the Uncompleted Presidency has enabled a constitutional legend to be created. The legend is that the personal energy of the President can overcome the energy of the other political bodies in the country whose primary interest is either in inaction or in different action. An Uncompleted Presidency is necessary to such a myth because it means that no final account can be rendered, that no final adding up of the credit and debit columns can be made. It means that the benefit of the doubt can be given to exaggerated and even exotic claims.

Would President Kennedy's second term have been the record of achievement which Sorensen and Schlesinger and Neustadt (in the afterword to *Presidential Power*) ask us to believe? I doubt it, and I am grateful for their spirits that the disillusionment never came: disillusionment, not with the man, but with the capacity of the office. How would Lincoln have handled Reconstruction? It is the question which I never cease to ask myself as I pass the Lincoln Memorial, and watch the tourists taking their snapshots with their Polaroids. He might well have handled it superbly, but one must be given leave to doubt it. In a list of the ten greatest men the world has ever known, Lincoln would be my only confident entry as a politician (except, possibly, Elizabeth I who, in difficult and alarm-

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ing circumstances, created a nation and the idea of nation which were to flower for another three and a half centuries). Yet, even our awareness of the vast achievement of Lincoln depends partly to-day on the fact that it was an Uncompleted Presidency, that the final account could never be rendered.

Written and unwritten constitutions

The energy of the Presidency, actual and potential, must be the starting point. But, before going any further, it is necessary to advance two further suggestions, on which the rest of my argument depends, especially since they are suggestions which I would not have advanced so confidently without an experience of Presidential government in the United States.

First, it is about time that we abandoned the fruitless distinction between "written" and "unwritten" constitutions. The more experience one has of political systems – whether direct personal experience of those existing to-day, or the indirect personal experience of reading oneself into the political adventures of the past – the more it is clear that, however useful to the English Whigs, at their moment in the 17th and 18th centuries, the contrast between "written" and "unwritten" constitutions is dangerously false.

England is supposed to be the great exemplar of a country with an "unwritten" constitution. As I have tried to convey already, there could be no more absurd falsity. Its constitution is written in an indescribable number of bureaucratic memoranda, of judicial decisions, and of political precedent, all of them written. Against all the traditional Whig propaganda, I would argue that England is not, and cannot be, subject to arbitrary and personal rule precisely because its constitution is written in a thousand-and-one scraps of paper.

The American constitution is supposedly written: and yet it needs, now, massive commentaries to explain, not merely what it means, but what it is. It has been wrenched this way and that, mostly by the Presidency and the Supreme Court, until it has become impossible to know what the constitution is merely by reading it. Since the farthest years, when the Supreme Court made its first confident assertion of the scope of federal law and federal authority, to the nearest years, when we have witnessed another such confident assertion, it has been abundantly clear that the constitution of the United States is no more "written", in the conventional sense, than that of England. From Lincoln's invocation and generous interpretation of the war power of the President, to President Johnson's employment of the war power without even a declaration of war, there has been no reason for regarding the constitution of the United States as anything but custom-made (a phrase, in America, of pleasing am-

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biguity) – and custom-made, sometimes, by presidential tailors with very sharp and long scissors.

Popular will and representative assemblies

Secondly, it is time that we rid our minds altogether of the idea that, in our age, the popular will or the popular voice find their true or convincing or authoritative expression in representative assemblies. It is certainly not true of France, which has returned, with an equanimity born of indolence, to its (revolutionary *and* Napoleonic) belief that government is "the incontrovertible agent of the . . . organic people." It is certainly not true of England, where representation has ceased to be a serious consideration in the political system, and the nature of the constitution is, with only marginal restraints, plebiscitary in its nature, a direct transference of power taking place from the people to the government. It is a *little* more true of the United States, because the two Houses of Congress can still exercise considerable restraints; but the fact remains that the popular will, in any energizing form, is again transferred directly from the people to the executive.

It was L. S. Amery who, in England, first cleared out the rubbish which the Whig propagandists had left in the attics of most constitutional textbooks. The executive, he said, had always been the "initiating, directing, energizing" influence in the constitution. Search as one may, there is no alternative to it being the same in the United States. (The Supreme Court, by its interpretation of the constitution, can also be an "initiating and directing and energizing" influence; but, when it is so, it is because it is asserting the scope of the federal magistracy, judicial and executive.)

It is not strange that the idea of the executive as the energetic and energizing influence in a political system should crop up in both *The Federalist* and Amery's *Thoughts on the Constitution.* The idea of an initiating and directing executive is essential to the notion of the national state; and where it has always, in England, reflected what Dicey called the "omnipotence and undisputed supremacy throughout the whole country of the central government," it must increasingly come to reflect the same in the United States, whatever the distribution of powers in its constitution. It is essential, also, to the notion of democracy; for the one inescapable fact about a democracy is that its appetite for government is insatiable. "On, on and on – up, up, and up" – to use Ramsay MacDonald's favourite flourish of rhetoric – it goes: free enterprise creates the popular motor car; free citizens buy it; and, in a trice, both free enterprise and free citizens are demanding federally supported highways to be built through their states. The conservative critics of democracy in the

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19th century were right in their forebodings: merely by allowing rein to insatiable popular appetites, strong government would become inevitable.

At the height of the city riots in 1967, Bill D. Moyers called, publicly, for Robert McNamara to be made *tsar* in charge of clearing the city slums and ghettoes. Popular appetite had been expressed – there is no doubt that much of the looting was the simplest expression of the simplest appetites – and immediately came democracy's only response to popular appetite: the request for a *tsar*.

After Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Earl Long buttonholed one of the most violent supporters of state rights in Louisiana. "What are you going to do now", he asked, "now that the Feds have the atom bomb?" It was an extreme example, but a dry recognition, of the "omnipotence and undisputed supremacy throughout the whole country" of a national and democratic government, even under the "written" constitution of the United States. A strong executive, *The Federalist* continually argued, is threatened by "the maxims of republican jealousy." Who is jealous, now, of the power of the federal executive, when popular appetites want what only it can supply, because it "has the ships, it has the men, it has the money, too"?

"As one people . . ."

I do not wish it to be thought that, in my ignorance of American politics, I am not aware of the pluralist nature of American society, and the remnants of pluralism in its constitution. I am merely asserting that the executive energy which a national and democratic state needs for its survival is now to be found only in the federal executive and the federal judiciary. I know that it is possible to point to individual states, individual governors, individual mayors who still give fitful demonstrations that executive energy does not yet reside solely in Washington, D. C. But this is not enough. The more energetic, for example, that the schemes of Mayor Lindsay of New York City and Governor Rockefeller of New York State become – the more ambitious in their objectives, and the more extensive in their scope – the larger and more urgent become their pleas for federal help and federal money. In short, the multiplication of interests now able to mobilise in such a way that they have direct access to the central government, in order to press their demands on society, is not going to result in a corresponding diversity and complexity of political institutions and activity, but only in the strengthening of one institution and one kind of activity: not in a variety of "plebiscites," but in one plebiscite.

Where, then, does the source of energy of the Presidency reside? Quite obviously, it resides, first, in the actual and symbolic importance of the fact that he is the "Head of State." "America has no more

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solemn rite than the inauguration of a President," says Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. in his introduction to a collection of the inaugural addresses of the Presidents of the United States:

> Every four years since 1789 the austere ceremony has suspended the passions of politics to permit an interlude of national reunion . . . the nation listens for a moment as one people. . . .

To whom?

Fourteen years ago, Edward Shils observed the coronation of Elizabeth II, and then wrote a brilliant sociological essay explaining its meaning and its relevance. He was, in fact, bowled over by the ceremony, and by the mood it created (or appeared to create). In every stage of the medieval ritual, he found an exact, contemporary, social significance: the Queen stripped, at the beginning of the ceremony, of all her apparel, until she stands in nothing but a plain white shift, the image of a frail and powerless human being, only then to receive the Robe, the Sword, the Orb, the Sceptre, the Crown, the symbols of authority and majesty, *from other hands*, from the spiritual and temporal representatives of the nation and of God. Shils was so excited by the whole business that he cheerfully recorded the fact that, according to the Metropolitan Police, there were no pickpockets in the crowds on Coronation Day. Even the criminal classes, so it seemed, were moved by the coronation to regard themselves, for one day, as members of society. Even they had listened "for a moment as one people."

I do not know whether crime abates every four years, on Inauguration Day, in Washington, D. C. But I do believe that the character of the Presidency is such that the majority of the people can be persuaded to look to it for a kind of leadership which no politician, in my opinion, should be allowed, let alone invited, to give. "If people want a sense of purpose," Harold Macmillan once said to me, "they should get it from their archbishops": a remark of recognizably English accent, finely delimiting the area of politics. This delimitation is essential to a free society, and it is the most obvious mark of a society that cares more for other things than freedom that its political leaders try to give the nation, the people, "a sense of purpose," and so justify any interference with their private pursuits, inclinations, and morals.

Caesaropapism?

The Presidency seems to me to be a seed bed for, and already to have in it some of the seeds of, the most refined of all absolutist systems: Caesaropapism. Some American political scientists have tried to persuade me that it is really a constitutional monarchy, stuck more or less where the English monarchy was stuck in 1688. But no

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one (except Macaulay, writing his absurd eulogies a century and a half later) ever looked for "a sense of purpose" to William III, a tedious *statdholder* from the Netherlands. It was the true achievement of the Whigs to make the English monarchy dull and boring (and rather vulgar as well) and, in the process, to eliminate all concern with national and moral purpose from English politics – which does not mean from English society – for ever.

The Presidency, as we are coming to know it, is very different. When, some time ago, I expressed the view that President Kennedy reminded me of Justinian, it was drawn to my attention that another English journalist, Patrick O'Donovan of the London *Observer*, had, while he was in Washington, compared President Johnson with Justinian. I do not think this coincidence can be altogether dismissed. Historical analogies can, of course, be pushed too far. But Americans are either unable or afraid to make them at all; and, as a result, they sacrifice some of the perceptions these can offer. O'Donovan made his comparison in 1965, when President Johnson seemed to be an Emperor on the Potomac; and both he and I were commenting on the energy, equal to Justinian's, which two successive Presidents appeared to be bringing to the overdue business of the consolidation of an empire. The more I consider the work of the Presidency in the past seven years, the more it seems to me to be embarked on a consolidation (or codification) of imperial (or federal) law and administration, with the purpose of creating, as Justinian set out to do, a commonwealth of citizens under one law, all of them persuaded of the ultimate justice, in doctrine and in practice, of the regime to which they consent.

If this interpretation is correct, then the position of the President as Head of State is going to become of increasing importance. Of all the multiple facets of Caesaropapism – instructive even to-day, because it attempted to work out the relations between people, emperor, pope, and God, in one constitution – the one which matters here is that it managed to achieve a surprisingly convincing combination between the *ascending* and *descending* theories of government: between the belief that power is conferred from below by the people, and the belief that it is conferred from above, by a superior force, i.e. God. The throne in the Byzantine Empire was elective: the people were the electors, and they could take the crown away. Indeed "the legal right to revolution" was recognized, and was voiced, for example, by the Patriarch, Nicholas Mysticus, in the 10th century. But – and it was by this trick that the Byzantine Emperors sustained themselves for so long – the people were also the Christian Commonwealth, and when they gave their assent to the Emperor at his coronation, they in fact acknowledged him as the representative of the Christian Commonwealth, and therefore as the Viceroy of God. His

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power having been given to him from below, the Emperor then exercised it as being confirmed from above. It was a brilliant device.

The organic people

More and more, it seems to me, the Presidency in the United States, having originally received power from below, according to an *ascending* theory of government, will act, and is already acting, according to a *descending* theory, as if power is confirmed to it from above, by the law, the nation, the allegedly manifest (one is tempted to say, revealed) goals of the organic people. This is a recent development, and my description will be resisted by those who still emphasise the atomised nature of American society: a society of expectant capitalists and their institutions, able to buck the power of the state. I can only reply that I think their picture is already out of date (as both extreme right and new left instinctively recognise). The enmeshing of big business and the universities with the federal government hardly fits their picture. It fits the portents I am trying to describe here.

In England, the myth is still sustained that the executive is continually subject, from day to day, to a reaffirmation of assent from below, through the votes of the House of Commons. In practice, this is no longer true. But the myth is still useful. Although Harold Wilson from time to time tries it, no Prime Minister can announce a policy in the House of Commons (which is the only place he can announce it) as if he were a national leader, the Head of State; for there, opposite him, is the Opposition, representing half of the nation, and ready with a motion of censure and rejection. We know, anyhow, that the real Head of State is not there, but at the race-course, and the majority of the "organic people" are there, in spirit, with her.

In contrast, of course, President de Gaulle, having had power conferred on him from below (he uses the mandate like a coronation), has proceeded to act as if it had been confirmed to him from above: as if he were "the incontrovertible agent . . . of the organic people," the representative of *la France douce* – or rather, these days, *la France aigre*. Similarly, the President of the United States increasingly acts, in day-to-day matters, under the same claim, that he represents a superior national will – a claim which, in a moment of national crisis, President Lincoln felt bound to assert. (In terms of political theory, Lincoln claimed to represent a national will, the *real* will, even, of the organic people, at a moment when it could reasonably have been claimed that both national will and organic people had been shown not to exist. But he won, and so we know him to be great.)

I must emphasize again that I am fully aware of the countless bodies of interest which exist in this country, able to resist and

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obstruct the claims of the Presidency to exercise the national or popular will. But the fact remains that these bodies, even when they are organized in the two Houses of Congress, cannot and do not claim to represent the organic people. In fact their strength lies in the quite opposite claim: that they represent the people divided into separate and local interests, its organic unity destroyed. Again, therefore, the constitution of the United States might seem to combine two opposite theories of government: organic and inorganic representation of the people. But, in the modern age, no national state, and no democratic state of any size has been able to face the problems of government without, in practice, falling back more and more on the theory that a direct transference of power takes place from the people to the executive, that there is a direct transformation of popular energy into executive energy. In the United States, the difference in the political theory is evident in the difference between the methods of the New Deal and those of the Great Society. Roosevelt, for all his improvisation and his creative political genius, really manipulated the traditional political system. But the instinct of the administration of President Johnson has been to wrench both the theory and practice of the federal constitution almost to the point of annihiliating it.

Of course, the effort has had more failures than successes. Of course, President Johnson has encountered the inexhaustible reserves of inaction and obstruction which separate and local interests possess in a country as large as the United States. But the effort, in future Presidencies, will continue. The theory of the American constitution needs urgently to be restated in terms of the democratic, and not liberal, assumptions which now prevail in the Western world. But political theory, in the United States, is not taken very seriously.

The need for political theory

There are several obvious results of the working of the American Presidency in these conditions. In the first place, people come to expect too much of it: no sooner is a need demonstrated, an appetite expressed, than there is a demand for a presidential *tsar*. Secondly, and of course related to the first, the federal government itself tries to do too much: thus, there is a profound constitutional, as well as any political or personal, reason why the present administration is burdening itself with so many tasks. Thirdly, the available talent in the country, if attracted to public service, drifts more and more to the federal government, thus weakening all other sources of executive energy. Both the exaggerated elevation which the "new men" felt in the presidency of Kennedy, and the exaggerated disappointment so many of them feel in that of his successor, are explicable in terms of the "new presidency" itself, what is demanded of it and what

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it expects to do, and of the constitutional assumptions which increasingly support it.

Constitutions do matter. We spend far too much time these days examining political institutions – hence making the faulty analysis of an "institutionalized" Presidency – instead of the constitution which determines the relationship between them. Moreover, in examining constitutions, political theory is ultimately the only true assistance. If I have concentrated, in this article, on the combination of roles in the Presidency, it is because I believe that that combination lends itself, as in France, to the kind of distortion of a liberal constitution which the appetites of a democracy in a national state always demand: to the elevation of the descending over the ascending theory of government.

I am new to the Presidency. I have deliberately emphasized, perhaps over-emphasized, the one aspect of it which has most forcibly struck me: the elements in it which could lead to a form of Caesaropapism (which is a very different matter from the simple Caesarism which has always been feared to lie latent in the American Presidency, not least by the English Whigs in the early 19th century). In my edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, the article on Justinian is still the one composed by Lord Bryce. "Justinian's age," he says, "was quite unequal in intellect to so vast an undertaking as the fusing on scientific principles into one organic whole of the entire law of the empire." They are words of warning, worth addressing to the "new men" of our own age. (Was there not a hint of such a warning in Aaron Wildavsky's "The Political Economy of Efficiency" in *The Public Interest*, Summer 1967?) For, with all my selection and over-emphasis, I would add in conclusion that there is no aspect of the Presidency which does not seem to me to invite, as urgently, the assistance of political theory. The difference, in organization and role, between the national parties, on which the President relies, and the state and local parties is an obvious area in which political theory can offer illumination. So is the whole of the nominating (and, indeed, electing) process, which no longer performs, in theory or practice, what was originally expected of it.

When the two principles of representation and federation, which Hume said would alone enable a popular government to adapt itself to a vast continent, are to-day so changed and weakened, one can indeed question whether the federal constitution, as originally conceived, will survive. I am convinced only that its condition is critical, and that it requires, not only empirical observation, but the kind of political theory which makes even the prudent *Federalist* timeless.

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The Americanization of Frantz Fanon

ARISTIDE & VERA ZOLBERG

They moved in a tight-knit order, carrying sticks and clubs shotguns and rifles, led by Ras the Exhorter become Ras the Destroyer upon a great black horse. A new Ras of a haughty. vulgar dignity, dressed in the costume of an Abyssinian Chieftain; a fur cap upon his head, his arm bearing a shield, a cape made of the skin of some wild animal around his shoulders. A figure more out of a dream than out of Harlem, than out of even this Harlem night, yet real, alive, alarming.

"Come away from that stupid looting," he called to a group before a store. "Come jine with us to burst in the armory and get guns and ammunition!"

THE awesome presence Ralph Ellison conjured up twenty years ago is in our midst. But the Destroyer has moved with the times. In the Harlem of the twenties and thirties, he was an Ethiopian prince; in the Chicago South Side of the fifties, he was Jomo Freedom Kenyatta; today he still sometimes wears an animal skin, but more often a sweatshirt printed with the new symbols of a militant Third World. Now he is the warrior of Islam launching a new Jihad; he is the Black Panther; he is Simba, the Congolese lion, marching on Stanleyville. His weapons have been modernized too: no more sticks, clubs, and shotguns, but a precision rifle with telescope sight and a

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Molotov cocktail. Like a good Fidelista or Maoist, he completes his panoply with a book. Or at least some who dream of leading the Black Guard have this vision. "You're going along thinking all the brothers in these riots are old winos," Dan Watts, the editor of *Liberator* magazine told Jimmy Breslin of the Chicago *Sun-Times* after Newark and Detroit. "Nothing could be further from the truth. These cats are ready to die for something. And they know why. They all read. Read a lot. Not one of them hasn't read the Bible." "The Bible?" "Fanon. . . . You'd better get this book. Every brother on a rooftop can quote Fanon."

Well, perhaps not every brother on a rooftop, but at least every brother who sits in an editor's chair or who travels on the lecture circuit; every New Left intellectual, black or white; and especially every war correspondent or strategy analyst. In *The New York Times*, Paul Hoffman reported in May, 1967, that in New York, Chicago, and Berkeley, Trotsky and Camus had given way to Che Guevara and Fanon. In June, Gene Roberts reported from Atlanta that Fanon was on SNCC's Revised New Syllabus; in July, Fanon made the *Times*' editorial page in William V. Shannon's "Negro Violence vs. The American Dream"; and in August, Gene Roberts explained that SNCC's new pro-Arab stance was in keeping with Fanon's support of the Algerian rebels against France. *The Wretched of the Earth* has become *The Prince* of our age, its author a latter-day Old Nick.

The transfiguration of a man

Fanon himself came to America only as a dying man in 1961; he died here of leukemia a month after *Les Damnés de la Terre* was published in Paris. The book became available in English in 1964 and was published in the United States by Grove Press in 1965, a few months before the Watts riots. Its most striking idea, that the salvation of the colonial world lies in cataclysmic violence, was immediately broadcast in reviews which were granted prime space in publications ranging from *Time* and *Newsweek* to *Commentary* and *The New York Review of Books*. Many commentators saw it as an allegory of our own situation. Fanon's 1959 work, *L'An V de la Révolution Algérienne*, was brought out by the Monthly Review Press as *Studies in a Dying Colonialism* the same year. His first book, originally published in 1952, appeared in 1967 as *Black Skins, White Masks*. Only *Pour la Révolution Africaine*, Fanon's political essays and editorials for *El Moujahid*, written between 1952 and 1961 and published posthumously in Paris in 1964, is now lacking to make the American corpus complete.

The appeal of Fanon's books stems not solely, and perhaps not even primarily, from their content but from their form and from their author's personality. In fact, his readers know but little about his life;

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but as with Patrice Lumumba, James Dean, Malcolm X, or Richard Farina, early death contributed to the transfiguration of a man into a myth which infuses his ghost with fascinating powers. In Fanon's case, there are additional irresistible features. As he himself put it, "I attempt when I write . . . to touch my reader affectively, that is to say irrationally, almost sensually." His apocalyptic style gives new life to well-known sociopsychological hypotheses and ideological doctrines hitherto available only in dry scientific papers or turgid Germanic compendia. His visceral poetry transforms brilliant insights and trite half-truths into equally profound mysteries. His work embodies all the appropriate ingredients for selling an exotic product on the American market: it is made in France and contains sex, violence, psychoanalysis, Marxism, and it has been certified as an explosive intellectual contribution by Jean-Paul Sartre. But its contents too are timely. In an era of apparently inextricable American involvement in the sequels of European colonialism, in an epoch of growing incomprehension in the face of internal crisis, at a time when traditional religion is rejected even by theologians, in an age of rebellion against the tenets of time-worn liberal and radical ideologies, Fanon appears to provide a map which can guide the faltering steps of militant intellectuals in danger of being overtaken by events. But a cool look at the map reveals that its paths may take them in unexpected directions.

The French colonial experience

The specter who now haunts America is the Fanon of the first chapter of *The Wretched of the Earth*. But as one rereads his surrealistic essay, "On Violence," even in the light of burning American cities, it does not stand up as an allegory of our situation. In the face of imminent death, Fanon's single-minded passion was with birth, the birth of a new world in the colonies of Europe. His blunt assertion that "decolonization is always a violent phenomenon" is not a hyperbolic statement for someone who had gravitated in the French orbit since the end of World War II. It is merely an assertion of historic fact. By the time Fanon wrote, there had been an unbroken record of French warfare against its colonial possessions since 1947. It began with the little known, but extremely bloody, repression of an uprising in Madagascar, continued through seven years of war in Indochina, and culminated in seven years of war in Algeria. Meanwhile, there were protracted conflicts in Morocco, Tunisia, the Ivory Coast, and Cameroun, and a nasty confrontation between de Gaulle and Sékou Touré in Guinea in 1958, following which the French discovered that the rest of their tropical African territories could be more easily manipulated as legally sovereign client-states. It was hardly an exaggeration to suggest that there appeared to be no choice

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available to those colonized by France except to rise against her or to accept her hegemony on her own terms. Nowhere was this more obvious than in Fanon's own West Indies, which to this day are governed according to a one-way-only theory of assimilation, recurrently reinforced by coercive measures against political dissenters.

Fanon's entire life was dominated by this unbearable fact which forced him – an "acculturated" West Indian psychiatrist – into permanent exile. In *The Wretched of the Earth*, he was angrily denouncing the false consciousness of his fellow-islanders; he was warning his Algerian friends who had undertaken negotiations with France not to jeopardize the revolutionary transformation of Algerian society (which he had forcefully described in *Studies in a Dying Colonialism*) by seeking a compromise peace; he was warning the Congolese leaders not to put their trust in the United Nations; he was pointing out to the Angolans the dangers of turning to international organizations for redress against the horrors of Portuguese domination. Most of all, he was providing the younger intellectuals of the new African states with the critical apparatus needed to evaluate the one-party states founded by the first generation of nationalists. He foresaw accurately that authoritarianism was a mere façade which hid an absence of authority and that, in the absence of political integration, these new regimes would remain at the mercy of any blow inflicted by an indigenous military group or by an external power.

A murderous encounter

The simple paradigm of "On Violence" is by now well known. The confrontation between colonizers and colonized is not based on their relationship to the means of production, but on the forcible establishment of hegemony by one society over another. While this has happened before in history, the special situation of the contemporary world stems from the fact that the conquerors and the conquered belonged to different races, or at least that they came to be defined in this manner. Through a fundamentally violent act, the world was torn asunder. Everything derives from this event. Fanon argues that the colonial world is not like the world of capitalist countries – it does not constitute a single society but two, which are hierarchically related. Paralleling Rolf Dahrendorf's critique of Marx, he argues that political relationships are fundamental; in the colonial situation, even the economic infrastructure is a mere superstructure: "Cause is consequence. A man is rich because he is white, a man is white because he is rich."

History, then, proceeds dialectically. Colonialism is the rape of a society and the subsequent establishment of a totalitarian system – totalitarian in the sense that a completely new set of values is imposed, within which the situation of the colonized is fundamentally

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redefined. Through this cultural redefinition, initially enforced by a powerful coercive apparatus, the colonized becomes to the civilized colonizer as anti-matter is to matter. Some turn inward, becoming raging Calibans; others become "good natives," like Ariel, and are given a pittance in exchange for loss of freedom. There is therefore no solution except a self-assertion of the colonized which is as fundamental, as total, as violent, as the original act which brought colonialism into being. Nationalist agitation is but the first necessary phase in the process of emancipation. What is required is not merely the achievement of formal sovereignty but the full reintegration of each member of each colonized society into a new nation. This is to be achieved through mass participation in the process of decolonization, followed by equally intense participation in the struggle against underdevelopment. Intellectuals must lead, but they cannot trust themselves or be trusted by others, since they are most vulnerable to the temptations proffered by the colonizer. They can succeed in achieving their historic task only if they derive a new innocence from intimate contact with those least affected by colonialism, the peasants.

"If the last are to become the first, this can occur only as the result of a decisive and murderous encounter between the two protagonists." Was this dying man inciting the world to murder? As Sorel and others who before him viewed violence as a source of salvation, Fanon remains ambiguous on the subject. The need for violence in the struggle for national liberation, he argues, is a function of the size of resident white minorities and of its use by the colonial power to maintain hegemony. There is no doubt that he fully endorsed armed insurrection in the cases of Algeria and of Angola, and that he deplored the unwillingness of the leaders of the new African states around 1960 to support direct assaults against southern African bastions. But he also argued that, in other situations, political struggle would suffice, that violence may be symbolic only or channeled into other forms of pressure. Speaking of violence in the international context, for example, he merely advocates the use of boycotts as a major weapon to obtain from the developed countries aid which would be viewed as reparations for past exploitation. Although he rejected "non-violence" as a mere bargaining counter and reflecting a willingness to compromise, he wrote approvingly of the American freedom riders. Throughout, he refers to the political *or* armed phase of the struggle for national liberation without distinguishing qualitatively between them. What matters, then, is the determination to struggle, not violence *per se.*

Anyone attempting to adapt Fanon's scenario for the American stage must reflect on his critique of the intellectuals of the new states who, he believed, were too easily satisfied with mere ideologi-

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cal borrowing. He urged them to abandon European models, be they bourgeois or Marxist, and to draw their own maps. How is this to be done? Fanon offers no guidance except through his own analytic method. The fundamental key to an understanding of his method is the importance he attributes to the situational context. Even as an ideologue, Fanon remains the clinician who bases his diagnosis on *this* patient's case, on *this* patient's history, constitution, and environment, not merely on an understanding of systems in general. He repeatedly asserts that the colonial patient is unique, that even Marxist doctrine is inadequate in approaching his bedside. But if that is the case, then it follows that the physician's prescription for treatment cannot be unthinkingly administered to others.

On Negro identity

Both *The Wretched of the Earth* and *Studies in a Dying Colonialism* are applied studies in revolutionary strategy appropriate to particular situations. They are linked not only by Fanon's Algerian experience but by an underlying theory of man in relation to society which he had developed in his first book, *Black Skins, White Masks.* Paradoxically, it is this book, his last to appear in America, which is potentially most relevant to the American situation, because it is concerned with the identity crisis of the Negro in a white world rather than with the special situation of colonialism.

Written while Fanon was a medical student, it reflects his clinical experiences, beginning with the belated discovery of his own alienation, reinforced by his observations concerning other Negroes from the Antilles and from Africa in a society which maintained that, unlike Anglo-Saxons on both sides of the Atlantic, it was not racist. He discovered in the course of his studies that Freud and Jung were culture-bound. Observing the interactions between North African proletarian patients and French middle-class doctors in a French hospital situation, he learned, as American medical students are only now beginning to be taught, that even somàtic medicine is not independent of its sociocultural context. The book was conceived in the intellectual and political atmosphere of post-war France which included: the beginnings of the period of colonial warfare already mentioned; the repression of the more militant political movements in West Africa; and the apogee of the intellectual community of French intellectuals of African descent in diaspora on the basis of the concept of *négritude* – a concept developed since the late 1920's by two poet-politicians, Fanon's countryman Aimé Césaire and Léopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal. It was a time, also, when French intellectuals began to move beyond *Uncle Tom's Cabin* and were becoming somewhat more familiar with contemporary analyses of American race relations. The philosophic bastion erected by Bergson

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and Alain had already been rocked by the belatedly discovered batteries of Marxism and was crumbling under the onslaught of Merleau-Ponty's and Sartre's attacks.

Out of these ingredients Fanon fashioned a theory strikingly similar in many respects to the nascent paradigm of American sociology of race relations, which had already been fertilized by its encounter with psychoanalysis. Beginning with early socialization and finding many clues in language, he discovered that the black man living in a white world necessarily assumes an identity which is not congruent with his true being: he puts on a white mask. The consequences are obvious at another stage of human development: examining sexual relationships between adults of different races, he concludes that love is not possible because such relationships always involve the intrusion of another relationship which manifests itself through an inferiority complex or through its negation in the exaltation of domination. In passing, he criticizes the thesis then recently argued by Mannoni, in *La Psychologie de la colonisation* (in its English version: *Prospero and Caliban*) concerning the innate need for dependence in primitive societies, as demonstrated by ancestor-worship in Madagascar. This dependence, Fanon argues, is merely the result of the depersonalization which stems from a forcible imposition of European supremacy over traditional cultures. However, he expands Mannoni's notion that the European in a colonial situation suffers from a "Prospero complex" to encompass Western industrial society in general.

Like the Freud of *Civilization and Its Discontents*, or more recently Norman Brown, Fanon does not hesitate to psychoanalyze history. Racism, he argues, is a fundamental component of Western society, founded on the sexual repression Europeans underwent in the process of striving for high achievement, and embedded in the authoritarian family structure of European society as well as the socialization it entails. Not only the European in the colonies, but *all* men of European culture seek to overcome their own inferiority complex by dominating others. The mechanism always involves the projection of inner fears upon the Other: fear of Jewish brains, fear of Negro sexual power. The latter, for Fanon, is more ravaging than the former, because it concerns a more basic drive, anchored into European cultural archetypes. When the Black internalizes this European collective unconscious through contact with white society, he then becomes a victim, enslaved to the archetype. Unable to deal with this cultural neurosis on an individual level, forcibly prevented from seeking drastic solutions, Negroes resolve it in their dreams: they become white or disappear.

The Negro is less than a man, he is a Black; but the European is also less than a man, he is a White. Since the source of the neurosis

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stems from the creation of a manichean world in which race is a fundamental category of differentiation comparable to class, the neurosis cannot be extirpated through individual psychotherapy of Blacks or Whites. The task of the healer is not merely to analyze the psychodynamics of the situation, but to provide a collective solution.

Anti-négritude

Most of the book is devoted to a critique of the solution devised by Franco-African intellectuals, *négritude*. Fanon retraces his own discovery of pride in being black, based on the African past, but also relates how this solution became inadequate after Sartre praised its architects but condemned their work as mere "antiracist racism," a fleeting antithesis, which must in turn destroy itself and move on to a universal level through Marxism. Sartre was wrong to condemn it, Fanon argues, because it is a *necessary* stage; ultimately, however, he agrees with his master that the solution is not to oppose black narcissism to white narcissism, but to surmount both by changing the world. The self of the Black can become that of a man only through confrontation with others: citing Hegel, he concludes that the universality of the self must be recognized by others in order to acquire true existence. This recognition cannot merely be granted; it must be acquired through one's own efforts, in struggle.

Much of what Fanon had to say was profoundly original in the French world of 1952. The more lasting value of *Black Skins, White Masks*, however, lies in the consummate ability of its author to merge the role of the analyst and of the man of action by creating a myth without which, following Sorel, he believed no struggle could be successful. At the beginning there was a state of psychic peace. But this was violated by the Europeans, themselves the victims of their own history, who created a Manichean world. By committing himself to a human destiny, not to a black past or to a white present, not by exploiting white guilt or by avenging black suffering, the Black will become a Man and force the White to become a man as well:

> There is no Negro mission, there is no white burden. . . . No, I do not have the right to be a Negro. I do not have the duty to be this or that. . . . I find myself suddenly in the world and I recognize that I have one right alone: That of demanding human behavior from the other. One duty alone: That of not renouncing my freedom through my choices. I have no wish to be the victim of the *Fraud* of a black world. . . . There is no white world, there is no white ethic, any more than there is a white intelligence. There are in every part of the world men who search. I am not a prisoner of history. I should not seek there for the meaning of my destiny. I should constantly remind myself that the real *leap* consists in introducing invention into existence.

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A vision of regeneration

Fanon rejected hatred and blackness for its own sake in favor of a fierce humanism. Much as does Baldwin, he imposes upon the Negro the immense burden of saving himself by saving a decaying world. But he was an incorrigible optimist. Beyond violence, in *The Wretched of the Earth* he foresaw the regeneration of the entire world through the self-assertion of Third World nations and their full integration into a world community from which the Manichean heresy would have been expunged. His vision of America's fate was more ambiguous. In his last book, America appears as a second Europe, more monstrous than the first. But in 1952 he had conjured up for America a vision which paralleled, on the *national* level, his vision of a regenerated world:

> The twelve million black voices howled against the curtain of the sky. Torn from end to end, marked with the gashes of teeth biting into the belly of interdiction, the curtain fell like a burst balloon. On the field of battle, its four corners marked by the scores of Negroes hanged by their testicles, a monument is slowly being built that promises to be majestic. And at the top of this monument, I can already see a white man and a black man *hand in hand.*

He appears to have believed, like many American liberals of the pre-Little Rock period, that America had moved from lynchings to mere discrimination, and that this in turn was now being overcome as the result of the efforts of both Negroes and Whites. The mood of the now distant era when the yearly affirmation of new legal rights constituted tangible steps forward, and when the change of constitutional doctrine concerning segregation was imminent, makes the apotheosis appear less utopian than when we come upon it in the year *Black Skins, White Masks* was published in the United States. Yet, Fanon's vision was not merely the result of his ignorance of the depths of the American racial problem. It was founded on a notion, not well articulated but nevertheless present throughout his work, that the special relationship which bound Blacks and Whites in America constituted a source of national regeneration which was not present in the nations of Europe. The problems of American society were greater, but its ultimate potential was greater as well. He believed that America could bring about within itself the fundamental transformation which elsewhere would necessitate action on an international scale.

The anguish of liberty

It is difficult to ascertain how well he knew the then already large literature on race in America. Nowhere does he refer to the pre-World War II works of Bogardus and Park, of Davis and Dollard;

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to the great breakthrough of Myrdal; to the early post-war works of Clark, of Cayton and Drake, of Allport, of Bettelheim and Janowitz. His references are to films such as *Home of the Brave* and *Lost Boundaries,* to Richard Wright's *Native Son* and works by Chester Himes, as well as to occasional articles in *Les Temps Modernes* such as a piece analyzing the Uncle Remus stories. From these he derived the conviction that the situation of the Negro in the United States differed significantly from that of his counterpart in the French world, the Negro of the West Indies.

While both are descendants of slaves, in the French world emancipation came as a paternalistic *fiat* from afar, followed by total indifference, leaving the ex-slave with the frustration of having no perception of strong feelings toward him. Hence, he has nothing to fight against. "The former slave, who can find in his memory no trace of the struggle for liberty or of that anguish of liberty of which Kierkegaard speaks, sits unmoved before the young white man singing and dancing on the tightrope of existence." Doomed to be unchallenged, the French Negro turns his anger upon himself. "I say 'the French Negro,' for the American Negro is cast in a different play . . . ." There is no question of indifference there, because unlike Frenchmen who simply ignore the Blacks, white Americans are constantly confronted with the presence of Negroes – directly in the South and, Fanon believed, vicariously through literary works in the North. The White is inextricably involved with the Black. To the White American the Negro represents freedom, gregariousness, passivity, contentment, exuberance; he is an unfrustrated animal. The White, constrained by his own civilization, envies this freedom. Fanon analyzed the White's response much as Conrad did: fearing the Negro as a potential rapist and aggressor, he tries to frustrate and constrain him to make him more like himself; but at the same time the Negro is his "secret sharer" who represents all that the white man would like to be. Wish fulfillment often takes the form of artistic fantasy: it is no accident, according to Fanon, that novels and films in which whites learn that they are Negroes, in which Negroes make love to white women or kill whites, become box-office successes and best-sellers; that whites become jazz musicians and that they put on blackface.

In America, whites oppress Negroes, but some necessarily participate in their struggle. Like Camus's *Stranger,* Fanon demanded that the Negro, as a man, be greeted with shouts of hatred. He believed that hatred and active oppression were a form of recognition and that, because these conditions determined his existence, the American Negro was less depersonalized than the Negro West Indian. The American slave, who was liberated in battle, has always fought discrimination and has always been fought against. But his

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existence has never been denied. "There is war, there are defeats, truces, victories."

Immersed in the Algerian situation to the end of his life, Fanon never wrote extensively about the changing American world. In *The Wretched of the Earth*, he alludes briefly to rumors of preparations for armed insurrection by Negroes in America. But his comments are cryptic: he cites these rumors, together with the efforts of counter-insurgency troops in Algeria and other incidents as evidence for the proposition that the two blocs may find it convenient to end violence on the international scene, while fostering it within each other's camp. Did he believe, anticipating some Americans, that racial conflict in the United States was the result of Communist efforts? Of greater interest are his remarks in a chapter "On National Culture," devoted to a demonstration of the dead-end to which *négritude* leads if it is pursued as an objective in itself. He traces the evolution of American Negroes in contact with African intellectuals from 1956 to 1959: initially, the Americans obtained from the apostles of *négritude* a reasonable birth certificate; but they soon realized that their problems were fundamentally different. All Negroes are confronted with a white world, but: "The principles and objectives of the freedom rides in which Black and White Americans attempt to roll back racial discrimination are but tenuously related to the heroic struggle of the Angolan people against the odious colonialism of Portugal." This is as it must be, Fanon concludes, because "any culture is first of all national."

One nation or two?

Fanon remains silent on what concerns us most: Is the American situation analogous to the extreme colonial situation of *The Wretched of the Earth*? Is America one nation with an oppressed minority of Americans, or is it two nations? That is the debate which is now raging among the worshipers of Saint Fanon. Some, like LeRoi Jones, derive from him arguments on behalf of the impossibility of integration and for the assertion of the solidarity of the Negro nation, captive in America, with the Third World. But Daniel Watts castigates LeRoi Jones and others for their utopianism. He too invokes Fanon, but he argues that the struggle is meaningless unless it is organized around systematic demands for "a realistic piece of the action" in America.

In the spirit of Fanon's existential dialectic, the answer cannot be preordained but can only stem from choices made by both sides. If readers of Fanon, be they angry Negroes or frightened whites, neglect his own warnings and impose the scheme he extrapolated from Algeria on our own situation, then it is possible that the nation will be irremediably torn asunder. But if they do justice to Fanon

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by using his works as critically as he used those of other thinkers, from Marx and Engels to Jung and Sartre, then they may recognize, as Fanon himself appears to have done, that the only path to salvation for both Negroes and whites in America lies in their determination to forge a common fate.

Fanon believed that self-emancipation requires participation in a struggle to bring about cultural and structural change, and that all means were useful to this end, "including, of course, violence." From his particular vantage point, he viewed passive acceptance of the dehumanization of the self by the colonized much as others have viewed the apparent acquiescence of Jews to their own slaughter in World War II. There is no dignity in permitting oneself to be brutalized and murdered. Defensive organizations of Negroes in Deep South counties, where justice is never done through legal channels and where more or less organized brutality by whites against a hitherto submissive Negro majority prevails, are in keeping with his call for the creation of a new man, one who says No to oppression and is willing to die for his dignity. But what of the urban areas, where – in Fanon's own view – the forces of oppression are not so palpable? There is no band of night-riders; oppression involves a complex of socio-economic factors in which no particular agent can be singled out as more responsible than others. Will the looting of a shop transform the economic system? Will setting fire to the ghetto purify America? Or are these acts, notwithstanding the temporary elation they produce among the participants and spectators, to be taken, as Fanon might have done, as evidence of the inability of the damned to surmount the inhumanity that has been imposed on them? The main consequence of uncontrolled fury may well be to bring about, in America, an attitude similar to that of the *Cartieristes,* the right-wing anticolonialists of France, who shrugged, "Let them be independent and be damned." Then, black sovereignty would be established over dead American cities. Lest we forget, Fanon never excluded means *other* than violence and passionately rejected the notion that regeneration would be brought about by a wonder-working conflagration alone. Self-assertion in urban situations will be infinitely more meaningful and effective if it takes the form of political and economic pressure, of community organization, and other strategies which alone can bring about structural change.

The right to be violent

Ultimately, a consideration of the functions of violence in the emancipation of the Negro American cannot be divorced from its functions in American society as a whole. If what is at stake is the resolution of the identity crisis of Negroes, and particularly of young adult males, through manipulation of the external world, then it is

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important to recognize the constraints imposed by existing cultural patterns upon the range of available means. Evidence of manhood can take many forms, but a crisis can transform selected role-models into especially timely stimuli. This appears to be the case at present with the oldest of all American heroes, the Minuteman. Lone and defiant, judge and jury, he has reappeared throughout our history in his many avatars as the vigilante, the cowboy, the gangster; he has been glorified in military doctrine and in the mass media; he is protected by the Constitution in his right to bear arms and organized to defend his rights in Congressional lobbies. The Molotov cocktail is but a McLuhanish extension of his self through a new medium, gasoline. The adoption of this role-model by the Negro is the greatest proof yet that the Negro is an American.

That this choice should be made, literally on the rooftops or in the streets, and more often vicariously as by carrying Fanon's Little Black Book, is not surprising since the Negro male has been denied the right to this role throughout most of our history. Negro men, as analysts from Davis and Dollard on to Moynihan and Fanon himself have pointed out, have been forced to suppress aggressive impulses in the face of oppression in order to survive, with corresponding damage to their psychic structures and a turning inward of violence upon themselves. While many outlets for male violence have been available to whites, either in fact or in approved fantasy, the Negro male until recently could be openly violent only when contained in the cage of the boxing ring; from Reconstruction to World War II, with some exceptions, even combatant roles in the Armed Forces were usually closed to him. Given the importance of violence in defining the role of the American male, the relative deprivation which has ensued for the Negro has been much greater than Fanon imagined.

Unfortunately, the Negro's assertion of his right to be a violent American comes at a time when traditional American views of violence are themselves being altered, especially among those who hitherto have been most sympathetic to Negro emancipation. While sex is being demystified through scientific objectivity, violence — at least in middle-class urban society — has taken over as the great source of anxiety. The same mothers who protest that science kits for children are defective because sex organs are omitted also protest against the diversity and quantity of war toys on the market; masturbation and "playing doctor" are approved as normal educational experiences, but children are told, "Don't get into a fight"; liberal PTA's insist that sexual education be included in the curriculum, but listen attentively for rumors of corporal punishment by teachers. This Victorianism-turned-on-its-head seems to be involving us in a process which parallels the earlier one stemming from the repression of sex.

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As violence is being extirpated from our institutional life, it begins to lurk around every corner as a mysterious force. The new novel and the new drama, the new art and the new cinema, drown us in a massive outpouring of gratuitous violence, literal or symbolic, which evokes the delights of pornotopia. Benefiting from the general liberalization of censorship, however, bloodshed can be displayed with impunity in spite of occasional mutterings by incipient liberal Watch and Ward societies.

This transformation seems to be expressed in white views of Negroes as well. The Negro remains the Other, but elementary knowledge generally available makes it difficult to believe the Negro male capable of prodigious sexual prowess. The abandonment of old beliefs is reflected in the disappearance of laws concerning miscegenation and in the appearance of interracial love scenes on the screen. Instead, there is a growing belief that the Negro male is in close touch with the source of the new mystery, violence, and that his potency in this respect is infinite. Faced with the moral duty to accept integration while mistrusting Negroes, Americans projected their fears onto other objects: from 1960 on, for example, the Congo, another old cultural theme, became available in daily headlines recounting atrocities; events in other African countries, selectively reported and selectively perceived, contributed to the process. It was possible to believe that *our* Negroes were civilized and hence entitled to human rights, while conveniently holding the view that *elsewhere* Blacks are still savages. But Negroes in America have been exposed to the same information about Africa as whites, and their perceptions are often similar. Of all the cultural materials Africa makes available to those in search of *négritude,* it is noteworthy that symbols connected with violence are so often selected. White fears are confirmed: the savages are now in our midst.

In the atmosphere of panic which has been created, there is a tremendous market for pseudo-scientific writing concerning violence, the equivalent of early anthropology, which was often a mere veneer for racialism, and of early sexology, which was often barely distinguishable from pornography. At a time when the prestige of science in relation to social engineering is extremely high, pseudo-science is extremely dangerous. Ardrey's theatrical theory, which extrapolates from animal behavior a fundamental human drive — backed by violence — for territoriality, naturally acquires prestige in a society in which areal segregation is a dominant feature; such a theory can easily provide the underpinnings for one more instant ideology. But the possibility of the existence of an aggressive drive in humans is not to be taken as evidence that we are at its mercy, any more than the recognition of our sex drive transformed us into erotomanes.

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Fanon's interpretation of the role of violence in history is in the same twilight zone between science and nonsense.

In the process of making himself, man has repressed, ritualized, or replaced violence as a means of obtaining food, mates, or territory. His recurrent lapses do not invalidate the efficiency of the substitute means he has invented to achieve these ends. Similarly, violence has often appeared in constituted society when new goals of political and economic justice were set. It is not so long ago that culturally homogeneous England could be viewed as two nations. As the history of the labor movement shows, however, it is possible to transform riots into strikes, and to further institutionalize strikes as collective bargaining sessions, while preserving the benefits which both sides derive from membership in a common economic system and without jeopardizing the dignity of the participants. Love is not enough for the transformation to occur. What is required is a determination that the society will not fall apart, a realistic appraisal of the costs of different strategies, and the assumption that violence is not a cosmic force, to be worshiped or exercised, but merely another complex facet of the human phenomenon.

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A reader's guide to the Crime Commission reports

JAMES Q. WILSON

Despite the widespread popular concern with "crime in the streets," the report of the President's Crime Commission – officially, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice – is not likely to be a best-seller. In this, it will be no different from the report of most other blue-ribbon commissions, and for the same reasons: it offers no "solution" to the problem and it provides no convenient answers to the question of what we might do short of solving it. Even if it were possible (which it is not) to give clear, simple answers to popular questions about crime, the political problems of the Commission – the need to adapt its work to the interests of existing institutions now managing the crime problem, to the professional specialties of the staff recruited to write the report, to the diverse persuasions of the Commission members charged with agreeing on recommendations, and to the urgent deadlines of a White House eager for "results" – would have made either clarity or simplicity unlikely.

That famous but anonymous person – the "reasonable man" or the "intelligent layman" – would, I suppose, have some rather obvious questions about crime in America. He would want to know how much crime there is, whether there is more or less today than twenty years ago, what could be done to reduce or prevent it, and how criminals could best be handled to reduce the chance of their causing more mischief. In getting the answers to those questions, he would expect to be told whether we need more policemen; whether foot patrolmen are (as he supposes) better than motorized officers; whether the laws should not be changed to make arrests and interrogations easier

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for the police; whether the probation and parole system is working and, if it is not or if the issue is in doubt, whether "tougher sentences" should be handed out; how much police "brutality" there is and what can be done about it; whether capital punishment is of value; and how we can get rid of the drug addicts. These, at least, are the subjects of most editorial and political speeches on the subject of crime, and they comprise, I would guess, a reasonable sampling of dinner-table conversation on the issue.

The reader will have to search diligently for the answers to some of these questions. The reports – one general volume and nine task force reports, plus research studies and selected consultants' papers – are organized, by and large, not around the questions our intelligent layman would ask but around the existing institutional machinery for handling criminals (the police, courts, corrections) or around special problems in law enforcement (juveniles, drunks, drug addicts, racketeers). Only two volumes are analytical: one, on the "assessment of crime," tries to discover how much crime we have and why; the other, on science and technology, tries to find ways in which brainpower and gadgetry can assist law enforcement agencies. And the summary "Table of Recommendations" is not much help – it lists over 200 "specific recommendations," but the great majority seem rather obvious and not very illuminating (hire better people, pay higher salaries, require more training, collect more information, develop better statistics, and – above all – "coordinate" everybody's activities). The lay reader might respond, "yes, of course, but what do we do tomorrow morning that will reduce the chance of my wife having her purse snatched by some punk on the way to the supermarket?"

Delinquency

Not much, it appears. Take the section on juvenile delinquency. It contains forty recommendations. Seventeen of these are really not recommendations at all but observations on how we must improve society before we can reduce delinquency. For example, one is to "develop activities that involve the whole family together"; another is to develop better means in our schools "for dealing with behavior problems"; a third is, "reduce racial and economic segregation." Fourteen recommendations are quite specific, referring to the operations of the system of juvenile justice. But of the fourteen, *ten* are devoted to protecting the juvenile from unjust treatment at the hands of the police and the courts; *none* is obviously intended to protect society from the delinquent (four will have general benefits, perhaps, to both society and the juvenile).

At this point the reader may well throw down the report and ask, "Whose side are they on, anyway?" In fact, some law enforce-

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ment officials have taken exactly that attitude. This would not be quite fair, however. In the first place, how *do* you stop purse snatchers? We cannot put a police officer on every street corner, twenty-four hours a day. And suppose we catch a kid in the act – what is the best way to reduce the chance that he will snatch another purse next month? Put him in a reformatory? Turn him over to a probation officer? Give him a psychiatric examination? Or administer a swift kick? Answering these questions turns out to be a bit harder than one might imagine – we really don't have, strange as it may seem, very good studies of what mode of treatment or punishment will produce the smallest recidivism rate for a given cost, or a given rate for the least cost. (And cost is a very important consideration – not only are most methods of handling criminals and delinquents very expensive, but the voters, despite their well-advertised anxiety about crime, have shown themselves most reluctant to permit more than trifling sums to be spent on police salaries, jails, courts, probation officers, or treatment centers. It is even hard to get legislatures to finance a decent maximum-security prison, to say nothing of a rehabilitation center.)

Furthermore, there are some ideas about reducing purse snatching by delinquents, but they don't happen to appear in the report on delinquency. There are some in the report on the police (for example, clarify the right of policemen to stop and question a suspicious person on the streets) and some in the report on science and technology (for example, develop methods of shortening the time it takes the police to respond to a citizen call for help, better ways to allocate patrol forces within a city, and technologically feasible – but again, very expensive – citizen alarm and crime detection systems). The report on corrections also has something to say on the subject. It claims that controlled experiments in California and elsewhere have shown that intensive juvenile treatment programs – involving remedial education, work training, very low caseloads for probation or parole officers, and doing a full day's work on useful community projects over a period of weeks or months – have produced lower recidivism rates than the conventional correctional programs, which involve (for a small percentage) being locked up in a reformatory or (for most) being assigned to a probation officer whose caseload is so high and whose resources so limited that he rarely sees his nominal charges.

Thus, one reason why the average reader may find the Commission's report so unhelpful is that it is, from his point of view, badly organized. Another reason is that any new ideas the Commission could find were often just that – new ideas, for the most part untried and untested or, where tested, very costly in terms of either money or able personnel or both. But most importantly, the reader will be

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puzzled because the Commission was puzzled: it either could not obtain the necessary facts, or it could not figure out what to do about those facts it did obtain, or it could not get agreement among its members on what it thought should be done. Nobody knows how to prevent crime and nobody is very optimistic that the underlying social forces that cause crime are going to show much improvement over the next generation or two. If anyone should think he could do a better job than the Commission, he should first read the methodological appendices to the Report. The closer you get to the facts, the harder it is to offer confident generalization.

The best way to make clear all of these points is to reorganize the findings and recommendations of the Commission so that they are responsive to some of the common-sense questions of laymen rather than to the occupational concerns of the staff and consultants of the Commission.

1. How much crime is there in America?

Quite a lot, and quite a lot more than the official statistics show. One of the few major pieces of original research undertaken by the Commission was the household survey conducted by the National Opinion Research Center to discover how many families have been the victims of certain major crimes, and to compare that "victimization rate" with the "crime rate" reported by citizens to local police departments and through them to the FBI. There appear to be about half again as many robberies, twice as many serious assaults and thefts, three times as many burglaries, and four times as many rapes as the FBI reports have indicated. (The rates for murder and auto theft, on the other hand, seem to be quite accurate – murder because it is serious, because a dead body is hard to conceal, and because the police solve most homicides; auto theft because cars are heavily insured and because most are recovered by the police.) Matters are even worse in the central cities, where the true crime rates for certain offenses may be as much as *ten* times greater than the reported rate. Why is so much crime unreported? The survey suggests that the explanation is quite rational, from the point of view of the victim. Assaults are not reported because they so often involve persons known or related to each other who do not wish to "make matters worse" by turning the other fellow in to the police. Crimes against property – thefts and burglaries – are under-reported because the victims believe the chances are slight of ever getting the stolen item back; and they are quite right.

2. Is there more crime today than in the past?

It depends on the kind of crime you have in mind and the sort of evidence you are willing to trust. Of the two crimes about which

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available data are probably most accurate – murder and auto theft – the answer is yes and no. The murder rate is not increasing; in fact it has decreased to a point about a third less than what it was in 1933. The auto theft rate is increasing, but not very dramatically – today it is not much higher than it was in the 1930's. For other crimes, especially thefts and burglaries, there appears to have been a significant increase, but we cannot tell whether that is because more crimes are being committed or more once-unreported crimes are now being reported. Reported robberies declined from 1933 to the end of World War II and then started back up again. How much of that change is due to reporting error? Nobody knows, but it could be a great deal. In the early 1950's, when the New York City police changed their reporting system, the number of robberies reported there increased 400 percent in one year! And this is no isolated phenomenon – cities which have made significant changes in their reporting systems since 1959, account, according to the Commission, for 25 percent of all crimes against the person committed in the country. The Commission agonized over the problem of making a reasonable estimate of crime trends, given these imponderables. After taking into account reporting errors, migration to the city, the changing age structure of the population, and all other reasons offered to explain away the apparent increase in crime, it concluded that the apparent increase could *not* be explained away. Its Task Force on Assessment, one of the most competently staffed and intelligently directed of the nine which served the Commission, said in its report:

> The number of offenses . . . has been increasing. . . . Most forms of crime are increasing faster than population growth. This means that the risk of victimization to the individual citizen for these crimes is increasing, although it is not possible to ascertain precisely the extent of the increase. . . . Age, urbanization, and other shifts in the population already under way will likely operate over the next 5 to 10 years to increase the volume of offenses faster than population growth.

In other words, things are getting worse and they will continue to get worse. Saying this is not, however, the same thing as saying that Americans are, man for man, more "criminal" or less law-abiding today than they once were. A fifteen-year-old Negro boy may be no more criminal today than ten years ago but, since he is more likely to commit a crime than a fifty-year-old white woman and since he and his peers now make up a larger fraction of the population than ever before, the total number of crimes being produced (and, of course, the total number of victims being produced) is now greater than in recent history. Thus, the Commission finds no reason (yet) for inferring moral decay from increasing crime, and one lesson I am sure it would like people to learn is that they should stop confusing the two

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issues. The crime problem is bad enough, and will almost certainly get worse, without our also worrying that our souls are lost.

3. Why do we have so much crime?

The reader will have a harder time getting from the Commission a clear answer to this question than to almost any other. Partly this is because the causes of crime are so complex that they are difficult to specify theoretically or to test empirically. Despite this, we can list factors which increase the chances that a person will be arrested for a crime and thereby draw up a composite profile of what constitutes a "high risk" status – for example, a low-income Negro who is uneducated or mentally retarded, who comes from a broken family, whose brothers have already become criminals, and who lives in the central city behind a pool hall is almost certain to be arrested. In fact, one of the most startling calculations made by the Commission staff is that *90 per cent* of all urban Negro males will be arrested for something more serious than a traffic offense sometime during their lives.

The rejoinder to such a calculation, and one about which sociologists have fretted for many years, is the possibility that those who are *arrested* for crimes are quite unrepresentative of those who have *committed* crimes. Obviously, we have to catch them before we can study them, and some scholars, who apparently would like to believe that the lower classes and the Negroes are no more criminal than middle-class suburbanites, have gone to considerable lengths to try to show that this is the case. One method has been to ask a random sample of persons, rather than just those who get arrested, what crimes they have committed. The results usually show no relationship between social class and the commission of offenses. From this, the conclusion is drawn or implied that there is much "hidden crime" and many "hidden criminals" and that the only reason the poor and the racial minorities get arrested is that prejudiced police officers single them out and because, lacking lawyers or influential friends, they cannot avoid arrest and conviction.

This, in my opinion, is nonsense. The motivation behind this nonsense is both comprehensible and laudable. At one time, public opinion held that Negroes (or Italians, or whatever) were congenitally criminal and that the lower classes were lazy, shiftless, and immoral. There was no point in trying to change what was the product of bad genes or wicked souls, so only the most repressive law enforcement could keep the streets safe for decent people. Criminologists have struggled valiantly to disprove such notions – but unfortunately some of them have disproved too much. It is one thing to show that criminality is not an attribute of race, genetically speaking; it is quite another thing to imply that we have no reason for

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believing that Negroes (because they have been poor and badly educated, because they experience discrimination, or whatever) commit more crimes than whites, or that the poor commit more crimes than the rich.

The Task Force on Assessment of the Commission does not support the we-are-all-criminals-but-only-some-of-us-get-picked-on hypothesis. In the section where it reviews studies of high-crime areas (the so-called ecological studies) it states explicity that these studies all point in the same direction – to the coincidence of high crime rates with low incomes, broken families, mental disorder, infant mortality, being on relief, Negro concentrations, poor education, and the like.

"Hidden" crimes

But what of those surveys that show people of all walks of life confessing to hidden crimes? Most of them were done with juveniles and in the form of self-administered questionnaires. I remember filling out one myself when I was in high school. At a time when one is desperately preoccupied with proving one's masculinity, with being one of the boys, with showing that one is really grown up, you can imagine how I reacted (and everybody else I knew reacted) to the chance to make check marks on a form to show that, yes, we had stolen and fought and fornicated and generally raised all kinds of hell, especially when the question asked (typically) whether you have "ever" done that sort of thing. In a footnote, the Task Force observes that interviews, as opposed to self-administered anonymous questionnaires, produce less of this over-reporting, especially when the interview data are checked against the observations of others about the subject's delinquent tendencies.

Perhaps the best test of the proposition that "we are all criminal but some of us are unlucky enough to get caught" is to live in a low-income, central city neighborhood and then move to a middle-class residential area and ask yourself where you felt safer on the streets, where you were most willing to leave your car unlocked, and where your peace and security seemed least threatened. The Commission's household survey confirms the common-sense judgment in this matter. It provides a careful analysis of the victims of crime. For all major crimes except homicide, "the highest rates of victimization occur in the lower income groups." It is the poor, and especially the nonwhite poor, who are the victims of rapes, robberies, and burglaries. Only for larceny (taking things by stealth rather than by force or by surreptitious entry) are affluent whites more frequently victimized; interestingly enough, however, the *value* of the items lost was greater for Negroes than for whites and, among whites, slightly greater for low-income than for higher-income persons. Auto thieves are also

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no respecter of income – not surprisingly, since the rich have better cars to be stolen and since they park them downtown while shopping or working.

In short, since the poor are more often the victims of most serious crimes and since there is little reason to believe that the rich, whatever their criminal instincts, would burgle or rob lower-income persons (the rich may be larcenous, but they are not usually stupid), the victimization study, in my opinion, strengthens the impression that crime (other than white-collar or business crime) is primarily a lower-class phenomenon. Indeed, since the lower-income and Negro groups are more often the victims of crime, and especially of crimes that are unreported to the police, there is as much reason to believe that the police *under*-arrest lower-income persons as to believe that they over-arrest them. To say that crime is primarily a lower-class phenomenon is, of course, to say a bit too much – not all lower class people are criminal, and one nice question is why so many persons of lower-class origins avoid becoming so.

4. How can we eliminate the underlying causes of crime?

Strictly speaking, the Commission undertook no study of how to eliminate the causes of crime. It identified the characteristics of criminals and of crime-prone areas, but it was most reluctant – or at least the Task Force on Assessment was most reluctant – to be very categorical about causality. Though it was prepared to draw a composite profile of a social status in which the likelihood of becoming a criminal was very high (it did not call that status "lower class," but I will), it did not – because it could not, given the inadequate information at its disposal – try to estimate the most strategic factors in that status. We know that *everything* is wrong with the most criminal element – but since we cannot change everything, what one or few things should we try hardest to change? The Task Force, being cautious and statistical, does not say, and it might have been foolhardy for it to try.

The Task Force on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime, by contrast, supplied the Commission with a report very different in tone and style. It draws heavily on anecdotes about individual delinquents, on autobiographical accounts (such as Claude Brown's *Manchild in the Promised Land*), and on long, undocumented passages about the "materialism" and "sensualism" of "teenage culture" in America. It did little new research on the problem (there was neither money nor time for that) but it did pull together both the available empirical studies and several rather speculative essays on the "powerlessness" of youth and "subcultural value systems." The appendices by consultants account for three-fourths of the pages in this Task Force report, and the consultants are often in disagreement. In some

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ways this report is among the most interesting because it is so graphic and close to its subject; in other ways, it is among the most disappointing because it offers so little systematic evidence to support its generalizations and recommendations.

Those recommendations, essentially, are that we must make a "massive attack" against the conditions of slum life and that we must strengthen the family, improve the schools, provide more jobs, involve youths in community life, and eliminate the "injustices" of the juvenile court system. If delinquency, like crime generally, is primarily a lower-class phenomenon, then a "massive attack" on the conditions that create lower-class life certainly seems in order. But what conditions *do* create it? The Task Force doesn't know, and so it offers a long list of plausible but mostly untested and unproved suggestions for fixing up everything at once. "Develop methods to provide a minimum income." (But is it the receipt of *money* or the holding of a steady *job* that is most likely to get a person out of the lower class? And if just money is offered, what evidence is there that we will not thereby create a new form of dependency?) "Develop activities that involve the whole family together." (Such as?) "Involve youths in community activities." (How?) "Develop better means for dealing with behavior problems." (?) "Expand counseling and therapy." (Are there enough counselors and therapists to go around even now? And if we had more, do we know what to tell them to do?) "Reduce racial segregation." (Why? Not why generally – morality requires ending *discrimination* wherever it is found – but why end separateness in order to reduce crime? Could not a plausible argument be made, as indeed Black Nationalists are making it, that stable, homogeneous neighborhoods and communities with their own institutions are better able to exercise social control than mixed or integrated neighborhoods? I do not assert that this proposition is true, I only assert that there is as yet no less evidence for accepting it than for accepting the contrary.)

More of the same?

Indeed, this is a rather vital point. There is to some extent a trade-off between programs to end segregation and programs to end poverty. To end the latter, we may prefer more jobs (even if in all-Negro work forces), more decent housing (even if in all-Negro neighborhoods), and more suitable training programs (even if in all-Negro schools). If we prefer integration, we may be willing to give up some material gains (at least in the short run) for wider opportunities. The Chinese and Japanese have crime rates among the lowest in the nation, and they have – at least until very recently – been quite segregated, on the basis of color, from the rest of the community.

What does this mean in practical terms? We are never likely to

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have adequate scientific grounds for choosing one anti-crime strategy over another; a judgment – indeed, a leap of faith – will always be necessary. But given the rather strong evidence linking economic class and family status with crime and delinquency, and the weak or nonexistent evidence on the efficacy of counseling, youth activities, residential integration, up-to-date schools, and youth bureaus, the Commission's report would have had more force and point if it had come down squarely and emphatically for job-creation and family-maintenance programs and left the invention of new "services" and "activities" and "centers" to those willing to test seriously their value. On this point, the testimony of Stanton Wheeler, Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., and Anne Romasco of the Russell Sage Foundation deserves to be quoted in full. Writing of the various prevention and rehabilitation programs undertaken thus far, they conclude:

> As of now, there are no demonstrable and proven methods for reducing the incidence of serious delinquent acts through preventive or rehabilitative procedures. Either the descriptive knowledge has not been translated into feasible action programs, or the programs have not been successfully implemented; or if implemented, they have lacked evaluation; or if evaluated, the results have usually been negative; and in the few cases of reported positive results, replications have been lacking.

These are hardly grounds for urging more of the same, if the focus is to be – as the Task Force on Delinquency assumes it is to be – on reaching the "underlying causes" through "community efforts."

5. What can be done to prevent specific crimes?

What, in short, can we do tomorrow morning to make the streets safer? Granting that only large-scale and necessarily slow social changes will produce a reduction in the number of potential criminals, surely – the reader will think – there is something we can do in the meantime to keep the criminal away from his victim.

There was no task force on crime prevention and there is no chapter or section of the Commission's report on how to prevent crime. The "Table of Recommendations" has thirteen subheads, but none refers to crime prevention. Only in the summary of the report is there a statement on preventing crime, but it contains only six specific recommendations – having more police callboxes available to citizens, developing a single phone number by which to reach the police, experimenting with computers to reduce police response time, changing auto ignition locks so that keys are not left in them when they are not in use, and enacting stricter laws governing the sale and interstate shipment of guns.

Can that be all? Is it possible that a Commission that labored for two years, with nine task forces, a large staff, and scores of con-

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sultants and advisers, and that was created in large part because the 1964 presidential campaign had revealed how widespread and deep was the popular concern over "crime in the streets," could have only six things to say about making the streets safer? By contrast, there are at least twenty-five recommendations specifically intended to insure that the suspected criminal is treated fairly by the police and the courts, and many more intended to provide him with maximum opportunities for rehabilitation in the correctional system.

In fact, it is not as silly as it sounds. In the first place, the whole report is a study of "crime prevention," and this goal cannot be attained by listing gadgets that might be built. Perhaps the major conclusion of the Commission – and, given its conservative membership, certainly its most remarkable one – is that basically crime can only be reduced by fundamental social changes. Furthermore, I was a member of the advisory committee to the task force (on science and technology) that produced five of the six explicitly crime-prevention recommendations, and I am satisfied that a very considerable effort was made to devise reasonable measures for deterring criminals by either increasing the risk of apprehension (alarm and surveillance systems, quick police response, etc.) or by "hardening the target" (theft-proof auto locks or parking meters, for example). The problem is twofold: first, many plausible crime prevention measures either have not proved their value or, if proved, cost too much; second, for certain kinds of crimes no one can think of a plausible deterrent, proved or not.

Street lighting is a good example of the first problem. Many people think that brightly-lit streets are safer streets. Whether they are in fact safer, or only make people *feel* safer, it is thus far impossible to say. There have been tests – in New York, St. Louis, Flint, and other cities – in which crime rates are measured before and after improved street lighting. In each case the rate seems to go down, but in each case there was no effort to discover what happens to the crime rate in adjoining darkly-lit areas, or to eliminate the influence of other changes (such as increased police patrol) which have often accompanied the lighting changes, or to measure the effect on crime over a long term. Or take citizen alarms. It is fairly easy to install devices on every street and in every housing project and apartment elevator by which victims could call the police when attacked – by yelling a code word, for example, or by pushing a button or triggering a transmitter carried in one's pocket. The difficulty with such measures is that they might cost a great deal (up to $400,000 per square mile) and they would probably have a very high false alarm rate (the conventional burglar alarms in use in Washington, D. C., for example, sound alarms that prove false in 98 *percent* of all cases). Nonetheless, no one can be sure that alarms are not worth the cost

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until some city tries them, and hopefully some city will, under circumstances that permit a careful test of the results.

But for many crimes, there is almost nothing one can do. Murder occurs in private or semi-private places among (mostly) people known or related to each other. So do most rapes and serious assaults. Liquor and sex are often at the root of both crimes. If a policeman were on every corner, they would still occur. With respect to eliminating their causes, we have not had much luck in this country with banning the use of alcohol, and far from legislating against sex, the trend of the most advanced thinking is to encourage its practice as much as possible.

Burglary, larceny, robbery, auto theft

Burglary is a crime of stealth involving surreptitious entry. Burglar alarms are still quite unreliable, though in the few cases where they send a true alarm the chance of catching the burglar is so good as to make their continued use worthwhile. A policeman who can patrol noiselessly (on a bicycle or in an electric car) the back alleys has some chance of catching a burglar in the act, and thus there should be increased attention to diversifying the means of police mobility. But even then it will be a rare (and lucky) patrolman who catches a burglar red-handed. The clearance rate for burglaries is only about 25 percent, and though that figure is sometimes subject to a good deal of jiggery-pokery, it is impressive (and depressing) that it has remained about constant for many years despite all the innovations in law enforcement. Simple expedients such as locking doors and windows and leaving buildings illuminated at night are still the best deterrents to burglary.

Larceny is also a crime of stealth and therefore also hard to prevent without unacceptable invasions of privacy. One of the most common forms is shoplifting, and everybody seems to agree that it is on the increase. But that is about the same thing as saying that the amount of merchandise temptingly displayed in stores is on the increase. Some stores employ security guards, others do not. Some stores prosecute shoplifters, others consider it "bad public relations." Since most cases of shoplifting are misdemeanors, a deterrence system requires that the thief be seen stealing the goods by somebody willing to arrest and prosecute him. Many stores think the cost of catching shoplifters is not worth the price; many police departments feel they are simply being used as collection agencies by stores anxious to get the goods back but not anxious to prosecute. Hardening the target by locking up the merchandise in sturdy glass cases or putting it out of reach behind counters would undoubtedly reduce thefts substantially, but this is directly contrary to currently fashionable merchandising methods.

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This leaves, among the major crimes, robbery and auto theft. Auto thefts *can* be reduced by installing locks on the steering wheel or the transmission as well as on the ignition, by installing alarms, and by making it impossible to jump the ignition or leave the keys in the car. These innovations have been resisted by the auto industry in the past on the grounds that the consumer would not find them attractive and that extra sales would not compensate the manufacturer for the extra costs. This may be true, though anybody who has had his car taken by kids going on a joyride knows there are some inconveniences more serious than a pop-out ignition lock. In order to deal with the competitive problem, it may be necessary to encourage or require the industry to work out an agreement on anti-theft measures so that no one firm will suffer by being the innovator and thus bearing the whole cost and risk. Of course, no conceivable security system will stop a determined professional auto thief, but most cars are not stolen by professionals and thus a little deterrence may go a long way. Since stealing cars is a common way for kids to get into crime, making it harder for them to succumb to temptation may serve everyone's interests.

Robbery probably concerns people more than any other crime because (unlike murder, rape, or assault) it occurs among strangers and (unlike burglary or larceny) it involves the use or threat of force. A mugging and a purse snatch are street crimes; a hold-up usually occurs in a place of business, such as a bar, a service station, or a liquor store. Thus, robbery may be one of the few crimes which can be reduced by having more police officers on the street. We cannot be sure of this because very few police departments have ever tried to figure out, systematically, what strategy will best reduce any kind of crime. But intensive police patrols, hiring enough police, installing sufficient communications equipment, and giving the police a carefully-defined right to stop and frisk suspicious persons in high-crime areas will probably reduce the robbery rate. And we do know, from Commission studies, that the quicker the police get to the scene of a crime the greater the chance of catching the criminal. It is not the detective sifting physical evidence, tracking down clues, and solving mental puzzles who catches most of the crooks — it is the patrolman who is clever enough or lucky enough to get to the scene fast who makes the pinch.

6. Should we have more police officers, especially on foot?

"Putting the cop back on the beat" is the favorite popular remedy for rising crime rates, but the Commission has little to say about how many police officers are needed or how best they can be used; it has a great deal to say, however, about police department organization and staffing. The report of the Task Force on the Police, to put it suc-

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cinctly, is oriented to *managerial* rather than to *operational* problems. About half the report is written from the point of view of police administrators concerned with recruitment, staff services, and training, while the other half is written from the point of view of citizens concerned with "police brutality" and corruption. Patrol techniques, including the relative merits of foot and motor patrolmen, get one page. No major field study was apparently carried out by the Commission on this problem and the data reported are culled from other – mostly inadequate – sources.

The state of affairs is not entirely its fault. A few computer experiments were tried on how to allocate police patrols, and one or two "real-world" experiments were discovered and evaluated, but so far there is little to report primarily because we do not know what we are trying to achieve. An experiment must have an objective, and right now we have no clear objective. More patrols with flexible beat boundaries are desirable if quick response time to citizen calls is the objective; foot patrols in small, fixed beats are desirable if the police are to get to know a neighborhood and its people in other than a combat relationship. Saturation patrols by tactical squads are useful ways of catching and disarming suspicious persons and recovering contraband; making the police inconspicuous and more passive is the best way of avoiding the charges of "harassment" and "brutality." Putting the cops into high-crime areas may reduce crime but it may also trigger complaints that more affluent areas are not being given adequate service. A police chief knows that a computer is not much help in choosing among these objectives (though it may be of some help in learning the consequences of one strategy over another), and thus the chief is not going to find the reports of the Commission very helpful in these matters.

7. Should criminals spend more time in jail?

As enlightened people, we like to think of our correctional objective as being the reformation and rehabilitation of the criminal. But there is one very strong argument in favor of detention – a person is not likely to commit a crime if he is behind bars with a guard watching him. The crucial issue, thus, is whether the cost of a convicted criminal committing another crime while on probation or parole outweighs the gain of rehabilitating other criminals undergoing the same program.

Though there are many persons – over 400,000 on an average day – in jail or prison, there are many more on probation or parole. One might think that this is because the benefits of probation had been clearly established by careful research. It is not. There are people (often with more than one conviction and, in the case of juveniles especially, more than one conviction for a serious offense) on proba-

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tion because the prisons are full, because many judges feel that prison often makes matters worse, and because a judge typically sees a contrite and deferential man while the previous night the police officer saw the same person as a drunk and dangerous assaulter. As a result, the police – and an increasing number of citizens – complain that men arrested are back out on the street before the officer finishes writing his report, and that persons convicted of crimes, unless they are very serious indeed, are almost certain to get a suspended sentence or probation. Having observed over a period of years several police courts in various cities, I can testify that this is true. Indeed, I have gone so far as to state it in the form of Wilson's Law: Other than drunks, the average criminal or delinquent will so rarely be sent to jail that the large number of inmates can be explained only by assuming that they were born there or wandered in by mistake.

The alternatives are bleak indeed: either being locked up in an overcrowded, under-manned prison where the only meaningful educational experiences are in coerced homosexuality and lock-picking, or being referred to a harassed probation officer who can see you for fifteen minutes every two weeks and whose rehabilitative resources are limited to a lecture on the importance of avoiding bad companions.

There have been some studies that suggest that there is a middle road. The evidence developed by the Vera Institute and others shows quite convincingly that at the time of arrest a quick check of a man's background (employers, place of residence, friends) is sufficient to make a judgment as to whether he can be released without bail pending his trial; when such a release is made, the overwhelming number return for their hearing on schedule. Such methods can greatly reduce the number of people waiting in jail for a trial because they cannot afford bail. (One minor problem with this procedure concerns prostitutes. To release them is to send them back to earn the price of a lawyer.)

It also seems that if, after trial and conviction, we screen the guilty persons carefully enough and if we invest sufficient resources in probation supervision and in community work programs, some results can be achieved. In California, a group of delinquents (screened to eliminate those for whom confinement was essential) were randomly assigned to a special community treatment center and to regular training camps. After five years, those who had gone to the special center were much less likely to have had their probation revoked for having committed new offenses than those who went to the regular camp.

Why did the experimental group do better? One reason was that there was one worker to every ten or twelve youths, as compared to the one officer for every forty, sixty, or a hundred children in a normal situation. Another was that the program was carried out in the com-

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munity, where the boys were put to work, rather than in isolation from it. (Other studies have shown that special training programs run inside a correctional institution have little effect on the subjects.) And, of course still another is that the program *was* experimental — the delinquents got special treatment and knew it, and anybody who gets special treatment is likely to react simply because it is special. (Social psychologists call it the "Hawthorne Effect.")

The Commission strongly recommends that other states emulate these pilot projects undertaken in California and elsewhere. But that will be no easy task, for the same reason that improving public education is no easy task. The changes that must be made in the institution to show *any* improvement in the subject are huge. Minor variations have no appreciable effect. The number of probation officers in the country would have to be *quadrupled* to achieve the ratio in the California experiment. A large number of communities would have to accept the idea of delinquents living and working in their midst rather than out in an isolated training camp or reformatory. Efforts to appropriate that kind of money or obtain that kind of acceptance would face the usual arguments about the dangers of "coddling criminals."

But if the money and forbearance required by these new programs will be hard for conservatives to swallow, the restrictions they impose on the freedom of the juveniles will be hard for some liberals to accept. Probation was always thought to be intrinsically better than the reformatory because nobody got locked up. But though most probationers do not become repeaters, a substantial fraction do, and conventional probation methods are not reducing this fraction. The best chance for changing those likely to repeat is to take them halfway out of the community — not to reformatories but to closely-supervised, full-time work and study programs where, though they will not be put in solitary, neither will they be free to come and go as they please. Meaningful probation requires at least as much loss of liberty as the schools impose.

8. Have court decisions really handcuffed the police?

The Commission does not say and did not try to find out. It does say that those decisions requiring that defense counsel be provided, free if necessary, to every person facing a significant penalty should be implemented. With respect to whether the police should have the right to interrogate a suspect briefly without a lawyer being present, the Commission is silent.

9. How much "police brutality" is there?

Nobody will ever know — it depends on what you think brutality is (certainly the police have the right to use force under some cir-

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cumstances) and on the (impossible) task of observing a large number of police-citizen contacts in many cities both objectively and in ways that do not alter police behavior. Nevertheless, the Commission added significantly to our knowledge of what happens between the police and the citizen, though not in ways that can settle once and for all the question asked above. First, it surveyed the attitudes of whites and Negroes toward the police; second, it commissioned a study in which 5,339 police-citizen contacts in the inner precincts of three large cities were observed. The attitude survey showed that Negroes were much less trustful of the police than whites, that lower-income Negroes were less trustful than middle-income Negroes, and that many Negroes reported having seen or experienced police discourtesy, abuse, and unnecessary force. The police behavior study, however, showed almost exactly the opposite! Done, as was the attitude survey, by reputable and highly-competent university scholars, it found that race made little or no difference in how the police behaved toward citizens in most routine street encounters. The police, if anything, were more correct toward Negroes (though less often downright friendly), even when provoked – an anti-cop white citizen was more likely to be treated in a hostile manner by the police than an anti-cop Negro. Twenty cases of police use of excessive force were observed; "most did not appear to be based upon racial prejudice." Most of the victims were white.

How does the Commission reconcile these contradictory findings? It doesn't. They are stated, side by side, and the reader is left to his own devices to decide what they mean. Predictably, different readers have drawn different conclusions – Negroes point to the "crisis of confidence" in law enforcement, the police (or at least the very few who have ever glanced at the reports) to the finding that they behave reasonably well on the street. About all the Commission can conclude is that "better communication" is needed between the police and citizens, especially in minority-group and low-income neighborhoods. Clearly it is, since somebody is wrong about what is going on, but there is not yet much reason to believe that more communication will convince either side that it is mistaken.

One thing that does seem clear is that there is no necessary connection between the attitudes and the behavior of the police. By the tests therein employed, the survey showed that police officers – *including Negro officers* in a large percentage of the cases – expressed strongly anti-Negro or "prejudiced" attitudes. Whatever may have been the errors in their methods, the researchers would surely not have found blatantly hostile attitudes and reasonably correct behavior coexisting among the police if behavior were simply a reflex of attitude. This is encouraging, as it suggests that here as elsewhere behavior can be changed without having first to change attitudes.

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10. What does the Commission think we should do about crime?

Or more bluntly: if you say that all our reasonable questions are either unanswered or unanswerable, and if all our pet ideas either won't work or are untested or the Commission did not take them seriously, what is left?

A great deal, it turns out, but not much that anybody expects will produce quick or dramatic results. Whatever else law enforcement may need, it needs money. The police are now getting a smaller share of the local budget than they were sixty years ago. State and federal aid programs have been developed for almost every program – schools, welfare, highways, health – but not for the police. Most police departments are below authorized strength and are finding recruiting increasingly difficult. Police salaries in many places have not kept up with prevailing wage rates in manufacturing and construction jobs. The large number of police officers who joined right after World War II (perhaps because they expected a depression which never came) are about ready for retirement and, accordingly, there will be increasing numbers of vacancies on local forces. And judges and prosecutors in larger jurisdictions are overworked and unable to give more than a few minutes – or a few seconds – to each case. There are not even enough probation officers or prison guards to run the present system, to say nothing of a better one.

The Commission's emphasis on money and manpower may be obvious but it is not trivial. Crime control, like any other effort to grapple with a fundamental social problem, is not amenable to "solutions." We cannot "solve" the crime problem any more than we can "solve" the problem of mental illness, or poverty, or urban ugliness. We can only cope with it. We cope best with it if we hire able people to do the coping. There is no question in my mind or in the minds of most law enforcement officials that the quality of manpower entering the field – especially the police – has been going down over the last twenty years.

The objective is not to make every cop a college graduate. The Commission says it should be, but I do not see why. Any group faced with a problem tends to recommend that the problem-solvers should all be college graduates – which is nonsense, since the supply can never equal the demand unless quality is allowed to deteriorate and since there are not that many occupations for which college offers any meaningful preparation. But the motive is understandable enough: the challenges facing the police are now so difficult that a great strain is being placed on the officers' civility, and one is tempted to reach for any expedient that seems likely to increase the availability of that resource.

There are many other recommendations of the Commission that

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are important though undramatic. It turns out, for example, that the police in many big cities face a critical shortage of communications facilities – not because they lack the equipment but because they lack enough radio frequencies to get all their messages on the air without unconscionable delays. Politicians agitating about "crime in the streets" are not likely to seize upon the reallocation of frequencies as a major program, but in fact they could do a lot worse. (Hopefully, nobody will promise that if elected he will expand the electromagnetic spectrum.) Creating new institutions that can handle chronic drunks, thereby easing the load on police, courts, and jails (which now are inundated with men arrested for public intoxication) would be a substantial gain – and one sought by the police themselves, who are not at all eager to spend their time locking up bums. Here again, the lawmakers are likely to do things backwards. Persuaded by liberal sentiment that drunkenness is not a crime, they are likely to enact laws or hand down judicial decisions denying the police the right to jail such persons without at the same time approving alternative facilities to keep derelicts from freezing to death on the sidewalk during winter. (New York's new penal law is a step in just that direction.)

But the major accomplishment of the President's Commission is that it existed. Citizens today expect leadership from the federal government in helping local law enforcement to deal with crime on the streets, just as they expected the Wickersham Commission in 1931 to help deal with racketeers and bank robbers. The fact that the Wickersham Commission provided almost no real help at all, and that its major accomplishment was less to improve the police than to set in motion events that led to the elimination or reduction of "third degree" interrogations, should remind us that we must never expect too much from commissions and that we are more likely to get unintended than intended results. Nevertheless, such efforts can have great symbolic value by reducing the chance that the deeply-emotional issue of crime will be allowed by default to polarize public opinion. By producing a unanimous report, despite the very different political and legal philosophies of its members, the Commission served that function well. To do this required compromise, ambiguity, and the ducking of a few issues, but that is a small price to pay. Beyond that, the Commission led the way toward putting federal money into local law enforcement. Though it has taken a few riots to prod Congress into acting on the bill, there is no doubt in my mind that this will be money well spent – not so much because it will buy more protection for citizens on the streets as because it will show to local judges, police, and correctional authorities that they are not being left alone and unaided while they cope with society's most refractory problems.

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Machine politics — old and new

THEODORE J. LOWI

The political machine is an institution peculiar to American cities. Like the militant party elsewhere, the American machine as a classic type is centralized, integrated, and relatively ruthless. But there the similarity ends.

Machines have been integrated from within, as fraternities; they do not arise out of opposition to the state or to a hostile class. The power of the machine rested upon being integrated in a dispersed, permissive, and unmobilized society. Integrated, however, in a special American way.

The most militant parties of Europe have depended upon homogeneity — enforced if necessary. Machines have developed ingenious techniques for capitalizing upon ethnic and racial heterogeneity. Militant parties have typically been based on common ends at the center, holding the periphery together by fear. The machines were based upon a congeries of people with uncommon ends, held together at the center by logrolling and at the periphery by *fraternité, egalité,* and ignorance.

As to the significance of the machine for the development of the American city, the returns are still not in. Typically, it was the European observers who were the first to appreciate this unusual, American phenomenon. Ostrogorski, Bryce, Weber, Michels, Schumpeter, and Duverger each in his own way made an outstanding effort to

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appreciate the peculiarities of urban democracy in America. Harold F. Gosnell, in *Machine Politics: Chicago Model* (1937), was one of the very first Americans to join that distinguished company with anything approaching a systematic treatment of the subject. (By this standard, the muckrakers do not count.)

However, Gosnell was limited by the fact that there was in his time, insufficient experience with alternative forms of big city politics. Too few big cities in the United States had been "reformed" in sufficient degree to provide any basis for comparison.

In the 1960's, sufficient time has passed. The machine is nearly dead, and we have experienced lengthy periods of Reform government. We can now see the machine in perspective.

How does it shape up?

Chicago and New York

We can begin to introduce perspective by immediately setting aside Gosnell's claim that the Chicago experience on which his book was based is representative. It is the very uniqueness of Chicago's experience with the machine that gives his study such value. It is New York that is the representative big city, not Chicago. Its representativeness derives from the fact that it has experienced Reform in a way that Chicago has not. In 1967, political power in Chicago still has an extremely strong machine base; political power in New York has an entirely new and different base. As New York was being revolutionized by the New Deal and its successors, the structure of Chicago politics was being reaffirmed. When New York was losing its last machine and entering into a new era of permanent Reform, Chicago's political machine was just beginning to consolidate. New York became a loose, multi-party system with wide-open processes of nomination, election, and participation; Chicago became a tight, one-party system. New York sought to strengthen a weak mayor who already operated under a strong-mayor government; Chicago has had the opposite problem of an already strong mayor in a weak-mayor government.

To evaluate the machine we must ask whether, by surviving, machine politics in Chicago in any way distorted that city's growth and development. How much change would there have been in Chicago's history if the nationalization of politics had made possible in Chicago, as it did in virtually every other big American city, ways of "licking the ward boss" and altering precinct organization, means of loosening the hold of the county organization on city hall, power for liberating the personnel and policies of the professional agencies of government? We cannot answer these questions for Chicago because the basis of machine strength still exists there, and the conditions for its continuity might well continue through the remainder

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of the century. However, we may be able to answer them, at least better than before, by looking at Chicago from the vantage point of New York's experience.

Populism and efficiency

New York city government, like government in almost all large American cities except Chicago, is a product of Reform. It is difficult to understand these cities without understanding the two strains of ideology that guided local Reform movements throughout the past three-quarters of a century. *Populism* and *efficiency*, once the foundation of most local insurgency, are now almost universally triumphant. These two tenets are now the orthodoxy in local practice.

Populism was originally a statement of the evils of every form of bigness in the city, including big business, big churches, big labor, as well as big political organizations. Decentralization was an ultimate goal. In modern form, it has tended to come down to the aim of eliminating political parties, partisanship, and if possible "politics" itself.

Efficiency provided the positive program to replace that which is excised by populist surgery. The doctrine calls essentially for the centralization and rationalization of government activities and services to accompany the decentralization of power. Some Reformers assumed that services do not constitute power. Others assumed the problem away altogether by positing a neutral civil servant who would not abuse centralized government but who could use it professionally to reap the economies effected by rationalization and by specialization. That was the secret of the business system; and, after all, the city is rather like a business. ("There is no Republican or Democratic way to clean a street.")

While there are many inconsistent assumptions and goals between the doctrines of populism and efficiency, they lived well together. Their coexistence was supported by the fact that different wings of the large, progressive movement they generated were responsible for each. Populism was largely the province of the working class, "progressive" wing. Doctrines of efficiency were very much the responsibility of the upper class wing. Populism resided with the politician-activists. Efficiency was developed by the intellectuals, including several distinguished university presidents, such as Seth Low, Andrew Dickson White, Harold Dodd, and, pre-eminently, Woodrow Wilson, who, while still a professor of political science, wrote a classic essay proclaiming the virtues of applying Prussian principles of administration in the United States.

These two great ideas were, by a strange and wonderful chemistry, combined into a movement whose influence forms a major chapter of American history. Charters and laws have been enacted

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that consistently insulate city government from politics, meaning party politics. It has become increasingly necessary, with each passing decade, to grant each bureaucratic agency autonomy to do the job as each commissioner saw fit, as increasingly appointments were made of professionals in each agency's fields.

On into the 1960's, the merit system extends itself "upward, outward, and downward," to use the Reformers' own rhetoric. Recruitment to the top posts is more and more frequent from the ranks of those who have made careers in their agencies, party backgrounds increasingly being a mark of automatic disqualification. Reform has succeeded in raising public demand for political morality and in making "politics" a dirty word. A "good press" for mayors results from their determination to avoid intervening in the affairs of one department after another. The typical modern mayor is all the more eager to co-operate because this provides an opportunity to delegate responsibility. Absolution-before-the-fact for government agencies has become part of the mayoral swearing-in ceremony.

Reform has triumphed and the cities are better run than ever before. But that is, unfortunately, not the end of the story, nor would it have been the end of the story even had there been no Negro revolution. The triumph of Reform really ends in paradox: *Cities like New York became well-run but ungoverned.*

The new machines

Politics under Reform are not abolished. Only their form is altered. *The legacy of Reform is the bureaucratic city-state.* Destruction of the party foundation of the mayoralty cleaned up many cities but also destroyed the basis for sustained, central, popularly-based action. This capacity, with all its faults, was replaced by the power of professionalized agencies. But this has meant creation of new bases of power. Bureaucratic agencies are not neutral; they are only independent.

Modernization and Reform in New York and other cities has meant replacement of Old Machines with New Machines. The bureaucracies – that is, the professionally organized, autonomous career agencies – are the New Machines.

Sociologically, the Old Machine was a combination of rational goals and fraternal loyalty. The cement of the organization was trust and discipline created out of long years of service, probation, and testing, slow promotion through the ranks, and centralized control over the means of reward. Its power in the community was based upon services rendered to the community.

Sociologically, the New Machine is almost exactly the same sort of an organization. But there are also significant differences. The New Machines are more numerous, in any given city. They are functional

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rather than geographic in their scope. They rely on formal authority rather than upon majority acquiescence. And they probably work with a minimum of graft and corruption. But these differences do not alter their definition; they only help to explain why the New Machine is such a successful form of organization.

The New Machines are machines because they are relatively irresponsible structures of power. That is, each agency shapes important public policies, yet the leadership of each is relatively self-perpetuating and not readily subject to the controls of any higher authority.

The New Machines are machines in that the power of each, while resting ultimately upon services rendered to the community, depends upon its cohesiveness as a small minority in the midst of the vast dispersion of the multitude.

The modern city has become well-run but ungoverned because it has, according to Wallace Sayre and Herbert Kaufman, become comprised of "islands of functional power" before which the modern mayor stands denuded of authority. No mayor of a modern city has predictable means of determining whether the bosses of the New Machines – the bureau chiefs and the career commissioners – will be loyal to anything but their agency, its work, and related professional norms. Our modern mayor has been turned into the likes of a French Fourth Republic Premier facing an array of intransigent parties in the National Assembly. These modern machines, more monolithic by far than their ancient brethren, are entrenched by law, and are supported by tradition, the slavish loyalty of the newspapers, the educated masses, the dedicated civic groups, and, most of all, by the organized clientele groups enjoying access under existing arrangements.

Organized decentralization

The Reform response to the possibility of an inconsistency between running a city and governing it has been to assume the existence of the Neutral Specialist, the bureaucratic equivalent to law's Rational Man. The assumption is that, if men know their own specialties well enough, they are capable of reasoning out solutions to problems they share with men of equal but different technical competencies. That is a very shaky assumption indeed. Charles Frankel's analysis of such an assumption in Europe provides an appropriate setting for a closer look at it in modern New York; "... different [technical] elites disagree with each other; the questions with which specialists deal spill over into areas where they are *not* specialists, and they must either hazard amateur opinions or ignore such larger issues, which is no better ..."

During the 1950's, government experts began to recognize that,

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despite vast increases in efficiency flowing from the defeat of the Old Machine, New York city government was somehow lacking. These concerns culminated in the 1961 Charter, in which the Office of Mayor was strengthened in many impressive ways. But it was quickly discovered that no amount of formal centralization could definitively overcome the real decentralization around the Mayor. It was an organized disorganization, which made a mockery of the new Charter. The following examples, although drawn from New York, are of virtually universal application:

(1) Welfare problems always involve several of any city's largest agencies, including Health, Welfare, Hospitals, etc. Yet during more than 40 years, successive mayors of New York failed to reorient the Department of Health away from a "regulative" toward a "service" concept of organization. And many new aspects of welfare must be set up in new agencies if they are to be set up at all. The new poverty programs were set up very slowly in all the big cities — except Chicago.

(2) Water pollution control has been "shared" by such city agencies as the Departments of Health, Parks, Public Works, Sanitation, Water Supply, and so on. No large city, least of all New York, has an effective program to combat even the local contributions to pollution. The same is true of air pollution control, although for some years New York has had a separate Department for this purpose.

(3) Land-use patterns are influenced one way or another by a large variety of highly professional agencies. It has proven virtually impossible in any city for one of these agencies to impose its criteria on the others. In New York, the opening of Staten Island by the Narrows Bridge, in what may be the last large urban frontier, found the city with no plan for the revolution that is taking place in property values and land uses in that borough.

(4) Transportation is also the province of agencies too numerous to list. Strong mayors throughout the country have been unable to prevent each from going its separate way. To take just one example: New York pursued a vast off-street parking program, at a cost of nearly $4,000 per parking space, at the very moment when local rail lines were going bankrupt.

(5) Enforcement of civil rights is imposed upon almost all city agencies by virtue of Federal, state, and local legislation. But efforts to set up public, then City Council, review of police processes in New York have been successfully opposed by professional police officials. Efforts to try pairing and busing on a very marginal, experimental basis have failed. The police commissioner resigned at the very suggestion that values other than professional police values be imposed

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upon the Department, even when the imposition came via the respected tradition of "legislative oversight." The Superintendent of Education, an "outsider," was forced out; he was replaced by a career administrator. One education journalist at that time said: "Often . . . a policy proclaimed by the Board [of Education], without the advice and consent of the professionals, is quickly turned into mere paper policy . . . The veto power through passive resistance by professional administrators is virtually unbeatable . . . ."

The decentralization of city government toward its career bureaucracies has resulted in great efficiency for the activities around which each bureaucracy was organized. The city is indeed well-run. But what of those activities around which bureaucracies are not organized, or those which fall between or among agencies' jurisdictions? For these, as suggested by the cases above, the cities are suffering either stalemate or elephantiasis – an affliction whereby a particular activity, say, urban renewal or parkways, gets pushed to its ultimate "success" totally without regard to its importance compared to the missions of other agencies. In these as well as in other senses, the cities are ungoverned.

The 1961 election

Mayors have tried a variety of strategies to cope with these situations. But the 1961 mayoralty election in New York was the ultimate dramatization of the mayor's plight. This election was a confirmation of the New York system, and will some day be seen as one of the most significant in American urban history. For New York, it was the culmination of many long-run developments. For the country, it may be the first of many to usher in the bureaucratic state.

The primary significance of the election can be found in the spectacle of a mayor attempting to establish a base of power for himself in the bureaucracies. The Mayor's running mate for President of the City Council had been Commissioner of Sanitation, a position which culminated virtually a lifetime career of the holder in the Department of Sanitation. He had an impressive following among the sanitation men – who, it should be added, are organized along precinct lines. The Mayor's running mate for Comptroller had been for many years the city Budget Director. As Budget Director, he had survived several Administrations and two vicious primaries that pitted factions of the Democratic Party against one another. Before becoming Director he had served for a number of years as a professional employee in the Bureau. The leaders of the campaign organization included a former, very popular Fire Commissioner who retired from his commissionership to accept campaign leadership and later to serve as Deputy Mayor; and a former Police Commissioner who had enjoyed a strong following among professional cops as well

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as in the local Reform movement. Added to this was a new and vigorous party, the Brotherhood Party, which was composed in large part of unions with broad bases of membership among city employees. Before the end of the election, most of the larger city bureaucracies had political representation in the inner core of the new Administration.

For the 1961 election, Mayor Wagner had put his ticket and his organization together just as the bosses of old had done. In the old days, the problem was to mobilize all the clubhouses, districts, and counties in the city by putting together a balanced ticket about which all adherents could be enthusiastic. The same seems true for 1961, except that by then the clubhouses and districts had been replaced almost altogether by new types of units.

The main point is that destruction of the machine did not, in New York or elsewhere, eliminate the need for political power. It simply altered what one had to do to get it. In the aftermath of twenty or more years of "modern" government, it is beginning to appear that the lack of power can corrupt city hall almost as much as the possession of power. Bureaucracy is, in the United States, a relatively new basis for collective action. As yet, none of us knows quite how to cope with it.

What if . . . . ?

These observations and cases are not brought forward to indict Reform cities and acquit Chicago. They are intended only to put Chicago in a proper light and to provide some means of assessing the functions of the machine form of collective action.

Review of Reform government shows simply and unfortunately that the problems of cities, and the irrational and ineffectual ways city fathers go about their business, seem to obtain universally, without regard to form of government or type of power base. All cities have traffic congestion, crime, juvenile delinquency, galloping pollution, ghettos, ugliness, deterioration, and degeneracy. All cities seem to be suffering about equally from the quite recent problem of the weakening legitimacy of public institutions, resulting in collective violence and pressures for direct solution to problems. All cities seem equally hemmed in by their suburbs and equally prevented from getting at the roots of many of their most fundamental problems. Nonpartisan approaches, even the approaches of New York's Republican mayor to Republican suburbs and a Republican governor, have failed to prevent rail bankruptcy in the vast Eastern megalopolis, to abate air or water pollution, to reduce automobile pressure, or to ease the pain of the middle-class Negro in search of escape from his ghetto.

The problems of the city seem to go beyond any of the known arrangements for self-government. However, low public morality and

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lack of what Banfield and Wilson call "public-regardingness" may be a function simply of poor education and ethnic maladjustment. The Old Machine and its abuses may just have been another reflection of the same phenomena. If that is so, then passage of more time, and the mounting of one socio-cultural improvement after another, might have reformed the machines into public-regarding organs, if they had been permitted to survive.

Are there any strong reasons to believe that real reform could have come without paying the price of eliminating the popular base of political action? Intimations can be found in the last of the machine-recruited leaders of Tammany, Carmine DeSapio and Edward Costikyan. Each was progressively more public-regarding than any of his predecessors. Indeed, Costikyan was a model of political responsibility for whom the new New York had no particular use. However, for this question the best answers may lie in looking afresh at Gosnell's Chicago. With a scientific rigor superior to most political analysis of the 1960's, his book goes further than any other single work to capture what political behavior was like under Old Machine conditions. The sum total of his findings, despite Gosnell's own sentiments, does not constitute a very damning indictment of the Chicago machine – if contemporary experience is kept clearly in mind.

Chicago in perspective

Even amidst the most urgent of depression conditions, the machine in Chicago does not seem to have interfered with the modest degree of rationality distributed throughout the United States. Take for instance the case of voting behavior on referendum proposals, the most issue-laden situation an electorate ever faces. Gosnell criticized the referendum as generally subject to fraud and other types of abuse, and most particularly so in Chicago during the 1920's and '30's. But even so, his figures show that the electorate, despite the machine, did not behave indiscriminately. The theory that universal suffrage provides no check against the irresponsible acceptance of financing schemes which pass the real burden on to future generations is simply not borne out in Chicago. Conservative appeals by the propertied were effective. Over a twelve-year period, including six fat years and six lean years, 66 local bond issues were approved and 48 were rejected. Those rejected included some major bond issues offered for agencies whose leaders had become discredited. Other types of issues show responsiveness to appeals other than local precinct or county organizations. As the antiprohibition campaign began to grow, so did the vote on the prohibition repealer. Clear irrationalities tended to be associated primarily with highly technical proposals involving judicial procedure or taxation; but this is true everywhere, and to much the same degree.

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In a bold stroke, Gosnell also tried to assess the influence of the newspapers, the best source for rational – at least nonmachine – voting decisions. For this particular purpose Gosnell's data were weak, but fortunately he was not deterred from asking important questions merely for lack of specially designed data. Factor analysis helped Gosnell tease out of census tract data and newspaper subscription patterns a fairly realistic and balanced sense of the role of the local newspapers. Gosnell was led to conclude that the influence of news media is limited, but that this was a limitation imposed far less by the machine than by the extent to which newspapers were regularly read. Newspaper influence on issues was measurably apparent wherever daily readership was widely established – the machine notwithstanding. Here again is suggested the possibility that real machine domination rested upon a level of education and civic training that was, at the very time of Gosnell's research, undergoing a great deal of change.

Taking all the various findings together, and even allowing for abuses that were always more frequent in cities than towns, and probably more frequent in Gosnell's Chicago than other cities, we can come away from Gosnell's analysis with a picture not at all at odds with V. O. Key's notion of the "responsible electorate."

Gosnell felt his book to be an indictment of machine politics. But today, looking at the Chicago experience from the vantage point of New York's, one feels less able to be so sure.

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On the draft

A HARVARD STUDY GROUP

[Editorial Note: *Last spring, a study group of Harvard scholars was organized at the Institute of Politics, in the John Fitzgerald Kennedy School of Government, to look at a variety of alternatives in selective service, and to consider their fairness, their efficiency, and their workability. The group met every weekend, from February through April.*

Professor Thomas C. Schelling, economist and defense analyst, was chairman of the study group. Other members were Professor John T. Dunlop, labor economist and mediator; Professor Samuel P. Huntington, who has written on civil-military relations; Professor John Rawls, of the philosophy department; and Professor Charles Fried, a lawyer. They were joined in the study by younger faculty members and graduate students, and by two "informed observers" from Washington. The following text represents the conclusions and recommendations of this study group.]

MANY teachers in American colleges and universities have been concerned about the draft. They naturally are, not only because the draft is related to war in general and to the war in Vietnam in particular, but also because the draft raises some fundamental questions about the obligations of citizenship in a democracy and the way those obligations are divided among the citizens. Moreover, most of the

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students we teach, and even many of the teachers among us, are qualified by age, health, and education to perform military service. A main feature of the present draft is that it singles out college students, and their teachers, as a group especially eligible for deferment; we are bound to be concerned with the wisdom of such an arrangement.

In January of this year several of us on the Harvard faculty, all holding opinions about the draft but not the same opinion, discovered that the strength of our opinions was out of proportion to our knowledge of the present selective service system, our acquaintance with alternatives, and our understanding of the issues raised by a choice among alternatives. Holding widely different views about military and foreign policy, and especially about the war in Vietnam, and differing greatly in the emphasis we attached to different consequences of the military manpower system, we wondered whether we could arrive, through patient exploration and argument, at an agreed set of recommendations. We knew we could not reach agreement on every matter of principle that would arise; we hoped we could reach agreement on a set of recommendations compatible with the differing premises from which we approached the problem.

Under the auspices of the Institute of Politics in the John F. Kennedy School of Government, a faculty study group was organized that met regularly during February, March, and April. Comprising a dozen members, mostly faculty, it brought together not only diverse opinions but diverse fields as well — economics, political science, law and philosophy. We drew on materials contained in Congressional hearings, in the report of the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service, and in other studies done both inside and outside of government. We considered many alternatives, each in the light of several criteria — fairness with respect to who serves, fairness in respect to conditions of service, efficiency in the use of the nation's manpower, efficiency in the use of military manpower within the services, the impact on race relations and on education and poverty, the impacts of alternative systems on politics and on policy-making, the satisfaction or resentment of those rejected and those selected, the technical workability of alternative systems, the uncertainty or disruption in the lives of young men, the career opportunities in military service, and matters of conscience, tradition, and law.

We still differ over the war in Vietnam and over other issues of military and foreign policy. We still differ in the importance we attach to the several criteria we examined. We still differ on a number of guesses and estimates about the results of certain policies for which the evidence is scanty. Somewhat to our surprise, we reached unanimous agreement on what we perceive to be the main policy issues.

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If our recommendations carry any claim to attention, it is not because we were, as individuals, specially qualified in the subject nor because three months of collective study have made us experts on military manpower. Nor is it because we in any way represent Harvard University or any other organization, governmental or private; we represent nobody but ourselves. If our recommendations carry any weight it is precisely because we differ in our politics, in our policy preferences and in our professional interests, and yet these recommendations, after our three months of wide-ranging discussion and argument, appeal to us all.

These recommendations are addressed to the question, how should the government obtain military manpower, in peace and in war, when the number of men in service is not expected to exceed five or six million men. It assumes an economy not characterized by comprehensive wartime controls. Specifically, we are talking about military manpower when the supply of eligible young men, relative to military needs, raises the question posed in the title of the Selective Service Commission's report, "Who Serves when not all Serve?".

These are our recommendations:

1. All young men whose age, mental and physical fitness, and educational attainment qualify them for military duty should be equally eligible for conscription. Nobody needs to be deferred or exempted at age 19 or 20 on grounds that his career plans and educational intentions make him too valuable a citizen to go into the Army, or make it a national interest that his, and not others', service be postponed a few years. The economic benefits of discriminating among young men are modest, and largely confined to the young men who benefit. It is even doubtful whether, in the interest of a student's education and career, the best time to do his service is after completion of college.

2. If, as should be done, specific deferment of students is abolished, or comparable postponement is made equally available to all young men, the number of men eligible will exceed the number needed by the military services. The means of determining who serves and who does not serve, within this eligible group, must be fair and nondiscriminatory and must appear fair and nondiscriminatory both to those who are selected and to those who are not. We know of nothing but a random process – a "lottery" – that will meet those conditions. We therefore recommend choice by lottery.

3. Military pay should be increased sufficiently to attract, in the absence of hostilities, at least two and one-half million men. There is no magic in this figure. It corresponds to what, a few years ago, was acknowledged to be the approximate "peacetime" level of

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the armed forces, less one or two hundred thousand that we believe might be replaced by cilivian employees during the coming years. Nobody can exactly estimate the pay scale required to reach this goal; but pay scales must be set with some goal in mind, and this should be the goal. In time of hostilities the additional men needed, and any short-fall of enlistments below this goal, should be acquired through the draft, preferably by lottery.

4. We have to ask young men to do our fighting for us, involuntarily if necessary; we should not ask the same young men to pay our taxes for us. The draft should not be used as a means of shifting the financial burden of war or preparedness onto the same young men who are selected to carry the burden of risk and disrupted careers. The "cost" of attracting 2.5 or 2.75 million enlistees in peace-time is not really saved when we draft men; it is merely shifted, in the form of lower wages, from taxpayers to the men in the service. Too often the questions of fairness and discrimination are confined to the choice of who shall serve, with little attention to how we might shift some of the burdens of service from those who serve onto those who are served. Those of us who do not serve because we are too old or because we are otherwise not selected, should be careful not to use the draft as a way of holding military wages down. And there is no reason to suppose that a man's sense of duty is weakened, or his morale undermined, by having his services appreciated with a decent wage. Surely the federal minimum wage is not too extravagant for a young man serving in the army in either peace or war.

5. Most of the inequity in the present pay scale for draftees could be eliminated, and reasonable pay differentials maintained among servicemen, with pay increases that would total between $2 billion and $3 billion per year. We recommend such increases on grounds of fairness and in the belief that a democracy with a GNP of over half a trillion dollars, and with income-tax rates lower than those prevailing before Viet Nam, has no compelling need to use conscription to keep military wages down. Official estimates of the likely cost of achieving a volunteer force of about 2.7 million men in peace-time appear to us somewhat exaggerated; pay increases on the scale we recommend should have an appreciable effect on enlistments. If so, the net cost will be reduced through reductions in training and other expenses associated with the higher turnover of drafted men.

6. Paying young men more nearly what they are worth in the civilian economy can have other benefits, through a better appreciation within the military services that drafted men are not cheap resources. An energetic and continuous effort should be made to replace uniformed men with civilian employees, male and female, in

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all of those tasks in which the discipline, the traditions, and the other qualities associated with uniformed armed forces are not essential. This may cost more; if so, we have been using the draft to save ourselves money by putting civilians in uniform.

7. The Reserves and National Guard should be considered ready, and should actually be ready, to serve in an emergency. If, however, as recent experience suggests, they are either not ready or not available for a war on the scale of the war in Vietnam, the worth of continuing the present Reserve and National Guard system ought to be brought into question.

8. Military service is national service, not service to a state or locality. Eligible young men ought to be equally vulnerable to selection, no matter what state they reside in. Randomized selection should be designed to achieve this and should not be based on state quotas.

9. A lottery can be designed that, without becoming too complicated, permits a young man some freedom of choice in the year that he chooses to serve. Such freedom of choice should be equally available to all young men. One workable arrangement would be to call young men in their twenty-first year in an order of call determined by lottery, but with the lottery taking place in the young man's nineteenth year. At age nineteen a young man would have a good idea of the likelihood of his being called two years later, and could anticipate his service by electing to be drafted at age nineteen or twenty. A longer period of choice might have the unhealthful effect of inducing young men to speculate unduly on changes in the prospects for war and peace or even for changes in the draft law. Young men high in the priority of call would be on notice that two years' service probably awaited them at age twenty-one, and a strict denial of dependency exemption at age twenty-one would not then involve significant hardship. This arrangement would substantially eliminate the issue of college-student deferment: and it would benefit the college student by letting him know at age nineteen the likelihood that he would be called at twenty-one, so that he could make his own choice whether to complete college before or after military service.

10. If, contrary to what we believe best, college students are deferred and others not, college students should become, upon graduation, equally vulnerable to the draft along with younger men who are not deferred. Exceptions should be made only for medical students, officer candidates, and others whose choice of career makes them more liable to military service, not less liable, than others. If college students are not permitted — and they should not be permitted

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— to avoid eventual liability for military service, the supply of eligible young men will exceed the military demand for them about as much as if nobody were deferred. Thus the need remains for a randomized selection process to determine who shall serve.

11. The pay structure of the armed services should be continually rationalized to improve efficiency, to provide stronger incentives to remain in service and thus to reduce training costs and to preserve the skills created by both experience and training, to achieve the best allocations of skills and qualities among and within the services, and to avoid wasting military manpower on jobs that cilivians or civilian contractors can do.

12. Increased pay, along the lines we recommend, should increase the number of men who enlist under the present physical and mental standards. There is a natural tendency, and a commendable one, for the armed services to want the highest quality personnel they can get; and with higher pay they would be able, and might be tempted, to raise standards of acceptance rather than to admit a larger number of enlistees. In order, however, to reduce reliance on the draft and to spread the opportunities for service as widely among the population as is consistent with military needs, standards of acceptance should be kept at present levels and the full effect of higher pay should be allowed to reflect itself in the number of enlistees.

13. We recommend the re-examination by the Federal government of the entire structure of G. I. benefits and Veterans' pensions and preferences, state as well as Federal. There is some tendency, especially because state and Federal efforts are poorly coordinated for benefits to be haphazardly related to civil service preference, to income and property taxes, and to the state a man resides in. The consequences, in both equity and economic efficiency, are not guaranteed to be favorable. What we have is a system of partially deferred compensation, often on a contingent basis, that makes less sense altogether than each particular piece of legislation makes by itself.

*

A POSTSCRIPT BY THOMAS C. SCHELLING: *Among the more favorable responses to our statement, one particular reservation has been so repeatedly expressed that I regret we did not deal with it explicitly in our statement. The editors have invited me to comment on it personally here. What concerns so many people is the prospect of the armed services' becoming predominantly Negro in peacetime if there is no compulsory service to bring in nonvolunteer white men. Whether the people who raise this point would actually favor a permanent draft to keep some racial balance in the armed services,*

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perhaps accompanied by low pay for enlistees to avoid having to turn away Negroes who volunteer, or instead are merely anticipating the social consequences of more attractive military pay, the point deserves attention.

There would indeed be serious problems with a predominantly Negro army, although there might be substantial advantages to the Negro as well. The main safeguard against the occurrence of this problem, at least in any extreme form, seems to be simple arithmetic. Negro men of the right age are slightly more than ten percent of their age group. With the present educational and physical standards, about one-quarter of the Negroes qualify and about half the whites, for the United States as a whole. If Negroes found volunteer military service three or four times as attractive as whites did – if, that is to say, the percentage of Negroes attracted to the armed services were three or four times as high as the percentage of white young men – there would be 30 or 40 Negroes volunteering for every 100 whites. At present acceptance rates, about 10 Negroes would be accepted for every 50 whites, with an ultimate ratio of about 20 percent.

Considering totals only, and not individual services, this is such a modest percentage that one might hope for it, rather than deplore it, on grounds that it provides a respectable career for Negroes in one of the best-integrated organizations in the country. At what percentage figure the "image" of America and its armed forces would be adversely affected, either abroad or at home, is hard to judge, but I should think proportions of 30 to 35 percent, even 40 percent, would pose no danger and would offer about a million respectable jobs to young Negroes.

One hopes and expects, of course, that the acceptance rate for Negroes will rise in the future; but one must then also expect that the availability and attractiveness of civilian jobs for Negroes will rise in competition with the armed service.

The more serious problems would be the concentration of Negroes in the Army and the fewness of Negro officers. These problems can be solved, but not easily. In part the tendency of the Navy and the Air Force to be white is due to the higher enlistment standards in these services.

On the overall question of proportions, the experience of professional baseball and football is reassuring. Negroes are significant but not dominant numerically, the proportion varies from team to team and from game to game with occasionally a majority of Negroes on the field. Baseball fans have little trouble recalling which particular players are Negro, but if asked about proportions, they have to start counting on their fingers and have no reliable image of what the proportions are.

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DISCUSSION

The New Industrial State

or

Son of Affluence

ROBERT M. SOLOW

More than once in the course of his new book Professor Galbraith takes the trouble to explain to the reader why its message will not be enthusiastically received by other economists. Sloth, stupidity, and vested interest in ancient ideas all play a part, perhaps also a wish — natural even in tourist-class passengers — not to rock the boat. Professor Galbraith is too modest to mention yet another reason, a sort of jealousy, but I think it is a real factor. Galbraith is, after all, something special. His books are not only widely read, but actually enjoyed. He is a public figure of some significance; he shares with William McChesney Martin the power to shake stock prices by simply uttering nonsense. He is known and attended to all over the world. He mingles with the Beautiful People; for all I know, he may actually be a Beautiful Person himself. It is no wonder that the pedestrian economist feels for him an uneasy mixture of envy and disdain.

There is also an outside possibility that the profession will ignore *The New Industrial State* (Houghton, Mifflin) because it finds the ideas more or less unhelpful. The world can be divided into big-thinkers and little-thinkers. The difference is illustrated by the old story of the couple who had achieved an agreeable division of labor. She made the unimportant decisions: what job he should take, where they should live, how to bring up the children. He made the important decisions: what to do about Jerusalem, whether China should be admitted to the United Nations, how to deal with crime in the streets. Economists are determined little-thinkers. They want to know what will happen to the production of houses and automobiles in 1968 if Congress votes a 10 percent surcharge on personal and corporate tax bills, and what will happen if Congress does not. They would like to be able to predict the course of the Wholesale Price Index and its components, and the total of corporate profits by in-

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dustry. They are not likely to be much helped or hindered in these activities by Professor Galbraith's view of Whither We are Trending.

Professor Galbraith makes an eloquent case for big-thinking, and he has a point. Little-thinking can easily degenerate into mini-thinking or even into hardly thinking at all. Even if it does not, too single-minded a focus on how the parts of the machine work may lead to a careful failure ever to ask whether the machine itself is pointed in the right direction. On the other side, Professor Galbraith gingerly pays tribute to the little-thinkers whose work he has used, but it is evident that he has been exposed only very selectively to the relevant literature. There is no point squabbling over this: big-think and little-think are different styles, and the difference between them explains why this book will have more currency outside the economics profession than in it. It is a book for the dinner table not for the desk.

I SHALL try to summarize the main steps in Galbraith's argument, and shall then return to discuss them, one by one.

(1) The characteristic form of organization in any modern industrial society is not the petty firm but the giant corporation, usually producing many different things, and dominating the market for most of them. Nor is this mere accident. The complicated nature of modern technology and the accompanying need for the commitment of huge sums of capital practically demand that industry be organized in large firms.

(2) With few exceptions, the giant corporation is in no sense run by its owners, the common stockholders. The important decisions are made – have to be made – by a bureaucracy, organized in a series of overlapping and interlocking committees. The board of directors is only the tip of an iceberg that extends down as far as technicians and department managers. The members of the bureaucracy are all experts in something, possibly in management itself. Galbraith calls them the "technostructure," but that awkward word is probably a loser.

(3) It is the nature of the highly-capitalized bureaucratically controlled corporation to avoid risk. The modern business firm is simply not willing to throw itself on the mercy of the market. Instead, it achieves certainty and continuity in the supply of materials by integrating backward to produce its own, in the supply of capital by financing itself out of retained earnings, in the supply of labor by bringing the unions into the act. It eliminates uncertainty on the selling side by managing the consumer, by inducing him, through advertising and more subtle methods of salesmanship, to buy what the corporation wants to sell at the price it wants to charge. The major risk of general economic fluctuations is averted by encouraging the government in programs of economic stabilization.

(4) It would be asking much too much of human nature to expect that the bureaucracy should manage the firm simply in the interests of the stockholders. There is, therefore, no presumption

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that the modern firm seeks the largest possible profit. Nor does it. The firm's overriding goal is its own survival and autonomy; for security it requires a certain minimum of profit and this it will try to achieve. Security thus assured, the firm's next most urgent goal is the fastest possible growth of sales. (Since firms grow by reinvesting their earnings, this goal is not independent of profits; nevertheless, once the minimum target in profits is achieved, the modern firm will expand its sales even at the expense of its profits.) There are two lesser goals: a rising dividend rate, presumably to keep the animals from getting restless, and the exercise of technological virtuosity.

(5) Modern industry produces mainly things, and it wishes to grow. Everyone will be happier if everyone believes that a growing production of things is the main object of the national life. People will be happier because that is what they in fact get, and the bureaucracy will be happier because they can feel that they serve the national purpose. This belief has been widely inculcated, but it takes effort really to believe it, because American society already has more things than it knows what to do with.

(6) The key resource in the modern industrial state is organized intelligence, especially scientific and managerial intelligence. One of the important things the government does to support the system is the extension of education to provide a supply of recruits for the bureaucracy, and the subsidization of scientific and technological research to provide something interesting for them to do. What Galbraith calls the "scientific and educational estate" therefore acquires a certain moral authority and even mundane power in the society. This is an important circumstance, because the scientific and educational estate – at least its youngest members – can see through the cult of the GNP and observe that it slights the claims of leisure, art, culture, architectural design, and even the innocent enjoyment of nature. Here is the most promising source of social change and of a rather more attractive national style of life.

There is a lot more in the book, much of it full of insight and merriment, but the main logic of the argument seems to be roughly as I have stated it.

IT MAY be unjust and pointless to consider the degree of literal truth of each of the assertions that make up this argument. One would hardly discuss *Gulliver's Travels* by debating whether there really are any little people, or criticize the *Grande Jatte* because objects aren't made up of tiny dots. Nevertheless, it may help to judge the truth of Galbraith's big picture if one has some idea about the accuracy of the details. So, at the risk of judging big-think by the standards of little-think, I proceed.

(1) Professor Galbraith is right that modern economics has not really come to terms with the large corporation. Specialists in industrial organization do measure and describe and ponder the operations of the very large firm. Occasionally some of these specialists propound theories of their financial or investment or pricing behavior.

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It cannot be said that any of these theories has yet been so successful as to command widespread assent. Perhaps for that reason, much economic analysis, when it is not directly concerned with the behavior of the individual firm, proceeds as if the old model of the centralized profit-maximizing firm were a good enough approximation to the truth to serve as a description of behavior in the large. But this is not always done naively or cynically. Professor Galbraith is not the first person to have discovered General Motors. Most close students of industrial investment or pricing do make room in their statistical behavior equations for behavior that is neither perfectly competitive nor simply monopolistic. (The long debate over the incidence of the corporate profits tax hardly suggests universal reliance on any simple model.)

There is, after all, a moderate amount of economic activity that is not carried on by General Motors, or by the 100 largest or 500 largest corporations. In fact, only about 55 percent of the Gross National Product originates in nonfinancial corporations at all. Not nearly all of that is generated by the giant corporations (of course, some financial corpoartions are among the giants). Nor is it entirely clear which way the wind is blowing. The giant corporation is preeminently a phenomenon of manufacturing industry and public utilities; it plays a much less important role in trade and services. If, as seems to be in the cards, the trade and service sectors grow relative to the total, the scope of the large corporation may be limited. Alternatively, big firms may come to play a larger role in industries that have so far been carried on at small scale.

Enough has been said to suggest that it is unlikely that the economic system can usefully be described either as General Motors writ larger or as the family farm writ everywhere. This offers at least a hint that it will behave like neither extreme. In any case, counting noses or assets and recounting anecdotes are not to the point. What is to the point is a "model" – a simplified description – of the economy that will yield valid predictions about behavior.

(2) The "separation of ownership from control" of the modern corporation is not a brand new idea. It is to be found in Veblen's writings and again, of course, in Berle and Means' *The Modern Corporation and Private Property*. Recent investigation shows that the process has continued; only a handful of the largest American corporations can be said to be managed by a coherent group with a major ownership interest. (The non-negligible rest of the economy is a different story.) I do not think the simple facts have ever been a matter for dispute. What is in dispute is their implications. It is possible to argue – and many economists probably would argue – that many management-controlled firms are constrained by market forces to behave in much the same way that an owner-controlled firm would behave, and many others acquire owners who like the policy followed by the management. I think it may be a fair complaint that this proposition has not received all the research attention it deserves. It is an error to suppose it has received none at all. Such evidence as

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there is does not give a very clear-cut answer, but it does not suggest that the orthodox presupposition is terribly wrong. Galbraith does not present any convincing evidence the other way, as I think he is aware. The game of shifting the burden of proof that he plays at the very end of this book is a child's game. Economics is supposed to be a search for verifiable truths, not a high-school debate.

(3) The modern corporation – and not only the modern corporation – is averse to risk. Many economic institutions and practices are understandable only as devices for shifting or spreading risk. But Galbraith's story that the industrial firm has "planned" itself into complete insulation from the vagaries of the market is an exaggeration, so much an exaggeration that it smacks of the put-on.

GALBRAITH makes the point that the planning of industrial firms need not always be perfect, that a new product or branch plant may occasionally go sour. By itself, therefore, the Edsel is not a sufficient argument against his position. His is a valid defense – but it is not one he can afford to make very often. No doubt the Mets "plan" to win every ballgame.

Consider the supply of capital. There is a lot of internal financing of corporations; it might perhaps be better if companies were forced more often into the capital markets. But external finance is hardly trivial. In 1966 the total flow of funds to nonfarm nonfinancial corporate business was about $96 billion. Internal sources accounted for $59 billion and external sources for the remaining $37 billion. Besides, depreciation allowances amounted to $38 billion of the internal funds generated by business, and much of this sum is not a source of net finance for growth. External sources provided about one half of net new funds. In 1966, bond issues and bank loans alone added up to about two-thirds of undistributed profits. Trade credit is another important source of external funds, but it is complicated because industrial corporations are both lenders and borrowers in this market. I don't know how the proportions of external and internal finance differ between larger and smaller corporations, but the usual complaint is that the large firm has easier access to the capital market. I do not want to make too much of this, because self-finance is, after all, an important aspect of modern industrial life. But there is, I trust, some point in getting the orders of magnitude right. There might also be some point in wondering if the favored tax treatment of capital gains has something to do with the propensity to retain earnings.

Consider the consumer. In the folklore, he (she?) is sovereign; the economic machinery holds its breath while the consumer decides, in view of market prices, how much bread to buy, and how many apples. In Galbraith's counterfable, no top-heavy modern corporation can afford to let success or failure depend on the uninstructed whim of a woman with incipient migraine. So the consumer is managed by Madison Avenue into buying what the system requires him to buy. Now I, too, don't like billboards or toothpaste ad-

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vertising or lottery tickets of unknown – but probably negligible – actuarial value with my gasoline. (Though I put it to Professor Galbraith that, in his town and mine, the Narragansett beer commercial may be the best thing going on TV.) But that is not the issue; the issue is whether the art of salesmanship has succeeded in freeing the large corporation from the need to meet a market test, giving it "decisive influence over the revenue it receives."

That is not an easy question to answer, at least not if you insist on evidence. Professor Galbraith offers none; perhaps that is why he states his conclusion so confidently and so often. I have no great confidence in my own casual observations either. But I should think a case could be made that much advertising serves only to cancel other advertising, and is therefore merely wasteful.

If Hertz and Avis were each to reduce their advertising expenditures by half, I suppose they would continue to divide the total car rental business in roughly the same proportion that they do now. (Why do they not do so? Presumably because each would then have a motive to get the jump on the other with a surprise advertising campaign.) What would happen to the total car rental business? Galbraith presumably believes it would shrink. People would walk more, sweat more, and spend their money instead on the still-advertised deodorants. But suppose those advertising expenditures were reduced too, suppose that all advertising were reduced near the minimum necessary to inform consumers of the commodities available and their elementary objective properties? Galbraith believes that in absence of persuasion, reduced to their already satiated biological needs for guidance, consumers would be at a loss; total consumer spending would fall and savings would simply pile up by default.

Is there anything to this? I know it is not true of me, and I do not fancy myself any cleverer than the next man in this regard. No research that I know of has detected a wrinkle in aggregate consumer spending behavior that can be traced to the beginning of television. Perhaps no one has tried. Pending some evidence, I am not inclined to take this popular doctrine very seriously. (It is perhaps worth adding that a substantial proportion of all the sales that are made in the economy are made not to consumers but to industrial buyers. These are often experts and presumably not long to be diverted from considerations of price and quality by the provision of animated cartoons or even real girls.)

Consider the attitude of the large corporation to the economic stabilization activities of the Federal Government. It is surely true that big business has an important stake in the maintenance of general prosperity. How, then, to account for the hostility of big business to discretionary fiscal policy, a hostility only lately ended, if indeed traces do not still persist? Here I think Professor Galbraith is carried away by his own virtuosity; he proposes to convince the reader that the hostility has not come from the big business bureaucracy but from the old-style entrepreneurial remnants of small and

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medium-sized firms. Their fortunes are not so dependent on general prosperity, so they can afford the old-time religion. Professor Galbraith is probably wrong about that last point; large firms are better able than small ones to withstand a recession. He is right that the more Paleolithic among the opponents of stabilization policy have come from smaller and middle-sized business.

But up until very recently, the big corporation has also been in opposition. Even in 1961 there was considerable hostility to the investment tax credit, mainly because it involved the government too directly and obviously in the management of the flow of expenditures in the economy at large. It was only after further acquaintance with the proposal excited their cupidity that representatives of the large corporation came around. More recently still, they have generally opposed the temporary suspension of the credit as a counter-inflationary stabilization device, and welcomed its resumption. (This warm attachment to after-tax profits does not accord well with the Galbraith thesis.) There is a much simpler explanation for the earlier, now dwindling, hostility that would do no harm to the argument of the book: mere obtuseness.

(4) Does the modern industrial corporation maximize profits? Probably not rigorously and singlemindedly, and for much the same reason that Dr. Johnson did not become a philosopher – because cheerfulness keeps breaking in. Most large corporations are free enough from competitive pressure to afford a donation to the Community Chest or a fancy office building without a close calculation of its incremental contribution to profit. But that is not a fundamental objection to the received doctrine, which can survive if businesses merely *almost* maximize profits. The real question is whether there is some other goal that businesses pursue systematically at the expense of profits.

The notion of some minimum required yield on capital is an attractive one. It can be built into nearly any model of the behavior of the corporation. I suppose the most commonly held view among economists goes something like this (I am oversimplifying): for any given amount of invested capital, a corporation will seek the largest possible profits in some appropriately long-run sense, and with due allowance for cheerfulness. If the return on capital thus achieved exceeds the minimum required yield or target rate of return, the corporation will expand by adding to its capital, whether from internal or external sources. If the return on equity actually achieved (after corporation tax) is any guide, the target rate of return is not trivial. The main influence on profits in manufacturing is obviously the business cycle; for fairly good years one would have to name a figure like 12 percent, slightly higher in the durable-goods industries, slightly lower in nondurables. In recession years like 1954, 1958, 1961, the figure is more like 9 percent.

Alternatives to this view have been proposed. Professor Galbraith mentions William Baumol and Robin Marris as predecessors. Baumol has argued that the corporation seeks to maximize its sales

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revenue, provided that it earns at least a certain required rate of return on capital. This is rather different from Galbraith's proposal that corporations seek growth rather than size. These are intrinsically difficult theories to test against observation. Some attempts have been made to test the Baumol model; the results are not terribly decisive, but for what they are worth they tend to conclude against it. Marris's theory is very much like Galbraith's, only much more closely reasoned. He does propose that corporate management seeks growth, subject to a minimum requirement for profit. But Marris is more careful, and comes closer to the conventional view, because he is fully aware, as Galbraith apparently is not, of an important discipline in the capital market. The management that too freely sacrifices profit for growth will find that the stock market puts a relatively low valuation on its assets. This may offer an aggressive management elsewhere a tempting opportunity to acquire assets cheap, and the result may be a merger offer or a takeover bid, a definite threat to the autonomy of the management taken over. Naturally, the very largest corporations are not subject to this threat, but quite good-sized ones are.

Professor Galbraith offers the following argument against the conventional hypothesis. A profit-maximizing firm will have no incentive to pass along a wage increase in the form of higher prices, because it has already, so to speak, selected the profit-maximizing price. Since the modern industrial corporation transparently does pass on wage increases, it can not have been maximizing profits in the first place. But this argument is a sophomore error; the ideal textbook firm will indeed pass along a wage increase, to a calculable extent.

There is, on the other hand, a certain amount of positive evidence that supports the hypothesis of rough profit-maximization. It has been found, for instance, that industries which are difficult for outsiders to enter are more profitable than those which are easily entered and therefore, presumably, more competitive. It has been found, also, that there is a detectable tendency for capital to flow where profits are highest. Serious attempts to account for industrial investment and prices find that the profit-supply-demand mechanism provides a substantial part of the explanation, though there is room for less classical factors, and for quite a lot of "noise" besides.

(5) Professor Galbraith does not have a high opinion of the private consumption of goods and services. "What is called a high standard of living consists, in considerable measure, in arrangements for avoiding muscular energy, increasing sensual pleasure and for enhancing caloric intake above any conceivable nutritional requirement. . . . No society has ever before provided such a high standard of living as ours, hence none is as good. The occasional query, however logically grounded, is unheard." One wonders if that paragraph were written in Gstaad where, we are told, Professor Galbraith occasionally entertains his muse.

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It is hard to disagree without appearing boorish. Nevertheless, it is worth remembering that in 1965 the median family income in the United States was just under $7000. One of the more persistent statistical properties of the median income is that half the families must have less. It does not seem like an excessive sum to spend. No doubt one could name an excessive sum, but in any case the reduction of inequality and the alleviation of poverty play negligible roles in Galbraith's system of thought. His attitude toward ordinary consumption reminds one of the Duchess who, upon acquiring a full appreciation of sex, asked the Duke if it were not perhaps too good for the common people.

(6) I have no particular comment on Professor Galbraith's view of the role of the scientific and educational estate as an agent of social and cultural improvement. But this is perhaps a convenient place for me to state what I take to be the role of this book. Professor Galbraith is fundamentally a moralist. His aim is to criticize seriously what he believes to be flaws in American social and economic arrangements, and to make fun of the ideological myths that are erected to veil the flaws. More often than not, in such expeditions, his targets are well chosen and he is on the side of the angels – that is to say, I am on his side. I trust that readers of his work will acquire some resistance to the notion that any interference by the government in a corporation's use of its capital is morally equivalent to interference in the citizen's use of his toothbrush. I share his belief that American society is under-provided with public services and over-provided with hair oil. I agree with him that men ought to be more free to choose their hours of work, and that this freedom is worth some loss of productivity.

But Professor Galbraith is not content to persuade people that his values ought to be their values. I don't blame him; it's slow work. He would like an elaborate theory to show that his values are, so to speak, objective, and opposition to them merely ideological. He would like to do, in a way, for the scientific and educational estate what Marx and "scientific socialism" tried to do for the proletariat. The ultimate point of the basic argument is that the economy does not efficiently serve consumer preferences – first because industrial corporations evade the discipline of the market by not seeking profit anyway, and second because the preferences are not really the consumer's own.

As theory this simply does not stand up, a few grains of truth and the occasional well-placed needle notwithstanding. There are, however, other powerful arguments against *laissez-faire:* the existence of monopoly power, inadequate information and other imperfections of the market, the presence of wide divergences between private and social benefits and costs, and a morally unattractive distribution of income. These need to be argued and documented from case to case. It is a kind of joke, but if Professor Galbraith would like to see more and better public services, he may just have to get out and sell them.

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A Review of a Review

JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH

PROFESSOR Robert Solow is one of the most distinguished and prestigious economists of our time. He is a calm and confident scholar with rare mastery of the technical tools of economic and quantitative analysis. To the extent that economics qualifies as a science, it is men like Professor Solow who have earned it the reputation. The rather subjective standards of the social sciences in general and of economic theory in particular allow men a certain liberty in defining their own competence. A scholar is often what he claims to be. But Professor Solow's superior mastery of his discipline is acknowledged and admired I think by all.

It is because Professor Solow is so intimately associated with the scientific claims of our profession that I find myself writing this comment. It is not to dispute his view of *The New Industrial State;* this naturally differs from mine, and did I agree with it I would hardly have been justified in publishing the book. But the book is in the public domain and to a degree surpassing my far from modest expectations. Reviews of books that are technical or otherwise obscure are of no slight importance. Others depend on them as do theatre goers to whom first night admission is denied. But human vanity what it is, the person who has seen for himself will reach his own conclusions. So it is here, and this is the principal reason, as I have often said, why I years ago determined to seek a substantial audience. One is not at the risk of those who react adversely to that with which they disagree or find otherwise distasteful.

However, Professor Solow's review seems to merit a word on its own account. It exemplifies a tendency of social scientists, unconscious but not above reproach, to divest themselves of the rules of scientific discourse when they encounter something they do not like. Carelessness also no doubt plays a part. This tendency acquires its

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special poignancy when, as in the case of Professor Solow, the writer is, and with reason, conscious of his scientific prestige. He is held to even higher standards than the rest of us. The phenomenon is worth explicit examination, and I trust that Professor Solow will not be perturbed by my using him, in effect, as a case study. Thus this review of his review.

2

ALTHOUGH the rules of scientific discourse have never been fully codified, a number enjoy wide acceptance in the common law. They can all best be stated in negative form. One should avoid comment *ad hominem* – that is to say, one should not attack a position by slighting or adverse comment on the personality or behavior of the person who defends it. One should be accurate. One should avoid *obiter dicta;* that is to say, nothing should be allowed to rest on the unsupported word of the speaker, however great his prestige. Both over- and understatement should be avoided – matters where I long ago learned to confess guilt. It is possible that another rule might be added although this may be a counsel of perfection. The scientist should be aware of, and disclose, personal interest. It is this, more than incidentally, that may cause him to violate the other rules. In the review in question Professor Solow is in more or less serious violation of the first three canons. There is at least a possibility that he violates the last. Even for a scholar with no special scientific pretensions this is a poor score. Let me specify.

He begins his review with a number of *ad hominem* observations – the alleged social life of the author and his association with what he calls the Beautiful People, the power that "he shares with William McChesney Martin . . . to shake stock prices by simply uttering nonsense," and this form of comment recurs when he takes exception to my suggestion that higher living standards are not a primary measure of social excellence. "One wonders if that paragraph were written in Gstaad where, we are told, Professor Galbraith occasionally entertains the muse."

Were this all and true, one would doubtless dismiss it as harmless needling, not damaging to careful discourse. I wouldn't, in reply, comment on Professor Solow's social preoccupations or choice of recreation or residence, but these are matters on which there is room for many levels of taste. But the reader will observe, I think, that these observations are in keeping with, and in some small measure serve, the larger design of his article. They suggest a certain frivolity of purpose. (One notices the use of the word nonsense.) Clearly, the deeply serious scholar should not be detained. It would surely be better scientific method though rather more demanding work simply to argue the case. More significant, perhaps, none of it is true. I regard most social activities, fashionable or otherwise, as a bore, and since I have been an ambassador there is even documentary evidence in the archives. In March of 1955 I gave testimony before the Senate Banking and Currency Committee, carefully prepared and not before

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described as nonsense, on the nature of the speculative fever in 1929 and the measures that might prevent a recurrence. I had just finished a book on the subject. While I testified the market dropped very sharply. On *no other* occasion have I ever seen it suggested that a remark of mine has affected the market. As opportunity allows, I certainly do go to Switzerland (as did Alfred Marshall), but in recent years it has been because I can work there free of both interruption and a disagreeable respiratory ailment. So even Professor Solow's personal comments, it will be evident, establish a rather disconcerting pattern of unreliabiltiy. Presumably, even *ad hominem* argument should be accurate. And his reliability does not become greater when he comes to substantial matters, and we measure his essay against the scientific canon that requires accurate meaning accurately conveyed. Let me offer what can only be a partial list.

3

THE *New Industrial State* draws rather extensively from the empirical work of other economists. That, presumably, is one thing such empirical work is for. Professor Solow states that the author "gingerly pays tribute to the little-thinkers [his term and assuredly not mine] whose work he has used . . ." That most readers will take to mean that I was miserly in my credit to others. Here, that the reader may judge, is what I said:

> This book has not, it will be agreed, been confined to narrow points. But I have singularly little quarrel with those who so restrict themselves. I have drawn on their work, quantitative and qualitative, at every stage; I could not have written without their prior efforts. So I have nothing but admiration and gratitude for the patient and skeptical men who get deeply into questions, and I am available to support their application to the Ford Foundation however minute the matter to be explored. I expect them to judge sternly the way their material has been used in this book.*

In commenting on my contention that the large corporation is a highly important, strongly characteristic feature of the American economy Professor Solow says that "Professor Galbraith is not the first person to have discovered General Motors" and that "There is, after all, a moderate amount of activity that is not carried on by General Motors, or by the 100 largest or 500 largest corporations." Most readers would conclude from Professor Solow that I somehow claim originality as the discoverer of the great corporation and that I equate all economic activity with the large firms. There are no such suggestions in the book. I do say that the great firm has not made its way in modern economic theory. This Professor Solow concedes. I am careful to point out that the world of the large corporations, what I call the Industrial System, is not the whole of the economy. The remaining "part of the economic system is not insignificant. It is not, however, the part of the economy with which this book . . . [is] concerned."

The New Industrial State, John Kenneth Galbraith (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1967), p. 402.

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I might add that Professor Solow then concludes this part of his discussion by saying that "enough has been said to suggest that it is unlikely that the economic system can usefully be described either as General Motors writ larger or the family farm writ everywhere." His logic here will surely seem casual. He is saying, in effect, that one cannot (as I do) describe a part of the economy, even a highly important part. One must do nothing unless he has a model that will cover all. This, I am sure, he does not intend.

Professor Solow says that "The 'separation of ownership from control' in the modern corporation is not a brand new idea," adding that it is to be found in Veblen's writings as well as in Adolph A. Berle, Jr. and G. C. Means.* Again the reader will suppose that Professor Solow is correcting, perhaps mildly rebuking, a spurious claim to novelty. None was made. Veblen's great point was, in fact, a different one. The engineers and the technicians he believed to be held in check by the greater power of the controlling pecuniary interest. The owners were unduly in control. Relying on his admitted competence on these matters, rather than more meticulous scholarship, Professor Solow uses error to rebuke precision. And my acknowledgement of the work of Adolf Berle, R. A. Gordon as well as of such later writers as Edward Mason, Carl Kaysen and Robin Marris on the separation of ownership from control could hardly be more complete or heartfelt.** But there is no need to argue a point that can otherwise be decided. Let Professor Berle, the scholar mentioned by Professor Solow as somehow slighted, say whether or not, both here and over the years, I have done less than justice to his work.

The reader will see what Professor Solow, however innocently, has sought to suggest. Here speaks the superior scholar. I must warn you against something that is not quite careful. I do not protest Professor Solow's superior view of his competence; it has much to commend it, and we are all allowed the enjoyment of our vanity. He has, however, gravely underestimated his task. An author will usually be more knowledgeable about his work than any critic. Accordingly, the latter has only slight leeway for error. And it will be evident that Professor Solow, so far from being careful, has been very careless. One final small example will show what he has let himself in for. In noting the importance that I attach to growth as a goal of the corporation he observes that Mr. Robin Marris, the distinguished British

*_The Modern Corporation and Private Property_ (New York: Macmillan, 1934). When this book first appeared economists and statisticians of high technical reputation, the men of the professional establishment, led in this instance by Professor W. L. Crum of Harvard, attacked it vigorously. They pointed to shortcomings in its measures of concentration and it its concept of control. These being present, it was held, in effect, that the book should be ignored.

**One name, to my embarrassment, is missing, that of James Burnham. Scholars, perhaps put off by his subsequent extreme views on foreign policy, have not given sufficient credit to the ideas he offered in _The Managerial Revolution_. Their importance is at least suggested by the phrase he added to the language and which I do, of course, acknowledge.

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economist, has reached the same general conclusion, only his effort is "much more closely reasoned." Again the warning flag. But I do not disagree. Marris' reasoning occupies an entire book as compared with a chapter in my case. And as I told in the book, and most explicitly in the Reith lectures which have also been published, I made great use of Mr. Marris' argument. I did not duplicate it. In large measure I followed it. Professor Solow is in the odd position of finding something less well done that wasn't attempted.

In arguing against growth and in favor of profit maximization as a primary goal of the corporation, Professor Solow comes out on the side of the latter. That, of course, is his privilege; it is the received view and one that is vital if the omnipotence of the market is to be assumed. But it is hardly proper that Professor Solow should ignore what, from his viewpoint, is the most difficult point. If the technostructure – the autonomous and collegial guiding authority of the corporation – maximizes profits, it maximizes them, in the first instance at least for others, for the owners. If it maximizes growth, it maximizes opportunity for, among other things, advancement, promotion and pecuniary return for itself. That people should so pursue their own interest is not implausible. Professor Solow, as he elsewhere makes clear, does not think it so.

In attacking the importance that I attach to the control by the large corporation of its own capital supply – an importance that Professor Solow also concedes – he compares for 1966 the total flow of funds from within nonfarm, nonfinancial corporation to that coming from outside. More came from outside. Professor Solow then observes: "I don't know how the proportion of external and internal finance differs between large and smaller corporations although the usual complaint is that the larger firm has easier access to the capital market." It is hard to explain this by carelessness. For Professor Solow knows that construction and trade (the latter with its need to finance inventories and sales) rely heavily on borrowed funds. Firms here tend also to be relatively small – as he agrees elsewhere in the case of trade. It is from such firms as he also knows that complaints come when money is tight. And his reference to the easier access to the capital market of the larger firm is surely disingenuous. He knows that the security that is associated with an ample flow of funds from internal sources will favor the firm so blessed when it goes into the capital markets for additional supplies. Such "ease of access" proves nothing as regards reliance on outside funds.

When there is an industrywide wage increase a normal expectation is of a compensatory price increase with, perhaps, something more. I note that if an industry is able to so increase revenues the day after a wage increase, it could have done so the day before, always assuming that it could find some substitute for the wage increase as a signal for action. It follows that before the wage increase it was not maximizing its revenues; it had some unliquidated margin of monopoly gain. The conclusion is based, Professor Solow states, in language that many will think a trifle lofty if not otherwise unsuited

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to scholarly discourse, on "sophomore error." The textbook firm, already maximizing its profits, would also raise its prices "to a calculable extent." Alas, the error is again Professor Solow's – though I naturally forego any pejorative adjectives. He omitted to notice that the two responses – my full and immediate compensation for the wage increase and an unspecified response to a cost change – are not the same. The first would not generally be possible were profit already at a maximum. And he did not notice that I carefully allowed for the second.*

One will sense that Professor Solow's desire to attribute error has undermined his instinct to precision. This is most disturbingly evident in the last example I will cite. He suggests that I ignore the danger of a "takeover bid" for the firm that sacrifices earnings for growth and thus abnormally depresses the value of its securities thereby making them open to acquisition. Thus I am indifferent to the disciplines of the capital market. But then he concedes that the takeover is not a threat to the very large firms with which I am concerned. (It arises only farther down the size scale.) And he has elsewhere himself suggested that I write of an economy in which General Motors is writ large. The reader at this point will surely have begun to wonder. I am accused of being indifferent to dangers that by his admission do not exist for the large firms with which I am excessively concerned. In point of fact I considered this problem at length. The danger of involuntary takeover is negligible in the management calculations of the large firm and diminishes with growth and dispersal of stock ownership.

The list of the points on which Professor Solow has left himself vulnerable could be extended. I have not said, as he states, that the "industrial firm has 'planned' itself into complete insulation from the vagaries of the market." To have to make a point vulnerable by exaggeration is again to suggest a determination to find error so compulsive as to allow it to be invented. On the defense of consumer sovereignty, a vital matter as I will suggest presently, there is already something approaching an agreed line. To this Professor Solow adheres. I have not shown that demand can be managed fully and for all. So the effort can be safely dismissed. (Much or most advertising Professor Solow ventures "serves only to cancel other advertising and is therefore merely wasteful." He suspects that I am influenced by a dislike for billboards and singing commercials.) I argue only for a partial management of consumer choice. But it will hardly be suggested that what is imperfect or incomplete can, as a matter of sound scientific method, be ignored. Professor Solow to the con-

*I fear that I, in some sense, tricked Professor Solow into this error. In an article in *The Review of Economics and Statistics* in 1957 I explored this problem in detail. I did not refer to it in *The New Industrial State* – I sought to ration footnotes beginning with those to my own work. Had Professor Solow been reminded of this earlier work he would not have fallen into the error of assuming a more simplistic rather than a more comprehensive view than his own. But it could be also argued that scholars should check the literature before reacting so strongly.

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trary, I do deal with the stabilization of markets for nonconsumer's goods, and I treat at length of the influence of producers on public procurement including, in particular, weaponry. Enough has been said, I think, to indicate a fairly serious default in the canon of scientific discourse that requires careful attention to subject and statement. Let me now advert more briefly to the use of *obiter dicta* – to reliance not on evidence but on the undoubted scientific reputation of the speaker.

4

THERE are two of these which troubled me and which may well have troubled readers who have approached these matters with more care than Professor Solow. One is his concluding statement, which I confess I came upon with surprise, that "the reduction of inequality and the alleviation of poverty play negligible roles in Galbraith's system of thought." Rightly or wrongly the treatment of poverty in *The Affluent Society* has been widely cited as helping pave the way for the modern belief that, in the forms therein described, it would survive a steady increase in aggregate income. (The observations of Michael Harrington are perhaps relevant in this regard.) The same book had at least something to do with drawing attention to deficiencies in the public sector – shortcomings in education, the squalor of the cities – as sources of residual poverty and the anger we now experience in the ghettoes.* A paper I presented before a special group working on the problem of "pockets of poverty" in the autumn of 1963 was at least well-timed in relation to the legislation establishing the Office of Economic Opportunity the following year.** I participated actively in drafting that legislation and served on the statutory advisory board to the Office until new legislation, plus possibly my views on Vietnam, brought my involuntary severance. I also served, though not with any great usefulness, on Mayor Lindsay's task force on this problem. None of this is final proof of a preoccupation with poverty and inequality, and in the nature of the case my own assessment is hardly to be trusted. But most fairminded readers will agree, I believe, that it is sufficient to place a certain burden of proof on Professor Solow. He could conceivably be suggesting, though the words do not imply it, that *The New Industrial State* is not directly concerned with poverty and in-

*The very first title of this book was *Why People are Poor,* and it was under this cachet that I negotiated a small grant for research from the Carnegie Corporation of New York in the early fifties. Later titles, *The Opulent Society* and then *The Affluent Society,* reflected my more mature view of the problem. That was less why people are poor than why residual poverty persists and other problems remain unsolved under conditions of generally high and rising income. I think it possible that Professor Solow might wish to plead that he has not read *The Affluent Society.* This is a wholly legitimate defense, one that would be offered by many other intelligent people, but it does, I would judge, deny him the right to pass on my preoccupations.

**"Let Us Begin" published in Harper's Magazine in the spring of 1964.

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equality. But one does not cover all subjects in one book, and I was additionally careful to say:

> There are many poor people left in the industrial countries, and notably in the United States. The fact that they are not the central theme of this treatise should not be taken as proof either of ignorance of their existence or indifference to their fate. But the poor, by any applicable tests, are outside the industrial system. They are those who have not been drawn into its service or who cannot qualify. And not only has the industrial system – its boundaries as here defined are to be kept in mind – eliminated poverty for those who have been drawn into its embrace but it has also greatly reduced the burden of manual toil. Only those who have never experienced hard and tedious labor, one imagines, can be wholly indifferent to its elimination.*

With equal absence of proof Professor Solow suggests that I have exposed myself only "very selectively" to the vast empirical literature relevant to the facets of the system I establish. Here again one is a poor witness for himself. I am naturally impressed by the time I have spent in the last ten years in tracking down and assimilating the distressingly vast material within the ambit of this volume – the case material on the management of the corporation, monographs on organization theory and practice, on the nature of scientific and technical development, trade union development and attitudes, socialist and Soviet planning including one substantial and one lesser journey for work on the ground, literature on political change and business ideology and the newer materials on the much more limited range of matters on which I consider myself a specialist and much, much more. (I need scarcely add that to my distress I keep on encountering materials that I should have seen.) Professor Solow as a teacher and scholar and distinguished public servant has, most plausibly, covered even more completely this same range of literature. Only as a result of having done so could he claim to pass on the adequacy or inadequacy of anyone else's coverage. But again the reader can rightly ask for at least some argument on behalf of his own greater and more systematic diligence. To let it stand on his own unsupported assertion is surely to trade unduly on scholarly reputation.

5

I COME now to the point of it all. And here I am on less certain ground. Professor Solow's error and his use of *obiter dicta* are objective. They are visible to all. To ascribe reasons other than the obvious one of carelessness in the case of so distinguished a scholar involves elements of subjectivity. One could easily find himself in scientific default. Moreover, I am not wholly critical of Professor

The New Industrial State, op. cit. p. 318.

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Solow for failing to disclose the interest which forces him into so unappealing a posture and performance. He may not be fully aware of it.

The issue concerns the future of economics in general and of the highly prestigious work with which Professor Solow is associated in particular. That work is within a highly specific frame. Within that frame it is the best of its kind. But it is only good if the frame is reasonably intact. When the frame goes so do the scholars it sustains.

What is the frame? It is that the best society is the one that best serves the economic needs of the individual. Wants are original with the individual; the more of these that are supplied the greater the general good. Generally speaking the wants to be supplied are effectively translated by the market to firms maximizing profits therein. If firms maximize profits they respond to the market and ultimately to the sovereign choices of the consumer. Such is the frame and given its acceptance a myriad of scholarly activities can go on within. Any number of blocks can be designed and fitted together in the knowledge that they are appropriate to – that they fit somewhere in – the larger structure. There can be differences of opinion as to what best serves the purposes of the larger structure. Mathematical theorists and model builders can squabble with those who insist on empirical measurement. But this is a quarrel between friends.

Should it happen, however, that the individual ceases to be sovereign – should he become, however subtly, the instrument or vessel of those who supply him, the frame no longer serves. Even to accommodate the possibility that humans are better served by collective than by individual consumption requires the framework to be badly warped. Should the society no longer accord priority to economic goals – should it accord priority to aesthetic accomplishment or mere idleness – it would not serve. And no one quite knows the effect of such change. One can only be certain that, for a long time, economics, like the lesser social sciences, will be struggling with new scaffolding. And the work of economists will be far less precise, far less elegant, seemingly far less scientific than those who are fitting pieces into a structure the nature of which is known and approved and accepted. And if social priority lies elsewhere, it will be less prestigious.

The threat to economics is a serious one; it could become like sociology and partly a branch of political theory. And there are even more pointed aspects. Students are attracted to economics partly by the fascination of working with men of precise and well articulated mind like Professor Solow. But they must be assured, also, that their work is within a framework of sound social purpose. (There remains considerable attraction, though not sufficient attraction, in being a member of a small band of technical initiates. It is somewhat like being a member of a fraternity, a lodge or a chess club.) To enhance the well-being of the individual has, in the past, seemed a sound social purpose. To assist the individual in his subordination to General Motors will not be so regarded. The sanctity of economic purpose

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will also be questioned if well-being as conventionally measured continues to improve and leaves unsolved the problems associated with collective need — those of the cities and their ghettoes and the by-passed rural areas — or if this progress involves an unacceptable commitment to the technology of war. And the doubts so engendered will be especially acute if concentration on narrow economic priority appears to be a cause of other social shortcomings. The fate of the business schools is a warning of what happens when scholars lose their reputation for association with social purpose. The better students desert in droves and what is a scholar without a school?

I have been looking, however inadequately, at the frame. This, it is plain from the response, does not seem an unreasonable exercise to those outside the profession. Nor to those within who do not feel endangered — whose temperament allows them to watch and philosophically adjust. But it is a threat to those whose prestige and academic position is profoundly associated with the existing structure. It is perhaps not too surprising that it should inspire a counter-offensive. It is less agreeable that it should be compulsively negligent of the scientific mood which, given the old frame, could be so proudly avowed.

A Rejoinder

ROBERT M. SOLOW

I have always laughed at Professor Galbraith's jokes, even when they have been directed at me or my friends. So it is naturally a little disappointing that he should come on so solemn when I tease him a little.

There are one or two places where Professor Galbraith, and therefore possibly other readers, may have misunderstood me. I mentioned that the existence of very large corporations, and the separation of ownership from control within them, had been observed before now. My intention was not at all to hint that Professor Galbraith has tried to palm these off as brand new observations of his own. He has not. My purpose was to suggest to the reader that ideas so long in circulation must have evoked some response, one way or the other, from economists. I agreed that the response had not been wholly satisfactory from an analytical point of view, but I did not think Professor Galbraith had done it justice. The facts about the size and organization of industrial firms matter to the workaday economist mainly as they affect the substance of pricing, production, and in-

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vestment decisions. There is, in fact, a large body of empirical work on pricing, production and investment behavior in manufacturing industry. Much of it explains the data moderately well while staying loosely within the framework of supply-demand theory. The facts of large size and diffused stock-ownership do not seem to change that very much.

By the way, it was this range of material that I had in mind when I observed that Professor Galbraith seemed to have missed some of the relevant literature.

I wrote that the reduction of inequality and the alleviation of poverty play negligible roles in Galbraith's system of thought. Professor Galbraith interprets me to be accusing him of indifference to the plight of the poor. But the context of my remarks was a discussion of the low valuation Professor Galbraith puts on the growth of private consumption and real output generally. My point was not that Professor Galbraith is hard-hearted, but that it is difficult to accommodate drastic reduction of the extent of poverty in a system of thought based on the unimportance of increased real output, except perhaps by sharply redistributive taxation. But the mean income is not so high as all that, and anyway Professor Galbraith does not talk much about redistribution.

Professor Galbraith is wrong to ascribe to me a belief in wants that are "original with the individual" and in "the omnipotence of the market." As to the first, it is hardly a deep thought that nearly all consumer wants beyond the most elementary physiological ones are socially or culturally determined. Indeed, that is precisely why I fear the whole issue is rather tricky. It is a very fine line between analytical statements about the creation of wants by advertising and elaborate indications that one believes one's own tastes to be superior to those of the middle classes.

As to the second, it is only to Professor Galbraith that I seem to believe in the omnipotence of the market. To people who really believe in it, I suppose I seem like Professor Galbraith. I do believe that market forces operate over a large part of the modern economy, sometimes loosely, sometimes tightly. That does not mean that whatever the market turns up is good, or immune from tinkering on the part of the political authority. It does suggest that it will often be efficient to accomplish the social good by *using* the market.

Finally, Professor Galbraith suggests that I disbelieve his argument not because it is unconvincing or unhelpful, but because I have a personal interest to protect. His doctrine is so subversive of conventional economics that if it were to be widely accepted my sort of work would fall in the academic pecking order, my students would diminish in number and quality, and economics would take a tack uncongenial to my sort of mind. About my motives, he may of course be right. Who knows what evil lurks in the hearts of men, as Lamont Cranston used to say. As for the rest, he may equally be right. I shall try to roll gracefully with the punch, and if I can not, well, then *Après moi, la sociologie.*

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CURRENT READING

The Negro Small Businessman

The creation of a viable Negro community, everybody agrees, depends in some measure on the development of a network of effective Negro businesses within the black residential areas. What are the possibilities? In a paper prepared for the September, 1967 meeting of the American Sociological Society, Richard Conrad and Hyam Jaffe of the Drexel Institute of Technology present their findings of a study of Negro small businessmen in Philadelphia – businessmen who employ fewer than four persons.

The residentially-segregated Negro population in Philadelphia is heavily concentrated in two out of twenty Community Business Areas. Negro-owned enterprises make up less than 10 percent of all businesses, although one-fourth of Philadelphia is Negro. Negro businesses, of course, are located in predominantly Negro areas – but even within these areas, the majority of businesses are owned by whites.

A disproportionate number of Negro businesses follow the domestic tradition. Over 35 percent of all Negro enterprises are in the beauty and barber shop categories, as against eight percent of all white-owned firms employing four or fewer persons. Yet, even in such "quasi-monopoly" situations, these Negro businesses are marginal. Median revenues for 35 percent of all Negro firms are under $5,000 a year, which, allowing even for family labor, indicates that such units are not economically viable.

Interviews by the authors led to the conclusion that the average Philadelphia Negro small businessman had only a limited commitment to his business career. Thus, running a business is often considered a source only of a second income and, in consequence, stores are not regularly attended; 87 percent of those owners had no formal follow-up in their system of open accounts; an understanding of the simplest form of balance-sheet was absent among 40 percent of those interviewed.

The authors conclude: "The interview data show clearly that the Negro American who has gained an understanding of business requirements and is willing to master necessary skills, enters the American economic system by way of the American corporation rather than by way of a small business career."

sis, Boom, BAH

The U. S. government is expected to spend $2 billion or more to develop a commercial supersonic transport (SST) that will be safe, profitable, and available for airlines use around 1974. Replacing an 80-mile-per-hour railroad train with a 600-mile-per-hour aircraft cuts travel time between Chicago and Los Angeles from forty hours to four hours. But replacing the 600-mile-per-hour aircraft with a 2000-

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mile-per-hour aircraft reduces elapsed time only another two and a half hours. Is it worth it? And how do we know? In the May, 1967 number of the *American Economic Review,* Stephen Enke applies a cautious yet devastating cost-benefit analysis to find out.

On the side of costs, Mr. Enke points out that the government simply cannot recoup the investment. The airlines will not buy a supersonic craft unless it can earn as much on its investment cost as on the advanced subsonics of the 1970's (e.g., the Boeing 747). Practically, this means that flight costs and receipts must permit a return of about 20 percent before taxes and interest. But airlines, to do this, would have to fly with an improbable load factor of 70 percent of seats (as against the present, typical 55 percent) – and also levy a surcharge of 10-20 percent. So the government will have to provide a subsidy.

The market mechanism, in effect, is not capable of "producing" the supersonic transport – just as it has not say, spanned Lake Michigan with a bridge. True, the government in many other cases has provided such a subsidy when the social benefits are great enough. Who, then, will benefit from the SST?

Not the military. The technology of supersonic flight has already been worked out for military aircraft. The general public? It turns out, as Mr. Enke reports, that "about 85 percent of U. S. residents have never flown, those who do fly do not always take long-haul flights, and perhaps less than 5 percent of all Americans will ever fly SST's at their higher fares." Yet 100 million Americans may find themselves subjected daily to sonic booms if overland SST flights are permitted.

So who needs the noise?

The New Apocalypse

Beneath every revolutionary movement is a recurrent apocalyptic temper – the antinomian need to strike out and destroy the "repressions" which every society imposes on its members. For several decades the old apocalyptic temper, derived from Marx, lay burnt out. Out of these ashes, a new mood is gathering. Its prophets are Michel Foucault, Frantz Fanon, and Herbert Marcuse.

Foucault, a French philosopher, in a recent book *Madness and Civilization* preaches a new view of psychiatry. He sees madness not as a flight from reality, but as another, and even more "correct" view of reality– since madness directly confronts the violence in the society, and in our own psyches which we fear and suppress. Because of that, madness, which once was allowed to stalk openly in society (and remind us of ourselves), was "shut away" in asylums, out of sight. Now, however, the "repressed" feelings are breaking through.

Frantz Fanon, a Negro psychiatrist, in his book *The Wretched of the Earth,* argued that the working class in the West had been seduced by the bourgeois life and that the peasantry of the Third World – he saw Algeria as the model – would purge this illness by a cleansing violence.

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Marcuse, a German philosopher who taught for many years at Brandeis, argues in his book *One-Dimensional Man* that industrial society has become totalitarian, not by overt political terror, as in Nazi Germany, but by corrupting the individual, muffling his reason and debasing him by instilling in him the excessive desire for affluence. The quest for goods, for things, has become an end in itself and Western society has become a huge machine to gorge these false wants.

Each of these prophets has his disciples and interpreters. Foucault's view of the history of madness has been taken up by the British psychiatrists R. S. Laing and David Cooper who argue that schizophrenia, for example, can only be "treated" in new, familial, communal settings. Fanon's message of violence (endorsed by Sartre in the preface to his volume) finds its echo directly in the rage of a Stokely Carmichael. Marcuse's view of industrial society has been amplified by the sociologist Barrington Moore.

In London this summer, adherents of these converging points of view met in a congress at the Round House in London's Chalk Farm. Inevitably the participants divided between those who sought to espouse a new insurrectionary approach to politics (with Che Guevera as the model and hero) and those who sought a "personalist" and "existential" view based on the need for individual change. The Congress went completely unreported in the American press. But it is clear – such is the nature of the *Zeitgeist* – that with the hunger for a new ideology, fueled by an apocalyptic temper on the New Left, that these ideas will spread widely over the American campus in the next few years.

The Congress was reported, in detail, in the London *New Society* (August 3, 1967) by Roger Barnard who wrote sympathetically but critically of its proceedings. Some excerpts from Mr. Barnard's long and detailed report follow:

"The subject of the congress was "The dialectics of Liberation." It was organized by the Institute of Phenomenological Studies (founding members: Dr. Ronald Laing, Dr. David Cooper, Dr. Joseph Berke, Dr. Leon Redler), and the participants included Laing, Cooper, Jules Henry, Herbert Marcuse, Lucien Goldmann, Paul Sweezy, Gregory Bateson, Paul Goodman, John Gerassi, and Stokely Carmichael. . . .

"The Round House was packed to hear Dr. David Cooper open the fortnight with a short explanatory statement about their aims and objectives: to demystify human violence in all its forms, and social systems from which it emanates, and to explore new forms of action. However, this was not enough to satisfy Cooper, and he expanded a little more. "By concerting efforts in relation to the problems of poverty and war, it is hoped to achieve an effective transnational linkage of insight into human affairs that will assist and if necessary pressurise governmental policies in all nations." This seemed a curiously conservative goal for such a profoundly radical collection of thinkers, but presumably this irony was lost on Cooper . . .

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"On Tuesday morning, the lack of communication was compounded still further by Stokely Carmichael's apparent inability to have a direct face-to-face conversation with anyone who happened to disagree with him on the question of black-white relationships and the violence/counter-violence syndrome. Carmichael is a charismatic speaker. His interpretation of Black Power is exactly correct, his analysis of what has been done to the Negro and the coloured people of the Third World is radical and acute (though not very original, deriving largely from Che Guevara and Frantz Fanon), and every white man should listen to what he is saying and try to understand, if only for his own good.

"In the final analysis, however, I do not think that the man is authentic. Especially when he read from his prepared notes, he began to sound like a machine, and as he neared the end of his speech the mindless slogans ("we're gonna burn the system to the ground") seemed to take over and gain control, so that he slid into stupid demagoguery.

"From demagoguery he went into nearly incoherent rage as questions began to come up from the floor that challenged his fundamental assumptions. Despite his self-professed determination to talk, not about the individual, but about groups and organizations and mass resistance and the building up of "revolutionary black-consciousness," Carmichael is finally not a political man. He interprets the world, not just partially, but *totally* through his own wounded resentment at "the goddam white man." The result is frantic abstractions ("black guerrilla warfare throughout the West") and a fight for petty victories and spite, which are not political propositions, though they are good for the soul. On this evidence, at least, precisely the biggest trouble with Carmichael *is* his charisma, and the fact that he seems to *love* his charisma. It is the psychology of explosive apocalypse, of "burn, baby, burn," and it is frankly terrifying in its drift towards nihilism.

"My own feeling is that Carmichael is wishing, consciously or unconsciously, for catastrophe, and is actively working to bring it about. The longing for a blowup occurs in people who are so enmeshed in a frustrating system that they have no vitality apart from it: and their vitality in it is explosive rage. In my experience, very few American Negroes are so psychologically committed to the dominant social system that they need its total destruction and consequently lust for Armageddon. They have dreams of heaven but not of hellfire. A few exemplary burnings and lootings serve to mollify their natural desire for vengeance for the time being. Their intellectual leaders, however, who are verbally and willy-nilly psychologically enmeshed in the hated system, find it necessary to be more apocalyptic.

"In other words, contrary to his own claims, Carmichael takes his values and his definitions of violence ready-made from the dominant white society, precisely because he has no alternative values to offer. Just as he mislabels all the victims "black," so he mislabels all the executioners "white." He should know by now that the authority

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which pertains throughout man's society is not an authority of race but an institutionalized authority of property and arms. He should know, too, that the life-denying evil inheres in the *nature* of that authority and not in the colour of its functionaries or agents. If he wanted change he would speak change. Instead, he confines himself to a fantasy so absolute in its rejection that it amounts finally to little more than business as usual, the other side of the white liberal coin. That hectic rage, so resonant in its anger – partly real, partly manufactured – is not going to effect any really deep qualitative change. Still, there it is: people like myself, who have been pacifist and anti-state for years, have not got much to show him for our efforts.

"I have dealt with Carmichael at some length, not simply because he is important for the wrong reasons, but because he seemed to set the tone for the greater part of the proceedings at this congress. There was precious little dialogue after his tirade, and he contributed almost nothing towards the "demystification" of all forms of human violence, which was the ostensible purpose of the congress. If anything, violence was more mystifying and canonized than ever by the time he sat down. . . .

"Quite apart from the other conclusions that I draw later, I think it can be fairly stated that the congress failed in its own primary proclaimed purpose from the word go. Speaker after speaker merely posed the very arbitrary framework of violence/counterviolence – the polar opposites of aggressive and exploitative violence by the affluent West versus revolutionary violence by the deprived peoples of the Third World – and then opted unequivocally for "counter-violence," on the grounds that (1) it was necessary and (2) it was on a higher moral plane than "violence." I think that a strong case can be made out for saying that it *may* be both necessary and morally justified, though I would be loath to argue for these propositions myself: but obviously, this is by no means the same thing as "demystifying" all forms of human violence.

"In fact, by the end of the first week it had become quite clear that there was a major "ideological" split among the participants. On the one hand, we had a majority composed of militant political activists who seek to ally themselves with "historical forces," who wish to hook up the radical movements in the West with violent revolutionary colonial movements throughout the Third World, and whose understanding of the clear and distinct outlines of decaying capitalism is pretty solidly Marxist in its orientation. On the other hand, we had a small minority composed of the much more "existential" social psychologists and artists who are concerned with problems of consciousness, power corruption, excessive urbanization, alienating technology, ecological balance, the liberatory potentialities of art, knowledge, education, contemplation and in general with the perennial question of how people liberate themselves.

"I suppose that my own prejudices on this split are by now fairly clear. Certainly, the militant Marxists, whether revisionist or ortho-

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dox, perceive what the main problems are, but I doubt that they have much to say to us in our modern conditions, so far as the possibilities for reconstruction are concerned. They do not seem to pause for a moment to consider the dismal record of attempts to take control of institutions, and they somewhat conveniently forget that so many angry but earnest reformers in our time have been corrupted and done in by the demon of power, their visions twisted or discarded. This is not to say that institutional changes are irrelevant but that they are insufficient. At best, they constitute the necessary though not sufficient cause of the Good Life: at worst, they are a snare and a delusion. Frankly, I found it dismaying and profoundly disheartening to hear speakers like Gerassi and Mandel and Carmichael talking about or implying the necessity for organized terrorism, coordinated sabotage, and discriminatory violence throughout the affluent West, for they do not sound like normal grown men when they pontificate in this manner. They should come to their senses and realize that their proposals will get us nowhere except the mass grave. As for historical forces, I sometimes think that these are rationalizations invented by the oppressed to confirm their impotence, but no doubt that's unfair. . . ."

Build-up

The Hell's Angels is a group of motorcycle "outlaws" with a national reputation for having terrorized dozens of California communities. They received much attention after Labor Day 1964, when a half-dozen Hell's Angels allegedly raped two teen-age girls on the Monterrey beach. As it turned out later, the two girls had submitted to the gang-shag voluntarily at first, and four of the motorcyclists charged with the crime were later quietly released. But the newspaper publicity, plus the sight of dozens of these cyclists wearing winged death's-heads as symbols, shooting down the Californa highways, made the group an inviting political target. The Attorney-General of the State issued a lurid report, "the Lynch report," made up of gruesome acts of the Hell's Angels as alleged by various "eye-witnesses." And in March 1965 the *New York Times* ran a long and sensational story on the Hell's Angels, followed by further national publicity in *Time* and *Newsweek*.

Now the extraordinary thing, according to a report on the phenomenon in the book *Hell's Angels*, by Hunter S. Thompson, was this: "At the beginning of March 1965 the Hell's Angels were virtually nonexistent. The club's own head count listed roughly eighty-five members all in California. Routine police harrassment had made it impossible for the outlaws to even wear their colors in any city except Oakland. Membership in the San Francisco chapter had dwindled from a one-time high of seventy-five to a mere eleven. . ."

But as a result of the publicity, the Angels were flooded with membership applications! Charter applications came from as far as Indiana, Pennsylvania, New York, Michigan and even Quebec.

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Movie producers and television "talk shows" sought out the Hell's Angels. "A man from one of the TV networks . . . wanted to be on hand with a camera crew the next time the outlaws ripped up a town. But the deal fell through when the Angels offered, for a $100 fee per man, to terrorize any town the TV people selected."

As Thompson concludes: "The Hell's Angels as they exist today were virtually created by *Time, Newsweek* and the *New York Times.* . . . The *Times* took the Lynch report at face value and simply reprinted it in very condensed form. The headline said: CALIFORNIA TAKES STEPS TO CURB TERRORISM OF RUFFIANS. The bulk of the article was straight enough, but the lead was pure fiction: 'A hinterland tavern is invaded by a group of motorcycle hoodlums. They seize a female patron and rape her. Departing they brandish weapons and threaten bystanders with dire reprisals if they tell what they saw. Authorities have trouble finding a communicative witness, let alone arresting and prosecuting offenders.'"

Yet as Thompson checked it out, "This incident never occurred. It was created, as a sort of journalistic montage, by the correspondent who distilled the report." The report itself, as Thompson points out, took at face value various hysterical statements by persons who saw Hell's Angels swaggering in bars, and his own checking back indicated the degree of exaggeration of these statements. But the *Times* never checked the report. What it did was to introduce, for its own sake, the qualifier "alleged," a qualifier which allows one to print any statement without taking responsibility for its truth. As Thompson points out: "In fourteen short newspaper paragraphs, the *Times* story contained nine of these qualifiers. The two most critical had to do with the Hollywood lead and the 'alleged gang rape'. . . . Nowhere in the story was it either reported or implied that the Monterey charges had long since been dropped — *according to page one of the report being quoted.* The result was a piece of slothful, emotionally biased journalism, a bad hack job that wouldn't have raised an eyebrow or stirred a ripple had it appeared in most American newspapers . . . but the *Times* is a heavyweight even when it is wrong, and the effect of this article was to put the seal of respectability on a story that was, in fact, a hysterical, politically motivated account."

Micro-knowledge

Medieval theologians discoursed on the question of how many angels could dance on the head of a pin. They may have been wiser than they knew. In a recent paper on "Some Biological Considerations of Ethics," presented at M.I.T., Hudson Hoagland remarked:

"Francis Crick has estimated that the amount of information contained in the chromosomes of a single human fertilized egg is equivalent to about a thousand printed volumes of books, each as large as a volume of the Encyclopedia Britannica. This amount of coded instruction packed into the size of a millionth of a pinhead is the remarkable material which transmits information from parent to offspring to tell the next generation how to make a person."

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A Happening at Buffalo

From a circular to the editors, announcing a new magazine published at the State University of New York at Buffalo:

"Dear Sir:

"The current issue of CATALYST challenges the staid assumptions under which most social scientific thought proceeds. Our contributors demonstrate social scientists to be (a) unwary apologists for the *status quo,* (b) active ideologists for the Pentagon, and (c) victims of technological totalism. . . .

"DUSKY LEE SMITH, in 'Robert King Merton: From Middle Range to Middle Road,' demonstrates the ideological underpinnings of Merton's work on Influentials, Anomie, Manifest and Latent Functions, and the Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, and systematically exposes Merton's exclusion of historical and structural factors which leads to an emphasis on a non-existent Reality, a self-fulfilling Reality. SMITH proposes a new approach which rests on:

> *a refusal to accept Reality and its many ramifications — Reason . . . Logic . . . Scientific and Technological Neutrality . . . Empiricism . . . Concepts . . . Truth and . . . Facts.*"

The Credentials Society

Education, which once served as a means whereby the poor were able to lift themselves up from poverty, now is in danger of becoming a barrier to the next generation of the poor. So argues sociologist S. M. Miller in a paper given before the American Orthopsychiatric Association in March 1967.

"We have become," says Miller, "a credentials society where one's educational level is more important than what he can do. People cannot obtain jobs that they could well fill because they lack educational qualifications. Negroes who dropped out of the educational steeplechase before a high school diploma cannot get jobs. Employers and the better-off do not feel that there is discrimination; rather the low-educated are 'not qualified.' "

At one point, continues Miller, education was a means of democratizing society. Qualifications rather than nepotism or "pull" meant that the individual of talent had a fairer chance of getting ahead. But now the insistence on "credentials," says Miller, represents a false rationalism. In a society increasingly oriented to service, productivity and achievements are difficult to measure. Since one finds it hard to evaluate individual worth, one simply insists on the impersonal credential, the high-school diploma or the college degree, as the mark of competence. But actually this seeming "meritocracy" masks an irrational aspect:

"Industry seeks to employ the most qualified workers, yet Ivar Berg has discovered that at every occupational level the high-educated have a poorer record than the low-educated: more absenteeism, turnover, dissatisfaction, and probably lower productivity. Perhaps most striking in Professor Berg's study is that few companies

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even know the connections between the educational level of their employees and their performances."

Mr. Miller wants to "loosen up" the educational system:

"1. There should be a general downgrading of the importance of education as the major credential. Experience and performance should have greater importance then they now have. Individuals should be judged on what they can do rather than where and how long they have gone to school . . . civil service regulations should be changed so that low education is not an automatic barrier to many positions. Testing would be downgraded in favor of trying people in jobs and then assessing their performance.

"2. We need a *de-labelling* procedure which takes the curse off individuals who once ran afoul of conventional styles, whether the label is 'dropout,' 'delinquent,' or 'mental patient.'

"3. We need new channels of credentialing. Today if one does not get 12 or 16 or 18 years of continuous immersion without a break, one's chances of obtaining credentials are reduced. . . . Education and training will be increasingly a discontinuous process for the high-educated in American society, as they will need new kinds of education at various points in their careers. The same attitude should prevail towards those who have not successfully weathered the educational system to high school or college graduation or beyond. They should be in practice re-entering and benefiting from education and training at various points in their lives. . . .

"4. What is needed is the idea of a Second-Chance University which permits "dropout" adults to get further and more useful opportunities to get credentials. Experience should be given educational credit; courses should be more relevant to activities – liberal arts education need not be taught in traditional ways in order to reach traditional ends. . . .

"5. Every credential system should have an escape clause which permits the unusual person to be admitted to the realm of the elect. As professions "tighten" up their qualifications, there is usually a 'grandfather clause' which exempts oldtimers from meeting the new qualifications. A similar idea is involved here of exemptions from usual practices. At least 5 percent of each year's entrants into a profession or other highly credentialed occupation should be individuals who have "qualified" in non-usual ways – taking tests without the traditional educational prerequisites, getting credit for enriched experiences, etc. . . ."

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